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Abstract:
Drawing on original research, this paper explores the relationship between community identity
and informality in Bolivia and Brazil, answering the question “How does informality influence
and operate as identity in the social imaginary of urban Bolivia and Brazil?” Based on case
studies of informal settlements in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia and Niterói, Brazil, I argue
that informality is a tool of social control, community resistance, and identity consolidation.
Community identity is informed by the territorial stigmatization of place through national
conceptualizations of race and violence, and histories of marginality, resulting in resistance
identity and insurgent citizenships.
Keywords: community identity; informality; perception; territorial stigmatization; resistance
identity; insurgent citizenship

Gempler 1
Table of Contents
Introduction: Problematizing Informality as an Identity in Cities
Case Studies: Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio

5
8

Methodology

11

Definition of Terms

12

Chapter Outline

13

Chapter 1
On Informality, Citizenship, and Identity:
Constructing a Framework for Intersectional Informality

15

Introduction: Incorporating Informality and Identity

16

Constructing a Definition: The Complexities of Informality

17

Informality and Citizenship

23

Identity in Informality: Insurgent Citizenship, Resistance Identity, and Territorial Stigmatization

26

Towards Establishing Informality as a Tool, and Perception as a Unit of Analysis

29

Chapter 2
Constructing Identity:
Intersectional Informality in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio

31

Migration, Ethnicity, and Place of Origin: Racialized Resistance Identities

32

The Social Power of Violence: Stereotypes and Resistance Identities

46

Spatiality, Informality, and Control

51

Forging Identity: Narrative Resistance against Marginality

58

Chapter 3
Perceptions and Control
Building Public Perceptions

72
74

Spatially Informal: Perceptions of the Informal as Illegal, Unregulated, and Peripheral

74

Gente Humilde: External Perceptions of Poverty and Marginality

79

Territorial Stigmatization through the Media, Violence, and Race

80

Informality and the Law: Regularizing the Extralegal in Rio, Niterói, and Santa Cruz

91

Conclusions
Evaluating Informality as a Tool

103

Activating a Dichotomy: Reacting to the Narrative of Delegitimized Informality

104

Reflections on Informality

108

Bibliography

109

Appendix

128

Gempler 2
Acknowledgements
To my advisors and professors at Macalester College, Paul Dosh, Ernesto Capello, Eric
Carter, I-Chun Catherine Chang, Ernesto Ortiz Díaz, and Ron Barrett, and professor Sophia Beal
at the University of Minnesota, thank you for your continual support and encouragement. Special
thanks as well to Rachel Tan Wei Fen, Maru Meléndez, Nina Escrivá Fernández, Rachel Naasz,
Claire Looney, and Nicholas Bascuñan-Wiley – all incredible Macalester students who gave me
suggestions and supported me along the way.
In Santa Cruz de la Sierra, this research would not have been possible without the
assistance of Paula Peña Hasbún (Santa Cruz) and Ana Carola Traverso-Krejcarek (New York)
who assisted with the research process and facilitated research connections in Plan 3000 and
Santa Cruz, as well as with local and state libraries. Your help and continued support was
invaluable. Paola Viviana Blanco Rojas, an architect in Santa Cruz, generously provided me with
her thesis on urbanization and the urban imaginary in Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Plan 3000. I
am also grateful for the assistance of the librarians at the Sociology Department at the
Universidad Autónoma Gabriel René Moreno (UAGRM) and at the Biblioteca Departamental de
Santa Cruz for making the process of archival research much more bearable, and for finding
extremely useful gems where at times there was little information to be found. Thank you as well
to Gustavo Pedraza, for helping me to further direct my research and filling in the gaps.
In Plan 3000, I am especially indebted to Juan Pablo Sejas and the Centro Cultural San
Isidro for welcoming me into their organization, inviting me to experience their programming,
providing me with their original research conducted about their own community (Plan 3.000),
connecting me with academics and other useful resources, and sharing their wonderful
community space with me. This research would also not have been possible without the help of
the staff of La Calle, its director Daine and her siblings Cionny and Tito Álvarez Ortiz, who
coordinated interviews, acted as guides throughout the ciudadelas, and introduced me to the
wealth of information they had collected about their community. The work you do in invaluable.
In Rio de Janeiro and Niterói, I am grateful for the assistance of Erika Robb Larkins of
University of Oklahoma for helping me to think through the possibilities for research in Rio de
Janeiro, as well as for her incredible scholarship. Thank you also to the staff at the Biblioteca
Nacional do Brasil in Rio de Janeiro and of the Secretaria de Urbanismo e Mobilidade at the
Prefeitura Municipal de Niterói, especially Fernanda Mesa Vila, for giving me access to relevant
government reports and resources. I am especially grateful for the assistance and hospitality of
Luciano Ximenes Aragão of the Pontifícia Universidade Católica (PUC-Rio) and Alexandre
Rodrigues; thank you for taking the time to show me Rio and help me understand the processes
behind its formation, welcoming me into your home, and sharing your love of geography. Thank
you as well to professors Rogério Haesbaert and Márcio Piñón of the Faculdade de Geografia at
the Universidade Federal Fluminense and Marília Vieira de Araújo of Middlebury College
Abroad. In Morro do Palácio, I am grateful for the support and assistance of ‘Salgadinho’, the

Gempler 3
president of the Associações de Moradores do Morro do Ingá, and the staff of the MACquinho.
This research was funded by a Study Abroad Research Grant from the Rohatyn Center for
Global Affairs at Middlebury College.
All interviews included in this research are included with the permission of interviewees
to share their statements. All names included, except those of public figures in their
communities, are pseudonyms.

Gempler 4
Legend of Abbreviations

AEIS – Áreas de Especial Interesse Social
AMMI – Associação de Moradores do Morro do Ingá
BOPE – Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (Elite Special Forces)
CCSI – Centro Cultural San Isidro
CDU – Corporación Municipal de Desarrollo Urbano
COMPUR – Conselho Municipal de Políticas Urbanas
CPSC – Comité Cívico Pro Santa Cruz
IBGE – Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística
MAC – Museu de Arte Contemporânea
PDM – Plan de Desarrollo Municipal
PEMAS – Plano Estratégico Municipal para Assentamentos Informais Urbanos
PLOT – Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial
PMCMV – Programa Minha Casa, Minha Vida
UPP – Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Pacifying Police Unit)
UVs – Unidades Vecinales

Gempler 5

Introduction: Problematizing Informality as an Identity in Cities
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Urban identity – identity as a sense of belonging to a city – encounters ambiguity in cities
in which there is a visible divide between formal and informal space. Informal settlements (often
referred to as slums), as spaces in which the informal or the unregulated economy reigns and
urban development occurs independently of coordinated municipal efforts, have their own
realities that shape urban identity formation. In these communities, identity at the community
scale is intersectional, dynamic and, I argue, purposeful.
Governments and media often use the label informal to associate communities with
poverty, violence, or racial difference. These communities may be dubbed “subnormal”
agglomerations, unplanned sections, or poor. This rhetoric dominates dialogue around them and
dictates outsider perceptions. Such perceptions are then used to justify forced evictions and
planning policies that neglect infrastructure development in informal areas. Thus, because
informality is associated with the undesirable and precarious, it is imagined as a demeaning
identity rather than a flexible and pervasive condition.
On the other hand, the condition of informality is conducive to the development of
identities that permit communities to challenge negative rhetoric. The circumstances of their
existence involve an inherent marginalization, in part due to their dynamism and constant state of
evolution. Informal communities usually begin as conglomerations of settlers, and over time
consolidate as sections of the urban built environment. Their identity as a community thus also
evolves, crystallizing in relation to their surroundings. Community identities also contain a
narrative of self which residents project to those around them – yet external perceptions often
subvert the desired narrative. Informal community identities are therefore projects, narratives of
resistance that define an internal sense of self and assert a rhetoric that redefines its public image.
These identities foster the power of residents of informality against their marginalization by
society.
This paper explores the relationship between identity, urbanization, and informality in
Bolivia and Brazil. Specifically, it answers the question How does informality influence and
operate as identity in the social imaginary of urban Bolivia and Brazil? I analyze two cities:
Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In each, I focus on one informal
community – formed as a result of land occupation and in which significant characteristics of
informality persist: Plan 3000 in Bolivia and Morro do Palácio in Brazil. I argue that informality
constitutes a tool for narrative control used by multiple social actors in urban Bolivia and Brazil.
The condition of informality fosters the formation of resistance identities and project identities.
Further, community identity formation in the case studies is based on race and place of origin,
the spatial relationship between the community and the rest of the city, violence, and
marginality. In addition, I argue that informality is also used as a justification for rhetorical
control and policy-implemented marginalization by outside forces such as the government and
the media. Informality is thus a tool that benefits both the marginalized and institutions in power.
This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of the relationship of those who live in
informality to citizenship and identity on both the city and international scales. Considering the
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condition of informality as scalar (on local, national, and international scales) reveals the
experiences of those living in informality that transcend national and regional contexts, and the
ways in which informality is perceived and manipulated as an extension of socio-economic and
socio-spatial negotiations.
Problematizing informality and identity becomes significant when considered in relation
to the inherent scalar relationships of informality. Informal communities do not exist solely in
relation to the rest of the cities of which they are part, but also with the regions of influence of
their metropolitan centers, their national contexts, and the international scale through the
international flow of capital that binds all urban centers together. It is therefore useful to consider
informality as a global phenomenon. Just as a city becomes increasingly globalized in terms of
capital flow and metropolitan identity, so too do the informal communities within them.
Informal, or “slum”, identity – and the ways in which it is used and interpreted by multiple social
actors – also becomes interconnected across regions, states, and continents. This begs
examination of how citizenship relates to the informal-formal divide and the development of
identity. Saskia Sassen argues that cities are the site of economic globalization, and that the city
scale is becoming more relevant than the national scale in terms of international relationships.
Within this context of the internationalization of urban space, marginalized peoples find new
opportunities to participate and engage, given that their “political sense of self and identities are
not necessarily embedded in the ‘nation’ or the ‘national community’.”1 It is thus important to
recognize that local renegotiations of citizenship have international ramifications, and are
influenced by global relationships and the globalization of the economy.
There is little scholarly exploration that relates informality to identity development in
cities, let alone a comparison framed by a more holistic consideration of informality. I contribute
to the literature on informal communities in several arenas. I develop a definition of informality
that accounts for its pervasive nature and enables an investigation of intra-urban relationships.
Building on this definition, I then propose that the scholarly approach to informality needs to be
reframed in order to consider the power dynamics that control urban space. I argue that
conceiving of space as socially or legally ‘legitimized’ or ‘delegitimized’ rather than ‘formal’ or
‘informal’ more accurately captures these dynamics. I also address a gap in the literature by
joining the theories of insurgent citizenship, resistance identity, and territorial stigmatization to
understand how stigma contributes to identity and citizenship in informal communities. In
addition, this study is significant given that comparative studies of Bolivia and Brazil are not
common, despite their geographical, social, and regionally articulated similarities. Although
favelas and informal spaces in Brazil often appear in the literature, Morro do Palácio is not
widely studied, and comparable communities in Bolivia are largely absent from the scholarly
understanding of informality. I thus provide an understanding of communities new to the
scholarly eye, contribute to creating a more cohesive view of urbanization within South America,
and put previously ignored theories into conversation.
1

Sassen, Saskia. 1996. “Whose City Is It? Globalization and the Formation of New Claims.” Public Culture:
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Case Studies: Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio
The case studies are two informal settlements within large metropolitan areas in Bolivia
and Brazil. In Bolivia, I focus on Santa Cruz de la Sierra, a city of 1.5 million in the heart of
eastern Bolivia. This region, famous for its cattle, sugarcane, and natural gas production, drives
much of the Bolivian economy. While a significant portion of Bolivia remains rural (roughly 32
percent remained in rural areas in 2010)2 Santa Cruz de la Sierra is the main population center in
the eastern region. Its primacy makes it a destination for rural migrants, especially from western
Bolivia. The department of Santa Cruz had a 2010 population of nearly 2.7 million – thus the
majority of its population lives in the main city. Santa Cruz is also the department with the
highest percentage of people living in urban areas; 81% in 2012, compared to 67% in La Paz,
Bolivia’s most populous department (INE 2015).3 Residents of Santa Cruz de la Sierra are also
proud of their famed hospitality; it is the so-called ‘law of the cruceño.’
To understand the relationship between the informal and the formal city in Santa Cruz de
la Sierra, I narrow my case study focus to the community of Plan 3000. Plan 3000 has many
alternate names: the Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez, Plan Tres Mil, District 8, or simply “the Plan” –
all of which are used interchangeably by locals and residents. In this thesis I confine my
references to Plan 3000 or the Plan for the sake of simplicity. In this particular case, the term
‘community’ may be considered by some to be a stretch due to the size of the population.
Because of its informality, the population of Plan 3000 is difficult to ascertain. Some estimate
the district to be home to roughly 350,000 people.4 While this may seem to exclude
categorization of Plan 3000 from the realm of possibility, I argue that due to the circumstances of
its founding and the social dynamics and traditions that emerged from it, Plan 3000 is still
conceived of as a community both internally and by others in the city at large.
Plan 3000 was founded in March 1983 as an emergency settlement, after the Río Piraí on
the western side of Santa Cruz de la Sierra flooded and destroyed a section of the city. Notably,
the affected homes were owned by the poorest in the city – the reason why they lived in an area
prone to natural disasters to begin with. Hundreds (an estimated 3,000 families5) of damnificados
or ‘victims’ were displaced in the disaster, and after a short period of emergency housing in the
departmental university, were resettled on a parcel of land on the other extreme on the city, far
from the city center. Families were provided with tarps with which to construct emergency
2

The 2010 population was 10,030,501. Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). 2014. “Bolivia: Población Estimada
y Proyecta por Departamento, según Años Calendario, 2000 – 2025.”Estadísticas Demográficas.
http://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/introduccion-5/introduccion-2
3
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). 2015. “Características de la Población.” Censo de Población y Vivienda
2012: Bolivia. February.
4
La Calle, March 2013, 20.
According to census and other survey data, District 8 had 61,659 residents in 1992, and 148,704 in 2001. Regardless
of the accuracy of the widely cited estimate of 350,000, it is clear that the growth rate of the district in the past 20
years has been extremely high.
5
The number 3,000 is widely referenced. However, the legal magazine LEX listed the initial number of families as
50. (LEX: Revista Legal. March 2012. Ed. 61. “Plan 3.000: Por qué quiere ser município?”).
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housing. The new settlement was inaccessible by most vehicles due to poor roads; damnificados
had to walk 5 kilometers to reach the outskirts of Santa Cruz.
“We didn’t think about a house, but a shelter, more or less respectable. The idea was that
later, the Civil Defense or the City, would give us lots (of land), so we could build our houses.”6
The lots awarded to families were often of very poor quality, full of vegetation and potholes.
Abandoned by the state, the damnificados formed cooperatives to meet their basic needs, like
potable water, kitchens, and distribution of rations. A founding resident described the necessity
of self-organization amongst neighbors:
“In the end, we got tired and we organized ourselves into the Neighborhood Group of the Barrio
San Antonio. I was the first president. I remember that we didn’t have money and we asked
institutions for help to cover the needs of the neighborhood, and some of the officials labeled us
beggars and hobos. They discriminated against us on more than one occasion” (María Zabala
Cortéz Vda. de Chacón, Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez, 14).

Cooperatives for public goods such as water and electricity eventually succeeded in providing
basic infrastructure to most parts of the Plan. As people built their own homes, neighborhoods
consolidated, and few residents obtained land titles and therefore had little security or social
mobility. According to María Zabala Cortéz, many of the original damnificados eventually left
the community to escape the persistent extreme poverty in which they were placed.
“Over the years many people sold their lots because they could not endure the great necessities
that came with living in a place like this. At the start there wasn’t enough money, food,
transportation was horrible, there weren’t schools or basic services. Some didn’t last and they
went in search of better days in other neighborhoods in other zones. After many years, we are
seeing positive gains. We are missing a lot, but looking back, to when all this started, we are
better off” (María Zabala Cortéz Vda. de Chacón, Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez, 18).

As the damnificados struggled to meet their basic needs and some looked for buyers for
their lots, thousands of Bolivians migrated to the city from rural areas. The Plan’s population
ballooned and diversified. In 34 years, it grew from a poor settlement of roughly 3,000 families
to a bustling district of over 350,000 residents. Demographically, exact statistics for the
community are elusive. During my research in Plan 3000, the statistic that 80 percent of the
population of Plan 3000 are internal migrants was widely cited. This number also appears in
articles published in the local newspaper La Calle.7 Thus, much of the community’s growth is
due to internal migration, and therefore also involved cultural diversification among Bolivia’s
lowland and Andean cultures.

6

(María Zabala Cortéz Vda. de Chacón, 13). Proyecto “Quiénes Somos”. 2013. La Historia del Plan 3000:
Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez. Santa Cruz: El Deber.
7
La Calle. Number 174. March 2016. Pampa de la Isla, Villa Primero de Mayo y Plan 3.000. Santa Cruz de la
Sierra, Bolivia, 25.
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(See Macalester College hard copy)
Figure i. Map of District 8, or Plan 3000. Gobierno Municipal Autónomo de Santa Cruz de la Sierra

However much Plan 3000 has progressed in 34 years, significant poverty and social
stratification remain. In 2001, there were over 32,000 homes in the Plan, 11 percent of which did
not have electricity, and one percent of which had access to a sewage system.8 Informal
commerce, mainly in the form of large, unruly, unregulated markets, dominates the economy,
and many residents do not have legal titles for their self–constructed homes or lots of land, or
rent them from a family without a legal claim. To use an analytic term common in Bolivia, it is
one of the most “precarious” districts of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.
The Brazilian case is drastically different from Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Plan 3000.
The communities are of substantially different populations, have distinct relationships to the
cities of which they are a part, and are situated within distinct socioeconomic histories. These
differences increase the validity of observations about the similarities of aspects of life in
informal communities.
In Brazil, I examine Morro do Palácio, a community of 1,850 (in 2010) in the
municipality of Niterói, in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro. This location results in
several layers of spatial peripherality for residents, as by virtue of living in an informal
community they are peripheral to the city of Niterói, which in turn is considered a dormitory city
that supports the vibrancy of urban life in the center of Rio de Janeiro. Niterói developed as a
satellite city of the center of Rio de Janeiro. Founded in 1573, Niterói’s twentieth century growth
transformed it into a bustling population center by the 1960s. Along with the cities of Duque de
Caxias, Nilópolis, Nova Iguaçu, São João de Meriti, and São Gonçalo, Niterói and other satellite
city populations grew 368 percent between 1940 and 1960.9
(See Macalester College hard copy)
Figure ii. Map of Niterói, RJ. Prefeitura de Niterói, 2010

The community of Morro do Palácio has a vague history. The word morro in Portuguese
refers to a hill, namely the hills that make up the geography of the metropolitan region of Rio de
Janeiro. Historically, due to the difficulty of creating urban infrastructure on the steep slopes of
hills, the land value of morros was lower than the surrounding regular lands. This made morros
prime locations for unregulated land occupation. Morro do Palácio, or the Hill of the Palace, is
8

Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Urbano Regional (CEDURE). 2011. La Producción Social de la Vivienda en
Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Santa Cruz, Bolivia.
9
Fischer, Brodwyn. 2008. A Poverty of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio de Janeiro.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
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one such community founded through a process of occupation and continual settlement by the
city’s poor. Not much is known, or remembered, about how or why the first settlers came to the
morro, or why they chose that specific location. One resident of Morro do Palácio who has lived
on the hill for 38 years said that when he first arrived, much of the hill was undeveloped mud and
brush and that it was difficult to trek up and down the hill. He emphasized that when he arrived
there were fewer houses and more plants, indicating that in 1978 there were already homes on
the morro.10 From these comments and the knowledge that Niterói’s population boomed in
conjunction with the rapid growth of Rio de Janeiro, it is reasonable to assume that Morro do
Palácio has been minimally occupied since at least the 1950s.
This paper represents more contemporary experiences of residents of Morro do Palácio,
many of whom arrived in the 1980s and 1990s. Some who moved to the morro as adults or
adolescents were drawn to the cheap housing, and were economic migrants moving to Rio to find
work.11 Those who arrived in the 1990s and had lived in the community for less than 20 years
settled for similar reasons, but did not experience the same necessity of building their own home
as did earlier settlers. It is telling that little is known about the community’s roots. Only in recent
years have efforts emerged to recover this history, led by community centers and museums with
an interest in defining the present through knowledge of the past. Today, although to a lesser
extent, Morro do Palácio remains marginalized in terms of socioeconomic status and the racial
demographics of the majority of its residents.
~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~
Given the differences in population, location within the city, and ethnic makeup of Plan
3000 and Morro do Palácio, there may seem to be few grounds for comparison. In their current
states, the economic possibilities and built environments within each are markedly different,
resulting in differences in how people experience life in an informal community. However, it is
the extent of their commonalities despite these distinctions that strengthens my claim. Among the
most significant are their histories of struggle and bottom-up organization, the collective memory
of this history, the fact than Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio struggle with criminal violence, the
stigma involved in being a resident of each community, and the ways in which residents fight
back against this stigma.
Methodology
This study is based on research conducted in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio during
March-August of 2016. Interviews were conducted in Santa Cruz during March and April 2016,
and in Niterói during August 2016. All interviews were conducted by the researcher; no
interpreters were used. In Santa Cruz de la Sierra, I conducted semi-structured interviews of 25
informants within Plan 3000 (one of whom did not live in Plan 3000), and 24 interviews in the
10

Interview. Rafael. Morro do Palácio, Niterói, Brazil. August 5, 2016.
Many interviewees, or their parents, fell into this category. This group predominantly arrived in the community or
were born into it in the 1980s.
11
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central Plaza of Santa Cruz (4 informants lived in Plan 3000 or the other ciudadelas12). In
Niterói, I interviewed 15 informants who were residents of Morro do Palácio. I strove for a
balance of genders and ages when seeking informants. Interviews were acquired largely by
approaching informants in public, with the assistance of a guide in Plan 3000 and Morro do
Palácio, and on my own outside the community. The interviews focused on personal histories in
each community, perceptions of the community and the larger city, and relationships with city
residents who did not live in the community. I became familiar with organizations that are
representative of community interests and identity, such as the Centro Cultural San Isidro and the
MACquinho. These organizations became instrumental in finding additional informants as well
as community members actively working on identity construction or “rebranding” in both Plan
3000 and Morro do Palácio. I also conducted archival research and consulted with local scholars
and professionals on community history and on housing and formalization policy. In Santa Cruz,
I visited the Biblioteca Departamental de Santa Cruz, the History and Sociology libraries of the
Universidad Autónoma Gabriel René Moreno, the library at the Centro Cultural San Isidro, and
the archives of the newspaper La Calle. In Niterói and Rio de Janeiro, I visited the Geography
department of the Biblioteca Nacional do Brasil and the library of the office of Urbanismo e
Mobilidade of the Prefeitura de Niterói.
This investigation has several limitations. In Rio-Niterói, interviews of non-community
members to collect perceptions of Morro do Palácio were not conducted. This was a function of
the time spent in the research area, as well as the lack of a central location in which to find
interviewees within the city. In addition, the community lacked the local notoriety of Plan 3000.
To compensate for this lack of data, other scholarship on poverty and favelas in Brazil is used, in
addition to news reports and interviews conducted by local media. Another limitation results
from my positionality as a non-community member of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio.
Interviews in each community focused on perception, asking residents to comment on their
personal relationship with their community. I argue in this paper that community members
combat negative external perceptions of informality by emphasizing the positive aspects of
community life. It is therefore likely that as a foreigner and an outsider, the community rhetoric I
heard in interviews was more pointedly positive.
Definition of Terms
Informal communities exist in every country in Latin America. There are thus many
different names for informal communities in the Americas, as well as distinct definitions of such
communities. For example, Argentina uses villas miseria or barrios populares, and in Peru there
are Pueblos Jóvenes and barriadas. In this paper, I take informal community to mean an urban
community that lacks economic and real estate regulation. This may mean that the community
was formed through land occupation, and that current residents do not have land titles.
12

Ciudadela is the predominant label for large informal settlements in Santa Cruz de la Sierra.
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Within the case study locations, there are various ways to refer to these communities. Of
the multiple terms used to refer to informal communities and settlements in Bolivia, I rely on the
term ciudadela, which is common in Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Ciudadelas are highly populated
sections of cities characterized by a lack of regulation and poverty. A similar term used in a
specific instance in this paper is villa. In Brazil, two of the most common terms are favela and
comunidade. Favela is a well–known term for informal settlements that carries stigma related to
poverty, violence, and danger. For these reasons, some communities in Brazil prefer to identify
as comunidades – or communities. The merit of identifying as a favela then comes into question.
As is clear in the debate between the terms favela and comunidade, each name has a specific
context of development and context-dependent connotations. When referring to Morro do
Palácio in this paper, I use the terms ‘community’ or comunidade. In cases in which I use favela,
this is the designation that the community uses to refer to itself.
Chapter Outline
Chapter 1, “Theoretical Framework: On Informality, Citizenship, and Identity:
Constructing a Framework for Intersectional Informality”, examines the literature on informality,
alternative citizenships, and community identity construction in order to find the intersections
between these theoretical arenas, and proposes an intersectional definition of informality. The
overarching theoretical framework of the thesis is built from this cross section of scholarship. I
engage with the work of Manuel Castells to consider possibilities of social organization under
the condition of informality. James Holston’s concept of insurgent citizenship emerges as an
additional guiding framework for the analysis of community cohesion and power, framing the
‘performance’ (sociopolitical activation) of community identity as an institutionally delineated
category of civic identity. I expand upon this framework and consider citizenship as an
institutional identity that is complicated by the reality of informality, and liken insurgent
citizenship to Castells’ resistance identities in the context of territorial stigmatization.
Chapter 2, “Constructing Identity: Contextualizing Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio”,
defines the basis for community identity formation and contextualizes external perceptions of
each case study. The story of identity formation in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio is examined
in detail. In both cases, the common themes of race, marginalization, community violence, and
socio-spatial peripheralization are discussed. An application of the theoretical framework reveals
that these bases of identity formation are conducive to the development of resistance identities.
The chapter argues that community identity in the case studies is a consequence of national
conceptualizations of race and class as articulated through socioeconomic divisions in space
(territorial stigmatization), which in the context of informality, interact as resistance identities.
Chapter 3, “Perceptions and Control” explores the commonly-held perceptions of
outsiders about Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, identifying their intersections and roots. I argue
that these perceptions are present in media rhetoric and housing policy, and contribute to the
social control, or the construction of socially-imagined limitations, of each community. These
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social perceptions therefore control both the pervasive public rhetoric about each community
through their influence on the media, and have more serious ramifications, such as when they
influence policy and governance. Perception and territorial stigmatization is also used to justify
control of informality through mechanisms such as housing policy. I show that perceptions of
informality as a condition contribute to the use of the concept of informality as a tool of control –
the top-down and pervasive force that resistance identities act against, and thus also is a force
that activates identity.
“Conclusions: Informality as a Tool” presents conclusions about the use of informality as
a tool in Niterói-Rio de Janeiro and Santa Cruz de la Sierra. In addition, I analyze the
implications of case study identity for the understanding of urban informality, concluding that
urban space should be framed as ‘legitimized’ or ‘delegitimized’ in order to accurately conceive
of urban citizenship.
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Chapter 1
On Informality, Citizenship, and Identity:
Constructing a Framework for Intersectional Informality

“Where the shanties of migrants sprout next to the mansions, factories, and skyscrapers of
industrial-state capitalism, new kinds of citizens engage each other in struggles over the nature
of belonging to the national society.”
(Holston and Appadurai 1999, 10)
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Introduction: Incorporating Informality and Identity
South American urbanization is characterized by high levels of socioeconomic inequality
that are dramatically articulated in the spatial development of cities. This spatial inequality is
attributed in part to globalization and the increase in the interconnectedness of cities, which leads
to the dispersion and fragmentation of urban functions and the growth of urban sprawl.13 Cities
in Latin America are also characterized by “intense multiculturalism” representative of the
indigenous, African, and European populations that resulted from processes of colonialism, as
well as by intense post-WWII growth.14 The informal sections of cities (e.g., occupations,
squatter settlements, slums) have their own organizing logic and their own methods of design. In
many large Latin American cities the majority of urbanites live in these informal sectors.
Due to intersections between these informal settlements with racial and class differences,
the informal is typically associated with poverty, economic insecurity, a lack of public resources,
criminal activity, and socially determined racial tension. The size of the informal sector – both in
terms of the tertiary economy and physical urban space – has grown exponentially as increased
industrialization and employment opportunities attracted rural Latin Americans to the cities,
which were not prepared for a large influx of poor internal migrants. Today, such settlements and
the tertiary economy are common throughout the world, both in the global North and the global
South. However, the global South faces unique challenges related to the size of populations
living in informality and the integral nature of the tertiary economy to the ‘formal’ economy and
spatial organization of cities. Tertiary economies (e.g. street vendors) are often unregulated, and
supplement regulated economic interaction on a massive scale. These challenges have
compounded with globalization as urban markets become more connected to the international
flow of capital and less reliant on local or national economies, and the informal has grown more
integral in the urban global South. “The informal city, long treated as an aberration or an
exception to the standard of urbanism, is actually becoming the norm throughout the global
South, and it does so as an integral part of the global economy” (124-125).
Scholars argue that the increasing presence of informality in cities result from a “dual
city” phenomenon, in which the realities of urbanites are distinct based on their relationship to
the spatial production of legitimized capital, or in this case the false dichotomy of formality and
informality. Castells’ theory of the dual city holds that with the rise of the information economy
and concurrent globalization, cities become increasingly economically and spatially dualistic.
“The new dual city can also be seen as the urban expression of the process of increasing
differentiation of labor in two equally dynamic sectors within the growing economy: the
13
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information-based formal economy, and the down-graded labor-based informal economy. The
latter is a highly dynamic, growth-oriented, and often very profitable sector, whose reality is far
distant from the survival activities with which it has generally been associated” (Castells 1989,
225).15

Cities are thus conceived in terms of planned space (by urban planners, local government, etc.)
and unplanned or unregulated space, ‘real’ homes and the slums. In relation to the identity of
urbanites, this implies that the notion of urban identity is complicated by the reality of a physical,
economic, citizenship-rights, and at times cultural divide between the slums and the formal city.
After exploring traditional definitions of informality and offering a more intersectional
approach for its consideration, I propose that informality is a tool used by social actors in urban
space, both those in positions of power and the marginalized in the supposed “dual city”
dichotomy. Like the law, the designation or excuse of informality is used by governments and
those in power to marginalize others. This label and the reality of its associated condition is a
means through which marginalized communities can resist, acknowledge, and draw power from
the processes of their marginalization. This chapter lays the groundwork for an exploration of
informality as a social tool in urban settings and the role of urban identity in this negotiation of
legitimized power.
In addition to Castells’ dual city theory, I incorporate his scholarship on identity to
understand the consequences of the perceived urban divide on community identity formation.
Castells’ theory of resistance identities and their territoriality facilitates this investigation. To
relate the concept of identity to mechanisms of power and the legitimation of certain identities, I
incorporate James Holston’s theory of insurgent citizenship. I argue that informality engenders
alternative citizenships, and that these citizenships must also be considered in terms of resistance
identities. Citizenship is both a status and an identity, and alternative citizenships operate as
identities that emerge from the condition of informality. Informality thus creates the conditions
for certain kinds of identity formation. As informality elicits insurgent citizenships or resistance
identities, there also is a necessary counter reaction from social actors who have a stake in the
maintenance of the status quo.

Constructing a Definition: The Complexities of Informality
What do scholars and governments mean by ‘informality? Many definitions of
informality exist, ranging from a focus on economic differences, social class, and physical
infrastructure. I consider definitions that are specifically relevant to the slum context and allow
for the possibility of dynamism in these definitions, and for the existence of actors who develop
and cultivate their lived evolutions. This is viewing informality as a lived phenomenon. In this
15
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section I categorize the traditional approaches to defining informality, reviewing spatial,
economic, and social considerations as well as questions of legality. I then construct a more
cohesive definition of informality incorporating these classifications to highlight the necessity of
complicating these traditional definitions.
The informal sector can be broadly defined as “comprising all activities performed
beyond government regulation” (4).16 Such a definition is straightforward and easily applicable
to distinct contexts. However, it is perhaps too broad, as it does not acknowledge the ways in
which this ‘extra-governmental’ activity manifests. Informality has spatial, economic, and social
components, each of which contribute to context-specific definitions used by scholars. Each of
these components also relates to the concept of legality, which presents a false dichotomy that
classifies informality in terms of legitimacy and desirability, which has social and economic
repercussions for those living in informal communities.
In spatial terms, informal can mean peripheral, unplanned, or refer to the legal status of
land ownership. For example, historian Brodwyn Fischer describes informal cities
(“underprivileged and peripheral neighborhoods” in Latin America) as places with “illegal or
semilegal land–tenure arrangements, substandard construction, lack of formal urban planning, a
mostly poor and nonwhite population, and little or no access to public goods and services”
(12).17 She draws attention to the fact that by this definition, informal urban settlements have
existed in Latin America since the colonial era when poor and marginalized populations would
live in settlements outside the main city, which was reserved for people of European descent.
Scholars also conceive of informality in terms of how land value is determined by
capitalist development. Considered from the capitalist spatial development perspective,
informality is determined by variation in the economic control and production of space – spaces
that are regulated by the market and those that are not. The relationship between space and
capital, analyzed by Marx, dominates many considerations of urban informality. The focus on
the production of capital in urban space means that many analyses build on definitions of
informality framed around the flow of capital.
In Latin America, cities consist of formal, informal, and illegal sectors, which manifest
spatially.18 The formal, informal, and illegal economies interact to produce “a complex
configuration of the real economy” (122). Valenzuela-Aguilera and Monroy-Ortiz define
informality as “a dynamic and modern modality of daily reality – that although it exists “outside”
the formal market, or put another way is found in sectors of the population not “legally”
incorporated, but subsumed by the necessity of social reproduction – contributes to the
16
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development and consolidation of important areas of current capitalism.”19 In short, this
definition of informality refers to the condition of existing outside of a formal market, while
participating in an officially unrecognized sector of the economy that together with the formal
economy forms the true, interactive and dynamic economy that then manifests spatially in urban
development. The informal economy is “not reported, not registered” and involves the
“production and distribution of licit goods”, relying on networks and social connections “to
avoid fraud and abuses” (121). This is distinguished from the illegal economy, also integral to
economic development, which deals in illicit goods and requires criminal organizational force.
This economic consideration of informality is thus based on differences in the economic
production of space, but recognizes that formality is in reality influenced by informality.
Similarly, geographers and scholars of development tend to emphasize the importance of
a spatial approach to informal economy. For example, de Soto follows a capitalist-based theory
of development, taking into consideration the spatial dimensions of economic development by
focusing on property as the ‘unit’ of informality.20 He distinguishes between the formal and the
informal in terms of “legal” and “extralegal” – people that have legal rights to their property and
those that do not. De Soto argues that formal property rights allow citizens to transform their
assets (property) into capital. De Soto emphasizes the extralegality of communities in which the
informal dominates the formal, but recognizes that “they are held together by a social contract
that is upheld by a community as a whole and enforced by authorities the community has
selected” (28). Thus, De Soto’s informality emphasizes the importance of access to capital, but
takes into account the social ramifications of this lack of opportunity.
David Harvey also analyzes the effect of capital on spatial development, grounding his
theories in Marxist conceptualizations of space. He critiques conceiving of urbanization in terms
of the accumulation of capital, delving into the “right to the city” of all urban residents and
focusing on the formalization of informal settlements and the acquisition of property rights.
Harvey equates the informal with the illegal, restricting his analysis to the relationship between
land settlement, titling, and value. Importantly, Harvey highlights the danger of construing of
informality solely in terms of property rights. Referencing De Soto, Harvey acknowledges that
gentrification often follows formalization, in that “the concomitant effect [of formalization] is
often to destroy collective and non-profit-maximizing modes of social solidarity and mutual
support, while any aggregate effect will almost certainly be nullified in the absence of secure and
adequately remunerative employment”.21 This observation reveals a slightly broader definition of
informality – one that exposes the social systems of support that develop in tandem with the
conditions of poverty and living outside of a formal market.
The definitional paradigms represented by Valenzuela-Aguilera and Monroy-Ortiz, De
Soto, and Harvey suggest that informality means lack of regulation. Yet this masks nuances in
19
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urban planning policy and the organizing power possible in states of deregulation. Drawing on
the idea that informality corresponds to the processes of capitalism and interacts with both the
legal and the illegal, informality can be conceived of as an organizing logic, or a method through
which capitalist development organizes space. This is especially relevant in an increasingly
globalized world, in which urban areas are more and more connected with one another in
network fashion. AlSayyad (2004) defines urban informality as “an organizing logic, which
emerges under a paradigm of liberalization” (26).22 Liberalization has resulted in the
deregulation of markets and urban development regulation in an effort to support the flow of
capital (e.g. neoliberal free trade policies). According to AlSayyad, informality is then also an
organic form of regulation that works to counteract the negative organizational impact of
liberalization.
Informality as an organizing logic manifests on multiple scales. On the local scale, within
an informal settlement for example, the settlement is spatially organized according to the logic
that most responds to the needs or possibilities of the community and not according to the
designs of an urban plan. On a city scale, informality becomes synonymous to the concept of
legitimacy. There are many forms of urban informality, including those legitimized by the
government; for example, a government-funded commercial development built on improperly
zoned land is considered more legitimate than a poor urban community formed through land
invasion (Roy 2011). Thus, urban informality – whether technically legal, illegal, or ‘extralegal’
– may be considered either legitimate or illegitimate by institutions of power. Conceiving of
informality as a continuous part of urban space thus reframes the scale of legitimized urban
space within the city. The ‘informal’ is only ascribed negative connotations when it is
delegitimized. This assumption, that legitimation of informal space comes to define spatial
divides (‘legitimized’ and ‘delegitimized’) in the urban context, is the theoretical assumption
behind the idea of the “dual city”, and is a main operational assumption throughout this paper.
Informality is also operationalized on the regional or international scale. The
misconception that slums or informal spaces only exist in the ‘Third World’ is prevalent in much
of the scholarship. For example, Friedmann and Wolff (1982) consider ‘slum theory’, or slumfocused scholarship, as literature related to cities in the “semi-periphery” of the world city
system.23 However, informality does not neatly fit the tenets of world systems theory. As Roy
(2011) notes, informality exists throughout cities and has more to do with the legitimacy of the
use of space.24 One salient example of informality outside of the world “periphery” and “semi-
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periphery” is the existence of colonias in the United States.25 Colonias are informal settlements
located along both sides of the US-Mexico border. Authorities in Texas have historically
struggled with how to effectively integrate colonias into the formal land system in a manner that
addresses the lack of service provision and land titling issues, while Mexican officials have been
more successful with integrating colonias on their side of the border. Problematic informalities
are therefore not just a phenomenon of the “Third World”. This example complicates the
categories of the world systems theory, indicating that analyzing informality requires more
nuanced discussions and at smaller scales.
Given the complexity and nuances of the relationship between the formal and the
informal, how do scholars approach a more complete definition of informality? The discussion
above makes clear that informality is an organizing logic that determines and is influenced by
inherent differences in the production of capital, which then affects how people in informal
spaces live their lives. This implies that informality carries with it the possibility of inherent
social difference. However, informality is not a mindset or way of life. “The problem with the
notion of urban informality as a way of life is that it evokes Wirthian notions of an urban ecology
that somehow correlates with social organization and cultural mindsets” (5).26 Informality is thus
not a cultural trait, nor is it something more natural to a certain ethnicity or those who are
‘impoverished’. It is clear that definitions based in capitalist thought can erase the social realities
of living in informality. Writing on the architectural similarities between formal and informal
housing in Rio de Janeiro, Fernando Luiz Lara claims “the degree of informality is associated
either with the degree of social vulnerability or with the extent to which the resident population
is marginalised and ‘informalised in all dimensions of their lives, or both.”27 Even within
informal settlements, there are varying levels of informality in terms of the quality of the built
environment, income opportunity, and access to services.
Considering the social aspects of informality enables its use as a device that reveals the
relationships between class, legitimacy, and urban power. The definition of informality must
therefore combine the spatial, economic, and social realities of the condition. In this paper, I then
define informality as an organizing logic characterized by its relationship to the economic and
regulatory ‘gray space’28 between the legal and the illegal, which may be legitimated by the
government or society when convenient to the interests in power. As this paper then focuses on
informal settlements, spaces which are spatially, economically, and socially marginalized, the
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following examination deals with delegitimized (spaces that are not considered legal, regulated,
or formal) forms of informality.
Figure 1.1 outlines the common definitions of informality according to their economic,
spatial, or social biases. The definition of informality used in this paper combines key elements
from each definitional arena. Depicting the intersections of these arenas shows that common
considerations of informality only arrive at partial understandings of the concept, indicating that
scholars may find it useful to develop standardized ‘qualifiers’ for informality (much like has
been done by political scientists for ‘democracy’), and that the term ‘informality’ itself may be
insufficient to explain the influence of capital on uneven spatial development and the inherent
marginalizing power dynamics between urban residents in this development.
Figure 1.1: Definitions of Informality
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Informality and Citizenship
Delegitimized informality is characterized by social structures that facilitate growth in
informal areas. Lack of governmental oversight drives the emergence of more organic forms of
organization, and therefore it is important to investigate notions of citizenship in relation to
agency, community, and identity in informal spaces. Lefebvre (1968) presents the “right to the
city” as a human right, activated and demanded by the working class. As an abstract concept, the
right to the city affords the right of access and ownership of urban space to all urban residents.
This theory connects the spatial manifestations of capitalism to both the real and desired urban
experience.29 Considering the right to the city in relation to informal communities legitimizes
their existence from a theoretical perspective. Here, I conceive of the right to the city as a right of
urban citizenship that can be understood through performances of citizenship at the community
scale. To consider the role of ‘community’ in the performance of citizenship, in Chapters 2 and 3
I examine the existence and role of community organizations in each case study in responding to
and defining a community rhetoric of self. To frame this investigation, I draw on James
Holston’s concept of insurgent citizenship, connecting it to scholarship of intra-urban relational
citizenship.
The right to the city works as an assumption in much of the scholarship on urban
citizenship. Scholars, even those that conform to the dual city framing of space in terms of the
legal and the illegal, present an inherently community-based notion of the performance of
citizenship that accounts for the classification of citizenships in spaces of varying legality.30 For
example, Jorge Hardoy and David Satterthwaite (1989) explain subaltern urban citizenship,
classifying citizenship as part of a divide in cities between the “legal” and the “illegal”.31 There
is thus little nuance in their discussion of the legality of housing settlements and their
conceptualization of informality; the authors only use the term “informal” to refer to selfconstructed housing. Definitionally, this contrasts with the concept of informality as an
organizing logic as theorized by Appadurai and Roy, but reveals the common consideration of
informality as synonymous with illegality. The authors do however discuss the role people living
in informal, or “illegal” settlements play in developing the urban landscape. The builders of these
settlements are referred to as urban planners, who create their own spatial structure, communal
values and codes, and methods of accessing and providing public services the government fails
to provide (32).
29
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“It could be said that the unnamed millions who build, organize and plan illegally are the most
important organizers, builders and planners of Third World cities. But governments do not
recognize this, they do not see these people as city-builders; indeed, they usually refuse to
recognize that they are citizens with legitimate rights and needs for government services”
(Hardoy & Satterthwaite 1989, 15).

Thus, people forced to operate outside of the official governmental sphere of influence – the
formal city – participate in urban life in ways organic to their specific urban context.
James Holston (2008) considers this kind of organic and survivalistic participation a form
of citizenship.32 Holston theorizes the idea of subaltern agency within the postcolonial paradigm,
and specifically within the context of Brazil.33 Holston explores the institution of citizenship in
Brazil, positing that it at once legitimizes and marginalizes Brazilian citizens by legalizing social
difference (4). Holston distinguishes between two kinds of citizenship: a citizenship that is
simply the legal inclusion into the national body – an entrenched, government-defined
citizenship, and a citizenship that results from insurgence against this non-inclusive norm.34 He
asserts that the conditions of “residential illegality” lead to popular participation, the practice of
citizenship, and community mobilization to fight for inclusion in the formal city. Holston
specifies that the resistance mindset is not inherently part of these communities, but rather their
location places them within the paradigm of entrenched citizenship and thus both unsettles this
institution with their existence and perpetuates the attributes of traditional citizenship (by valuing
the attainment of citizenship markers such as property and regulation) (13). Holston specifies
that the urban peripheries in which this occurs most are constructed by residents, and therefore
that “their experience of the peripheries – particularly the hardships of illegal residence, house
building, and land conflict – became both the context and substance of a new urban citizenship”
(4). Therefore, the context of physical and social peripheralization and the condition of
informality engender a constant renegotiation between traditionally defined citizenship and more
organic, daily practices of insurgence, or insurgent citizenship. In tying its emergence to living
outside the formal sphere, Holston implicitly links insurgent citizenship to the condition of
informality. I assert that this relationship should be more explicit. The assertion that informality
leads to insurgent citizenships frames my approach to the case studies of Plan 3000 and Morro
do Palácio.
Holston (1999) also opens space for the consideration of citizenship as an identity.35
Holston discusses the distinction between defining citizenship based on the acceptance and
protection of differences (difference-specific) rather than holding marginalized and non32
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marginalized citizens to the same standard (difference neutral) (8). Difference-specific notions of
citizenship allow for the institutional protection of marginalized groups, facilitating their access
to services that may have previously been more accessible to others. This “rejects citizenship as a
homogenizing identity with the charge that homogenization reduces and impoverishes” (9).
Within cities, difference-specific definitions of citizenship become especially important in
relation to migrant communities. As poles of capital and centers of labor, cities experience high
levels of rural-urban migration that place groups of extreme socioeconomic and even cultural
difference in close proximity (10). Cities are thus the sites of articulation of national anxieties
regarding race and class, where the informal represents both the oppressed and their agency.
Thus, insurgent citizenships are manifestations of difference-specific inclusion, where
citizenship incorporates these differences.
The importance of defining citizenship as difference-specific rather than difference
neutral is evidenced by Caldeira’s consideration of urban segregation, in which she highlights
how citizenship is commonly conceived of as a single entity.36 “Cities of walls do not strengthen
citizenship but rather contribute to its corrosion” (136). In her estimation, urban citizenship
encompasses the methods of participation and rights of both the privileged and the marginalized;
this is a difference neutral position. Difference-specific definitions allow for an expansion of the
forms of action and existence than can be considered citizenship, and thus of those who are
considered citizens. Holston’s insurgent citizenships and Hardoy and Satterthwaite’s (1989)
described citizen engagement are examples of this.
The theory of insurgent citizenship is supported by the work of subaltern scholar Ananya
Roy (2011), who discusses the necessity of scholarship on subaltern urbanism, which takes into
account definitions of identity, community, and informality that apply in the informal slum
context. Roy’s subaltern urbanism identifies “economies of entrepreneurialism and political
agency” as the main themes that this approach to slums considers (227). Economies of
entrepreneurialism refers to economies in which participants take a more active role in creating
their own opportunities, and may be characterized by more small–scale business and a kind of
“ground up”, individualistic economy (e.g. street vendors and home businesses). Roy argues that
increased agency accompanies this kind of economy, which is what Holston considers as
insurgent citizenship. Thus, conceiving of urban slums as places in which self-organization and
agency are a way of life and means of survival merges traditional urban theory with the urban
experience of people living in informality.
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Identity in Informality: Insurgent Citizenship, Resistance Identity, and Territorial Stigmatization

If informality engenders forms of citizenship that function as identities, is informality
itself an identity? As previously explored, informality is not a mindset (Roy 2011). GC Spivak
(2005)37 goes further in her theorization of informality, maintaining that informality itself is not
an identity, especially not at the community level. I agree, but posit that it is most useful to
consider identity formation at the community level, especially when relating community
cohesion to avenues of collective agency. Spivak holds that informality is not an identity, where
informality or subalternity refers to a lack of opportunities for social mobility. Similar to many
postmodern scholars, she conceptualizes informality or subalternity as a device through which
agency can be built when applicable. In other words, the label of ‘informality’ can be activated
as a point around which organization becomes possible when necessary, but it is not an identity.
Considering subalternity as a condition outside of identity thus allows for the building of social
infrastructure, which then allows for agency in informal communities. Roy’s similar approach is
based on the claim that informality is an organizing logic that appears throughout urban space,
and is thus as much a part of the formal structure as the informal. This makes informality a
heuristic device that can be used to assess top-down urban planning and the reality the diversity
of urban economies. Roy’s informality is also not spatially bound as it is pervasive throughout
space, suggesting that identities cannot be spatially bound by the condition of informality.
Roy’s and Spivak’s approaches to informality and identity help separate the two
conditions. In particular, Roy’s suggestion that institutional designation of certain informalities
as less legitimate is helpful, as it reveals that perceptions are involved in the delegitimization of
certain informalities. However, the fact that these authors found it necessary to lay the theoretical
groundwork that separates informality from identity opens space for the consideration of the
operation or perception of informality as an identity. Absent from their theorizations is analysis
of the relationship between internal definitions of identity and socially perceived identity – or the
role of social institutions in general. Incorporating their claims, I argue that informality is not an
identity, but rather that it is often perceived as such, and may act as a condition that factors into
the formation of other identities (ethnic or political). This claim is relevant in both case studies,
where perceptions of informal communities – especially historical opinions – are racialized and
subjected to stereotypes of class. Thus, in addition, I resist their warnings that community-level
analysis is not the most relevant by considering that outside perceptions of identity are the most
relevant at the community scale.
Evaluating these claims requires an understanding of the mechanisms of identity
formation. Identity is a social construct, formed through a parallel process of identification and
differentiation; of internal and external factors.38 Bolivian sociologist Paula Peña Hasbún
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clarifies the mechanisms of these processes in her study of identity in Santa Cruz de la Sierra. In
terms of group identities, the internal construction of an identity is based on factors that promote
“self-identification”, such as symbols, cultural traditions, and a collective memory.39 Drawing on
Hobsbawm and Gadamer, Peña explains that traditions are the basis of cultural symbols that
represent the cultural values of the past, and thus become reference points for identity
construction (6). Collective memory regarding these symbols and commonalities works to
interpret the past in a manner that supports the maintenance of commonalities that are valid in
the present. Peña notes that “the selection criteria of historical facts and their very interpretation
vary from generation to generation”, but that the memory of a shared history forms a basis for
unity and a common identity (6).40 Therefore, different aspects of this common history become
more or less relevant given the context in which and identity is relevant. Peña states that
traditions and collective memory can manifest through “common institutions” that reinforce
feelings of belonging. It is then in “the relationship between people, institutions, and their
cultural practices that identity is constructed.”41 The process of differentiation then involves the
simultaneous process of defining the self through defining and opposing the “other”. Defining
the self – in this case the group – is a process of definition via exclusion, in which those to whom
the traditions, history, and traits of the group do not apply are considered as the other.
Peña’s framework helps situate the interaction between the kind of identity formation she
describes and external forces and perceptions that also affect community development. Bridging
this gap, Castells (1997) proposes a theory of identity in what he dubs the informational network
society. Castells proposes three variants of constructed identity in the globalized context:
legitimizing identity, resistance identity, and project identity. Legitimizing identity is introduced
and disseminated by dominant institutions (such as the state), resistance identity stems from
social actors who build identity through resisting a marginalizing “logic of domination”, and
project identity is the creation of a new identity that “redefines their [the marginalized] position
in society” in order to transform the social structure itself (8). These categories interact
extensively, as for example, a project identity is nearly always necessarily a resistance identity.
Of particular interest in relation to informality is the idea of resistance identity, or “the exclusion
of the excluders by the excluded” (9). This is in essence “the building of a defensive identity in
the terms of dominant institutions/ideologies, reversing the value judgment while reinforcing the
boundary.”42 Thus, members of informal settlements create an identity based on the fact of their
designated marginality, which both reclaims and reinforces this difference. According to
Castells, resistance identities also lead to mobilization around the idea of a cohesive community.
The process of resistance identity creation is thus a key element of identity formation in informal
areas.
39
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Castells’ idea of resistance identity is inherently related to Holston’s theory of insurgent
citizenship. The three categories of identity (legitimizing, resistance, and project) are in reality
distinct designations of citizenship. For example, a state-determined definition of citizenship can
be considered a difference-neutral legitimizing identity, as it is designed to be the only legitimate
consideration of a citizen. In turn, the insurgent citizenship inherent to informal communities is a
resistance identity. The act of determining an alternative narrative of what legitimate
participation as an urban citizen should look like – by existing in a peripheral, marginalized, but
economically central space – is an act of resistance. Because Holston conceives of citizenship as
an identity, insurgent citizenship can then be a resistance identity.43
Castells’ theory is also essential in considering the importance of the community scale for
identity creation and perception. Castells touches on the importance of purpose behind collective
identity creation. “Who constructs collective identity, and for what, largely determines the
symbolic content of this identity, and its meaning for those identifying with it or placing
themselves outside of it.”44 As the most visible unit of belonging for an informal community, the
community scale is the most relevant unit for defining a sense of place and symbolism that can
be projected to the outside world. In addition, the extent to which these identities are defined
from within the community is an indication of the robustness of community agency and
cohesiveness. Therefore, taking into account identity and its ‘quality’ is a method of accounting
for the nuances of community cohesion that Roy and Spivak stress.
The measure of community cohesiveness can also be discovered through an examination
of its territoriality as a territorial identity. Castells frames the development of resistance
identities, or the occurrence of insurgent kinds of citizenship, as a reaction against the processes
of globalization that have solidified the dual city dichotomy; the development of local identities
in the network or globalized society is an act of defense against the unknown (61). Castells posits
that territorial identity forms a sufficient base for community identity formation. In relation to
informality, territorial identity suggests that commonality is mainly formed amongst informal
communities as a result of the condition of social mobilization around common interests.
Following Castells’ theory, ethnic identities may also be activated as a point of connection, but
are unlikely to be as unifying as interest-based identities that reveal territorial commonalities –
especially in diverse communities. In addition, it is essential to recognize the danger of
conflating informality with ethnic identity, as it leads to a deterministic and belittling definition
of informality.45
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This paper posits that the concept of informality acts as a tool of social control, in part
because of the power of perception in determining social norms and influencing action. With
Peña, Castells, and Holston, I establish how territoriality and informality lead to the formation of
community identities in informal spaces. Loïc Wacquant’s (2008) theory of territorial
stigmatization serves as a further link between the development of these resistance identities at
the community scale and the influence of external perception within urban space. Territorial
stigmatization provides an explicit theoretical explanation for the repercussions of the stigma of
marginality and its repercussions. According to Wacquant, because poverty and marginality tend
to be concentrated, “a taint of place is thus superimposed on the already existing stigmata
traditionally associated with poverty and ethnic origin or postcolonial immigrant status, to which
it is closely linked but not reducible” (2008, 238). The people who live in these places thus take
on these negative perceptions associated with their place of residence.46 This stigma is based in
part on the racialization of marginality, and in turn of urban space (2016, 1079). Wacquant also
develops an “institutionalist conception of the ghetto as a concatenation of mechanisms of
ethnoracial control founded on the history and materialized in the geography of the city” (2008,
3). Thus, territorial stigmatization inherently connects the negative social imaginary and social
control of delegitimized informal spaces. It is important to note that Wacquant’s analysis focuses
on marginality rather than informality; I therefore expand the theoretical application of territorial
stigmatization.
Towards Establishing Informality as a Tool, and Perception as a Unit of Analysis
Building on Holston and Castells, I have established that informality engenders insurgent
citizenships, which must be considered in terms of resistance identities at the community scale.
This is based on the assumption that citizenship is an identity, and that insurgent citizenship
emerges as an organic alternative identity to the government-defined equivalent.
I have also discussed the relevance of perception in this process of self-determination and
community consolidation. Perception works in tandem with community identity, either
embracing a community’s self-determined narrative of self, or defining it contrary to such an
organic conceptualization in favor of broader social narratives of race, class, and the condition of
informality (territorial stigmatization). It is this relationship which then makes possible the use of
informality as a social tool.
It is precisely because informality is pervasive and exists in legitimized or delegitimized
forms that it is used as a social tool. On the part of those in power – who establish laws, reinforce
mainly structural (Fischer 2014, 34). Assigning marginality a cultural status limits the analysis of its development
and causes, and robs residents of poor communities of their agency.
46
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social norms, and create the official rules of ‘legitimization’ – the act of delegitimizing certain
informalities manifests as a method of control; territorial stigmatization controls social
possibility. Conversely, as Spivak (2005) theorizes, the label of informality (or is associated
status) can be used to generate power and commonality. It is a point around which community
identity emerges, and is therefore a foundation of community citizenship and agency.
The use of informality as a tool further relates to in-group and out-group differences in
perception of community identity. Perceptions of an informal community held by residents
reflect the internal narrative of community identity, as manifested in community agency. On the
other hand, perceptions of the community by non-residents are dependent on societal stereotypes
as well as the top-down, delegitimizing definition of informality disseminated throughout
society. Internal rhetoric and external perception of the identity of informal communities thus
become representative units of the relationship between the subaltern and society. In the
following chapters, I use the two case studies of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia and Rio de
Janeiro-Niterói, Brazil to suss out the relationship between resistance and acceptance as they
relate to informal community identity. Combining the perspectives of Castells, Holston, and
Wacquant, this paper clarifies a larger social model of the role of informality and stigma in intraurban identity formation and relationships.
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Chapter 2
Constructing Identity:
Intersectional Informality in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio

“[Cities’] identities, modes, forms, categories, and types recombine in the gray matter of the
streets. City narratives are, as a result, both evident and enigmatic. Knowing them is always
experimental.”
(Holston 1999, 155)
Spaces of Insurgent Citizenship
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Introduction
James Holston’s consideration of citizenship opened the dialectical possibility for
citizenship to be considered an identity, and offered a distinction between distinct forms of
citizenship identities. Chapter 1 asserted that these resistance identities constitute forms of
insurgent citizenship, and vice versa. Through an examination of the case studies of Morro do
Palácio and Plan 3000, this chapter addresses this claim.
In this chapter, I combine Peña’s categories of community identity formation (common
institutions, cultural traditions, collective memory) with Castell’s theory of resistance identity to
analyze the cases of Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Rio de Janeiro-Niterói. Interviews conducted in
informal settlements in these cities reveal that the traditions, collective memory, and common
institutions that inform identity are influenced by four main dialoguing social categories and
processes: race and place of origin, spatiality, violence, and marginality. In both the Bolivian and
Brazilian case, in order to resist a dominant narrative of community identity, residents challenge
their marginalized status while simultaneously reinforcing their identity difference. This is
accomplished through internal community dialogue and the emergence of community
organizations that help to define and reinforce a contrasting image of the community as ‘self’.47
In the process, as they establish that they are not as they are perceived, they reinforce their
difference from the rhetorical norm, or what Castells refers to as the “legitimizing identity” (8).
The role of community organizations in redefining community identity – and therefore the
possibilities for citizenship – in each informal settlement works to support my claim that
informality itself can act as a social tool around which organization and identification is possible.

Migration, Ethnicity, and Place of Origin: Racialized Resistance Identities
Race and ethnicity are obvious and outwardly apparent characteristics that influence how
people are perceived and treated in society. In Bolivia and Brazil, racial and ethnic differences
are geographically segregated, both within cities and regionally. Each country also has a long
history of internal migration from poorer, rural areas to urban centers that offer more
opportunities for employment. This leads to the conflation of internal migrants with class and
racial difference from the urban norm. Additionally, in both countries, internal migrants often
settle in urban informal settlements upon arriving in the city. For migrants, memories and
conceptualizations of their place of origin may become more salient once in another context.
These memories, as well as their experience of difference in the city, then inform how and the
extent to which internal migrants identify with their urban communities.
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Here, I detail the historical and geographical determinants of identity in Santa Cruz de la
Sierra and Rio de Janeiro, and explore how these identities are articulated and interact within
Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio. I argue that national and regional constructions of race affect
local racial identities and ideas of class, which merge with place-based identities, resulting in the
racialization and stigmatization of sites dominated by informality.
Bolivia: The Construction and Political Articulation of Ethnic and Racial Identity
Historical Context of Race
Bolivia has long been split by east-west regionalisms that date back to the era of
colonization. Within these regional distinctions are three at times nebulous identities – cruceño,
camba, and colla – which are constantly renegotiated at different scales and in the places in
which they converge. As an informal section of Santa Cruz de la Sierra and a site of cultural
diversity, Plan 3000 forces residents to confront these identity markers.
Cruceño, meaning “of Santa Cruz”, is an inherently place-based identity. According to
Peña in her study in identity in Santa Cruz, “‘the cruceño’ is the sum of historical characteristics
of the cruceño community that have developed throughout its history” (Peña 2009, 17).48 The
history of the cruceño identity is rooted in racial mixing and elite projects of power. Kirshner
(2009) identifies the main ethnic cleavage in Bolivia as the divide between the “poor indigenous
majority”, the “elite criollo minority”, and the mestizo class (8).49 This racial divide has its
history in the colonization of Bolivia, during which the white Spaniards who controlled the area
mixed with native lowland groups (8-9).50 The geographically determined isolation of the region
led to survival-based economic activity (36, 41). This survival and self-sufficiency mentality
became a trait of the colonial cruceño identity (44). The city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra remained
underdeveloped well into the first half of the twentieth century, only gaining a telephone line,
potable water, and electricity for the first time between 1910 and 1930 (92).
Isolation resulted in progressive whitening through miscegenation, which led to the
popular misconception of the cruceño population as a “white” and unmixed group. Over time,
the entire Eastern region of Bolivia took on a similar identity, that of the Oriente (45). This
shared regional history thus upholds of a regional identity based in the collective memory of this
history and the similar social structures that resulted from it.
Cruceño identity is based on a history of isolation and cultural confrontation. Before the
1950s, the Bolivian east was characterized by a lack of development and government
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resources.51 The years of neglect in the first half of the century led to strong regional cohesion in
the ‘abandoned’ east. There thus existed and still persists a strong attachment to the idea of
regional autonomy in the east, as well as a distrust of the central government. After the
revolution and land reforms of 1952, internal migration and government-sponsored colonization
projects in the east increased rapidly. The next wave of migration in the 1980s, caused by a
draught in the west, contributed to sustained regionalism, and neoliberal economic and land
reforms increased the economic production of Santa Cruz, making the department and city even
more attractive as a pole for internal migration.52 These massive migrations led to feelings of
resentment among many cruceños about their lack of control over regional development (46).
This helps explain current regional political and identity divisions in Bolivia, which are based in
geographical difference in addition to questions of race and class.
“It seems noteworthy that the contention emerged from Santa Cruz rather than La Paz. It is a
cruceño perspective that reflects local circumstances. In La Paz, both elites and popular groups
have long pursued political projects of national scope and aspirations. These same groups have
been highly “territorialized” in Santa Cruz, their vision of development largely limited to the
space of the region (see Soruco 2008: 7-8).” (Kirshner 2009, 48).

Confronted with more of a cultural clash, eastern cultural and business sector
organizations began to fortify the cruceño identity and turn it into a regionally unifying symbol.53
Isolationist sentiments and the growing articulation of local power in the Oriente manifested in
the founding of the Comité Cívico pro Santa Cruz (CCPSC) in 1950, which worked to define the
cruceño as part of its civic agenda to actively combat the influence of the cultural differences of
internal migrants.54 The CCPSC became a bastion of cruceño culture, valuing traditions based in
the cultural mixing between Spaniards and lowland indigenous groups and idealizing rural life.55
The CCPSC continues to promote the culture and civic engagement of Santa Cruz. In the 1980s,
therefore, the Comité was essential to forging connections between eastern departments and
strengthening the idea of regionalism as legitimate.56
Eastern Bolivian regionalism intensified and radicalized around 2003 during the
beginning of the Gas Wars, when politicians in Santa Cruz fought for regional control using the
cruceño identity as a point of reference to legitimize their regional struggle (19). Cruceño
regionalism was thus revealed to be an elite construct, for which regional difference was useful
politically. Evidence of this can be found in the debate over regional economic control. Cruceño
51
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organizations that promote regional identity such as the CCPSC are made up of mostly businessclass cruceños who have a vested economic interest in the success of the region. Anti-centralism
in the east is supported by the fact that Santa Cruz developed many of its industries in a
politically and economically liberal manner. This conflicts with the economic policies of
president Evo Morales, turning a policy difference into a regional difference in governance. To
this day, the tension between state control and regional autonomy in the economic arena is
apparent. The involvement of the government in cruceño economic policy is seen as a threat and
a failure of responsive governance.57 Beyond the economic basis for regional tension, conflict
with the central government is exacerbated by the fact that Morales and his party draw support
from his identity as a western indigenous person, interpreted in the east as a threat to the eastern
way of life.
In addition, one must note that although regional tensions existed many years prior to
Morales’ administration, they have intensified since his arrival on the political scene. The
following quote effectively summarizes the intersection between ethnicity, regionalism, and
politics during the Morales administration, and Table 1 below presents a timeline of the
development of eastern regional identity:
“Ethnic considerations have suffused other conflictual issues, such as the country’s long–standing
regional tensions, which in places like Santa Cruz is expressed in the desire for greater autonomy
and has contained some racist connotations. In response, the MAS and its supporters have
criticized the opposition as simply seeking to perpetuate a status quo from a bygone era that seeks
to sustain white superiority” (Crabtree and Whitehead 2008: 9).

Pre–1950s
Isolated east,
limited
development,
reliance on
regionalism

Table 1. Timeline of Regionalism in the Bolivian East
1950s–1980s
1980s
2003
Heavy west–to–
Incorporation of
Gas Wars,
east migration,
east into national
intensification
cultural clash,
scheme,
and
eastern orgs. key
resistance to new
radicalization of
to promoting
outside control
regionalism
regionalism

Present
Regional identity
informed by
historical
memory of
regional
development

Contemporary Racial and Ethnic Identity in Santa Cruz and Plan 3000
Today, Santa Cruz de la Sierra is more racially diverse and nearly 20 percent of the city’s
residents are internal migrants. In the department of Santa Cruz in 2012, 19 percent identified as
internal migrants – the most of any department – and 44 percent of all international immigrants
57
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in the country lived in the department.58 In Plan 3000 itself, international immigrants from Peru
and Colombia are associated with the drug trade and criminal activity. The community is also
home to a growing Chinese population.59
However, identity in Santa Cruz de la Sierra is still most differentiated in terms of the
country’s three main identity markers: cruceño, camba, and colla. While cruceño is more
inherently place-based in addition to a politically activated tool of regionalism, camba is more
dynamic. The term camba as defined by Peña is a “name with which the general inhabitant of the
Oriente (East of Bolivia) is designated” (129). However, Peña and others point out the camba has
evolved since its colonial inception. Camba, derived from a Guaraní word, is considered to be
more of a “cultural” identity with feudal or antiquated connotations.60 According to Peña, camba
historically referred to the indigenous Guarani, and thus became racialized and associated with
poverty (2009, 131). Peña’s 2001 survey of identity in Santa Cruz characterizes the camba
according to three main uses: a reference to people born in eastern Bolivia, a gentilicio, or as a
pejorative. To Peña’s informants, being camba most often meant being cruceño and from eastern
Bolivia, or a “feeling” (132). However, a different ethnography classifies the camba as consisting
of a “double cultural code” in which more traditional views of the camba – as associated with
honor, machismo, and the rural life – contrast and coexist with values of democracy, social
mobility, and the ‘modern’, creating a unique juxtaposition between past and present in
conceiving of the self.61
In this paper, interview subjects classify camba as a rural identity, tied to eastern
indigenous ways of life, poverty, and simple living. Some of those interviewed expressed offense
or disgust at being asked if they identified as camba. Thus, the dialectic between camba and
cruceño is deepened through the evolution of economic and subsequent cultural change. As Peña
concludes, “‘being camba’ is related to the culture and being cruceño refers to the desire to be
so,” where all cambas are cruceño, but not all cruceños are cambas (2009, 133; 151).
The camba and the cruceño are placed into opposition with the colla. The term colla
historically refers to the “mestizo del Alto Perú” (8). Today the term is applied to people from
the western highlands, often in a derogatory manner. In general, colla refers to indigenous people
from the Andes who have darker skin tones than the “mestizo” or “white” people of the Bolivian
east.62 The term also has a pejorative connotation. Although the term originates from Quechua in
reference to the Incas, colla has been used in Eastern Bolivia to ‘otherize’ and discriminate
against internal migrants. However, a large percentage of Bolivians identify with one of the
country’s many indigenous groups. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, as is its full name,
58
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recognizes the legitimacy of all languages used by the indigenous peoples of the country, and the
Constitution of 2009 includes a list of 37 official languages.63 This linguistic diversity is an
additional difference between highland and lowland Bolivians. The cruceño or camba is
associated with the Spanish language, heavily influenced with slang and terms from Guaraní and
other lowland indigenous languages, while the colla can speak Quechua or Aymara, both
highland indigenous languages.
Such official recognition of ethnic difference and importance is a relatively new
development in Bolivia. As previously mentioned, with the election of Bolivia’s first indigenous
president Evo Morales in 2005, indigenous rights came to the forefront of the national dialogue.
Within the cultural context of Santa Cruz, “highland migrants must position themselves in
relation to at least two overlapping sovereignties, that of the Bolivian nation and that of cruceño
autonomous territorial claims.”64 This view opens the door to an exploration of citizenship rights
in terms of the negotiation of identity in Santa Cruz.

Plan 3.000: Los “Damnificados” and Migrants in Search of “Mejores Días”
Whether cruceño, camba, or colla, identity in Santa Cruz de la Sierra is informed by
collective cultural memories and differences in history, language, and culture. Plan 3000 is a hub
for internal migrants in a majority cruceño city. In the context of interactions between the city of
Santa Cruz de la Sierra and the Plan, institutional practices and traditions bolster the maintenance
of the cruceño, camba, and colla identities, and facilitate their political activation. Interviews
with residents of both greater Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Plan 3000 reveal the interactions,
popular associations, and flexibility of these three identity labels.
Many Plan residents can be conceived of as colla. It is estimated that 80 percent of
residents of Plan 3000 are internal migrants.65 While this figure is difficult to confirm, the
research conducted for this paper reinforces that Santa Cruz de la Sierra is a diverse city. Of the
50 people interviewed in the city, 23 were themselves internal migrants, and 14 were the children
or grandchildren of internal migrants, meaning that 74 percent of interviewees had connections
to other parts of the country. In addition, some of the original founders of Plan 3000 in 1983
were internal migrants. Two interviewees from Plan 3000 who had family members who were
original settlers (damnificados) identified as colla or as from the West. Even though the term
colla has a history of discriminatory use in Santa Cruz, many western Bolivians still self-identify
as colla. The colla identity places these residents in opposition to the city of Santa Cruz, a
traditionally camba and cruceño space. The community is then imagined as a racially distinct
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space, or a colla stronghold. Given the politics of the city of Santa Cruz, this geographical
concentration of identity then becomes politically significant.
Regardless of the perception of Plan 3000 and the other ciudadelas in Santa Cruz, the
self-identification of residents is diverse. 28 of the 50 people interviewed in Santa Cruz de la
Sierra lived in the ciudadelas, 4 of whom lived in ciudadelas other than Plan 3000. Of these 28
ciudadela residents, only 3 identified as being primarily from their ciudadelas (from Plan 3000,
Villa Primero de Mayo, or Pampa de la Isla), 4 identified as a mix between colla and cruceño, 3
identified as colla, and the rest as cruceño or camba. 14 of the 50 total people interviewed were
born in the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and an additional 3 were born in the ciudadelas. The
rest were migrants from either the outer rural provinces of the department of Santa Cruz, western
Bolivians from La Paz, Chuquisaca, Potosí, Oruro, or Chuquisaca, and a few from the rural
Amazonian department of Beni. Of those born in the city, most self identified as cruceño even if
their parents were western Bolivian migrants, although several identified as colla for precisely
this reason. Perhaps because of the number of migrants interviewed, differences in nuances of
self-identification were not significant between those who were interviewed in the center of
Santa Cruz and those who were in Plan 3000, other than those interviewed in the center were
more likely to identify as cruceño or camba and those in Plan 3000 were more likely to identify
as colla. However, given the number of deviations from this rule, the following analysis takes
into account the identities of people who live in the ciudadelas as well as those who do not.
For those born in Santa Cruz, cruceño may be both place- and ethnicity-based. Alejandro,
18, had lived in the Plan for 3 years after moving from an outer suburb (Warnes), and identified
as cruceño “because I don’t have relatives that live on the other side.”66 For migrants, cruceño is
a place-based identity that is easily acquired over time as a result of living in the city of Santa
Cruz. For example, Rolando, an older man from a small community in Potosí who has lived in
Santa Cruz de la Sierra since 1977, identifies a cruceño and as a migrant, but not as colla.67 He
married a woman from La Paz, but said his daughters who grew up in the city also identify as
cruceña. Another man who came to the city from an outer province of the department and had
lived there for three years said “Everyone who migrates to Santa Cruz considers themselves to be
cruceño.”68 However, for others of western Bolivian descent, their ethnic heritage can undermine
the place-based application of cruceño identity. One young woman from Santa Cruz de la Sierra
identified as cruceña, but not ‘too’ cruceña because her grandparents had migrated to the city
from Cochabamba.69 The cruceño identity therefore has both place-based and racial significance.
The ambiguity and fluidity of the cruceño identity emerged from other interviews as well,
especially as it interacts with the label of colla. Laura, another interviewee who lived in Pampa
de la Isla and has lived in Santa Cruz her entire life – a fact that would indicate her identification
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as cruceña – identifies with colla more strongly because of her “colla blood”; her parents
migrated from Sucre, Chuquisaca to find work.70 Laura also indicated that she preferred the
culture of western Bolivia. Still others had no difficulty in identifying both as cruceño and with
their western roots. For example, one woman said she was cruceña, potosina, and colla, while
another identified as both cruceña and paceña.71 Both of these women have lived in Plan 3000
since they were 15-16 and 20 respectively, indicating that there is a relationship between young
adulthood and the retention of multiple place-based identities.
Although many highland interviewees who identified as indigenous indicated that they
still experience occasional discrimination, they noted that the frequency of such experiences had
significantly declined during the presidency of Evo Morales. Informants pointed to the Law
Against Racism and All Forms of Discrimination, enacted in 2010, which prohibits
discrimination of any kind and puts in place mechanisms and procedures to deal with acts of
racism.72 Thus, representation of diverse racial interests in government has led to a real reduction
in discriminatory acts in Plan 3000. To a certain extent, this means that regionalized place-based
identities have become less important in Plan 3000.
As opposed to cruceño or colla, camba was a loaded term for many interviewees, and
emerged as having distinct meanings. Some felt that it meant something close to ‘peasant’ and
carried a negative connotation, while others simply associated it with being from the rural areas
within the department of Santa Cruz. Those in the latter group were more likely to identify as
camba and to have come from the provinces of Santa Cruz department. Some interviewees who
had grown up in the city also believed that camba was nearly synonymous to cruceño.73 For
some with family who had migrated from the West but had grown up in Santa Cruz, camba is
more associated with the eastern accent and traditions than a racial difference. For example,
Luis, who lives in Plan 3000 and whose mother migrated from Cochabamba, identifies as
“camba-colla”.74 For him, both camba and colla refer to accent differences and cultural customs,
and he feels a connection to both.
Race and ethnicity are politically significant in Santa Cruz de la Sierra due to their
politicization on the national scale. Politics have been further divided along ethnic lines in
Bolivia since the rise of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and the election of president Evo
Morales in 2005. Morales, an indigenous coca grower from the western department of Oruro, ran
on a platform of multiculturalism, social reform, and the political institutionalization of both.
Collas have been largely more supportive of the national government, whereas cambas and
cruceños (who are not internal migrants) are more likely to support local or departmental parties,
including the separatist movement to grant for cruceño autonomy. The role of Plan 3000 as a
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center for internal migrants has placed it in contrast or at times in direct political opposition to
the rest of the city. In the 2014 national elections, for example, Evo Morales’ party (MAS) won
an additional seat in the Santa Cruz parliament due to widespread support from Plan 3000.75 In
Santa Cruz, Plan 3000 stands as a bastion of opposition identity politics.
However, within Plan 3000, ethnic difference does not seem to be a point of tension.
Both self-identified collas and cambas, many of whom also identify as cruceño, live in the
community. Over time and with the influx of migrants, there have also developed different
barrios analogous to ethnic enclaves, differentiated by the place of origin of internal migrants.
Some neighborhoods are home to predominantly migrants from Cochabamba, where many
residents speak Quechua, while others are populated by people from La Paz, and where a visitor
may hear Aymara. Western indigenous cultural celebrations are also commonplace in Plan
3000.76 For example, the Barrio Urkupiña is a neighborhood named after a syncretistic religious
celebration from Cochabamba. During the neighborhood’s weeklong folkloric celebration in
August, residents serve traditional food from Cochabamba and La Paz, dance folkloric
indigenous dances, and play traditional music.77 Eastern cultural traditions are also celebrated, as
in the Barrio 18 de Marzo where there are more eastern residents (39). Discussing the initiatives
of the CCPSC, Peña also gives the example of the Día de la Tradición, founded in 1989, which is
“an opportunity to remember and preserve the cultural wealth of the department” and which in
1990 was celebrated in Plan 3000 upon its designation as an official city celebration (199).
Thus, Plan 3000 is a microcosm in which different regional identities interact and are
redefined. This became more apparent in 2009, on the on the eve of ascension of president Evo
Morales to power. At this time in Santa Cruz, cruceño youth groups were in direct conflict with
those they deemed colla in the city. Violence broke out between these youth groups and others
related to western identity. Groups in Plan 3000 held community meetings around the Rotonda, a
symbolic center of the ciudadela as a historic community, and strategized about methods of selfdefense. These conflicts are evidence of both the politicization and organization of community
identity in Plan 3000.78
Brazil: Migration and Racial Identity in Rio de Janeiro
Although the development of place-based regional identities resembles the processes that
occurred in Bolivia, race is a concept that has plagued and challenged Brazilian society since the
colonial era. Throughout much of Brazil’s colonial history, racial thought was dominated by the
concept of scientific racism bolstered by the idea of the “noble savage”. In effect, scientific
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racism held that Brazil could never become a civilized country due to its ‘intrinsically inferior’
African population. This belief contributed to a national inferiority complex, as Brazilian racial
miscegenation meant that the country could never be completely equal to the more ‘civilized’
countries of Europe that were idealized by the Brazilian elite. Thus, because racial purity was
unattainable, white superiority was justified as necessary.79 Africans were also believed to be
inferior to the indigenous peoples of Brazil. The Brazilian national myth of foundation idealized
the indigenous population, maintaining that true Brazilians were the result of the mix between
white Europeans and indigenous peoples, and therefore the colonizers had more of a right to the
Brazilian territory than any European power.
Out of this racist tradition emerged the work of Gilberto Freyre, who first argued against
the tenets of scientific racism. Freyre claimed that the African population in Brazil was in fact
responsible for the majority of the social and economic development in the country since the
colonial era. Freyre argued that the Brazilian culture was therefore itself a miscegenation,
recognizing that Africans and Afro-Brazilians were not physically or mentally inferior, and that
they did more to develop the country than other racial groups (although failing to recognize that
as slaves they were forced to do so). Freyre’s work, however, gave way to the development of an
arguably more dangerous ideology: racial democracy. Racial democracy negates the existence of
institutionalized racism by implying that because the population of Brazil was so mixed, there
existed a racial harmony in the country. There was therefore no racial problem to be addressed,
an attitude which benefited the elite and prevented the reduction of racial disparity and
discrimination.80 Under this ideology, poverty and other social disparities were conceptualized in
terms of class difference. Since the 1970s, however, scholars have worked to debunk the myth of
racial democracy, showing that race is still a main factor in social inequality (355).
The history of racial distinctions and identities in Brazil is riddled with policies
supporting or negating racial identity markers. The identities recognized by the government
changed over the years as policies advocating for the branqueamento (whitening) of the
population took hold, changing how people could officially represent themselves.81 The
Brazilian census evaluates race strictly on the basis of skin color, and not ancestry as in the US.
In studies in which Brazilians were asked to racially classify themselves without any given
categories, between 135 and 500 race-color terms emerged.82Brazilians may identify as white,
black, mixed, mulatto, indigenous, moreno, caboclo, and various other identities indicating
distinct levels or combinations of racial mixture, although “white” is implicitly considered
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superior.83 Interestingly, the 2010 Census categories for race were: branca (white), preta (black),
amarela (yellow), parda (mixed), indígena (indigenous), or sem declaração (unspecified).84 On
the governmental level at least, race is simplified. However, these categories do not
communicate the current labelling tensions and preferences of those who identify as AfroBrazilian. Racial identities are often dependent on a combination of historical context and
personal preference.
Place-based identities exist in conjunction with racial identities in Brazil. Relevant to this
research are the terms carioca, niteróiense, and nordestino. Carioca refers to people from Rio de
Janeiro. Niteroiense refers to those from the city of Niterói, a much smaller geographical
location, which does not preclude those who identify as niteroiense from also identifying as
carioca, as Niterói is part of the larger metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro.
The most important oppositional identity in this case is that of the nordestino
(northeasterner). Nordestino is an externally constructed identity indicating that a person comes
from the northeastern states of Brazil. This designation is heavily racialized. Caldeira writes that
nordestino has been “used since the time of the Conquest to describe the native, the African
slave, the worker, and the poor.”85 In Rio and elsewhere in the southeast, the term is also
associated with internal migrants, as the northeastern states are one of the main places of origin
for internal migrants to Rio and São Paulo. In these cities, because of the relationship between
nordestinos and social marginality,
“...the nordestino narrative is an essentialized category meant to symbolize evil and explain
crime. It is simplistic and caricatured – which does not mean that it doesn’t affect social relations.
It is a product of classificatory thinking concerned with the production of essentialized categories
and the naturalization and legitimization of inequalities.”86

Morro do Palácio: Nordestinos
In Morro do Palácio, the carioca and nordestino identities manifest much as race and
place-based identity exists in Plan 3000. As a small favela, the community is a site of settlement
for internal migrants and has been for at least 40 years. In 2000, nearly 40 percent of migrants to
Niterói were from the northeast, with a nearly equal number from the southeast (mostly from the
neighboring interior state of Minas Gerais).87 Most surveyed in 2000 migrated to the city
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between the 1970s and 1990s. Migrants to Niterói come from Minas Gerais (21%), São Paulo
(10%), Paraíba (9.5%), and Ceará (9%).88 More detailed information about the racial make-up
and places of origin of community members in Morro do Palácio is difficult to find due to its
informal status. Although census data in theory should be complete, official data on favelas and
“subnormal agglomerations” is often questionable. However, a report from the 2010 Brazilian
census on the number of private homes in these “subnormal agglomerations” gives an estimate of
the number of residents in the community. According to this census, 1,851 people lived in Morro
do Palácio in 2010, with nearly equal numbers of men and women, who lived in 571 homes.89
Community interviews indicate that many in Morro do Palácio migrated from northeastern
Brazil. The time period of migration corresponds to the survey from 2000; dates of migration of
interviewees ranged from 1973 to 2000, with only one person migrating after that period in 2005.
Migration and place of origin was significant in terms of the self-identification of
community members. 12 of the 15 total people interviewed in the community were not born in
the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro. The time-related observations from the Plan 3000 case
also seem to be true in the case of Morro do Palácio. Those who have been in the community
longer were more likely to identify with the place identity of their new home, in addition to those
who migrated at a younger age. Interviewees who migrated as adults were more likely to identify
with their place of origin. For those who migrated when they were young or young adults, they
were more likely to identify as carioca. No one identified as niteroiense, perhaps because as
migrants, the moniker of carioca was more general and all encompassing. As in Plan 3000,
people who moved to Rio or to Morro do Palácio as young adults identified as carioca more than
nordestino. For example, Matheus, 48, moved to Morro do Palácio when he was 18 in 1986. He
said that he feels more carioca than nordestino because he has spent more of his life in Rio.90
Similarly, Rafael, 63, also arrived in the community at the age of 18 – in 1973. He identified as
more carioca than nordestino because “I left there young”.91 The comparison with Plan 3000 is
even more apt because informants tended to identify with the larger metropolitan region rather
than with a specific place–based moniker from their community. Significantly, the label of
nordestino did not seems to have a negative connotation for residents, although many identified
as from their specific state (e.g. Paraibano) rather than with the general moniker nordestino.
Few of those interviewed explicitly identified as palacianos. The one informant who was
born and raised in the community identified as palaciano. In the documentary Jovens do Palácio:
3 Caminhos92, three youth are followed throughout the community and talk about their
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experience growing up in Morro do Palácio. It is this demographic that is more likely to identify
as palaciano, as they have not spent significant amounts of their lives in other places.
Place-based identities from migrants’ places of origin seemed to persist due to cultural
markers, time in the community, and exposure to cultural traditions. Many informants who had
migrated to Morro do Palácio as children or young adults felt a connection to their place of
origin. One woman, Beatriz, felt more nordestina than carioca. Beatriz, 42, migrated to Rio de
Janeiro when she was 18, then moved to Morro do Palácio because it was the first place she
found and she had some friends in the community.93 She moved back to the northeast for several
years in 2004 before returning to Morro do Palácio. Another interviewee, Henrique, has lived in
the community for 30 years and identified as Paraibano (from Paraíba in the northeast).
Henrique, 50, said he identified as Paraibano in part because he still speaks with the accent of his
home state.94 Another man, João, 58, had only lived in Morro do Palácio for 18 years, a
relatively short amount of time to have lived in the community.95 Having arrived when he was
40, he had spent much of his life in his home state and thus consolidated his sense of self in
relation to that place.
Spatial articulation of identity within Morro do Palácio exists as it does in Plan 3000,
even though the community is substantially smaller than the large urban district in Bolivia. The
following quote from a community forum and panel discussion between residents of Morro do
Palácio, students at the nearby university, and nonprofit workers in the area reveals the formation
of identity “tribes” within the community.
“In comunidades, there are various communities within one. Because there is the side with the
nordestinos, the side with the cariocas, you have those now who are coming to live up there from
the college...the community has various tribes, and it’s weird sometimes. The side with the
nordestinos has the best houses. Because they come from where they are used to poverty and
having to work, when they arrive in the big city, for us that are born here and think it is fucking
hard, for them, it’s easy, because they learned to work from an early age. And they are united.
They are very united.” (Josemias, Morro do Palácio).96

Josemias also describes a group of nordestino friends in the community that when
someone might need a cistern, they get together and make one. But when it is a palaciano –
someone who was born in the community and does not identify as nordestino – that needs help
with a cistern, people ask how much they will pay. He says that it is hard for them to marry a
93
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carioca because of these kinds of cultural differences within the community. Another panel
member, Ronilton Dias dos Santos, agreed, adding, “the community discriminates against itself.”
This relative disunity in terms of race is supported in the findings of Janice Perlman in her 40
years of research in favelas in Rio de Janeiro.
“As for community unity, or more accurately the perception of community unity, 85 percent of
the original interviewees said that their communities were “united or very united,” while in XX,
only half (51 percent) of the original interviewees, 45 percent of their children, and 42 percent of
their grandchildren felt that way. Nonetheless, there was a decidedly greater sense of unity in the
favelas than in the conjuntos, and the bairros had the least of all. But even in the favelas, there is a
diminished sense of unity” (Perlman 2010, 195).

Thus, as a site of informality, Morro do Palácio is also a microcosm of racial mixture. As
in Plan 3000, place-based affiliations vary based on time living in the community, age of
migration, and cultural preferences. There is little self-professed place-based identification with
the community itself by the older population, but more with the generations who have grown up
in the community.
~~~

~~~

~~~

~~~

~~~

Given the distinct social constructions of race and ethnicity in Bolivia and Brazil, the
similarities in the ways in which people in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio self-identify in
relation to migration, race, and place of origin is revealing of life in informal communities. These
similarities point to several initial conclusions about the nature of place-based identity in
informal settlements. First, that although many residents of these informal settlement
communities are migrants and have lived in the communities for many years, their places of
origin still determine their personal identities. In addition, racial and ethnic difference are
conflated with place in both cases, factors which then contribute to the racialization of these
informal settlements by association with the larger socio-spatial context, even though the internal
dynamics and racial realities of these communities are more nuanced. These differences are key
to the cultural diversity of the case study communities – a reality that is little known by many
until investigated further. Also, although many of the interviewed community members do not
identify with labels signifying that they are ‘from’ their new home communities, those that do
are predominantly of the younger generations. The increasing number of people who identify
with their communities as places indicates the crystallization or consolidation of a place-based
identity in each case study. There are many reasons for this change. The following sections detail
some of the key factors in community identity formation and consolidation. The section Forging
Identity: Narrative Resistance against Marginality in this chapter argues that these factors
necessarily lead to the consolidation of these identities as resistance and project identities.
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The Social Power of Violence: Stereotypes and Resistance Identities
Violence is a social ill that affects all residents of a city, regardless of income, race, or
social class. However, violence affects society’s marginalized on a disproportionate level. Aside
from more often being victims of violence, society’s subalterns are also associated with
marginality. In her book City of Walls, Teresa Caldeira demonstrates that narratives of crime can
have on public opinion and interaction. According to Caldeira, the discussion of crime allows
people to cope with the reality of violence while simultaneously reinforcing their negative
associations and emotions.97 In addition, crime narratives create and maintain stereotypes that
reinforce an unequal societal order, while leaving out the voices of the most marginalized. “The
talk of crime is productive, but it helps produce segregation (social and spatial), abuses by the
institutions of order, contestation of citizens’ rights, and, especially, violence itself” (39).
Experiences with and narratives of violence can therefore shape popular perceptions of
marginalized groups, which can then be conflated with group characteristics.
In this section, I discuss the effect of violence – both real and perceived – on social life
and community identity in Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Rio de Janeiro, and specifically the
communities of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio. I argue that the histories and current realities of
violence in these communities lead to attitudes of defense on the part of community members.
They define their current identity as a community by what they argue they are not, and thus
actively construct a resistance identity based on the negation or minimizing of violence.
Bolivia – Plan 3000
Between 2006 and 2016, the crime rate in Bolivia rose 71 percent.98 The maintenance of
significant socioeconomic inequality, drug trafficking, and a culture of violence contributed to
this increase. In Santa Cruz de la Sierra, the districts inside of the fourth ‘ring’ of the city have a
much lower poverty rate than the districts that fall outside this boundary, where the number of
people living in poverty can be as high as 40 percent.99 According to the Bolivian sociologist
Guillermo Dávalos, “inequality increases violence and confrontation.”100 In the department of
Santa Cruz, the rates of theft, rape and domestic violence, and fraud were among some of the
highest in the country in 2014; granted, Santa Cruz also has one of the largest population
concentrations in the country.101
Plan 3000 also has a reputation as a zona roja or a red zone. Andrés Romero, a resident
and community leader of the ciudadelas, said that “another of the negative aspects of the Plan is
probably the high level of delinquency or of delinquent acts. This isn’t exclusive to the Plan, this
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happens everywhere, but I think it is more notorious here.”102 Although Plan 3000 does have
high crime and more gang activity than the rest of Santa Cruz, residents do not identify this as an
important aspect of daily life. Indeed, interviewees eagerly took pride in the positive aspects of
their community. Said one young man, “The majority of people think that the Plan is dangerous.
That there are a lot of criminals, thieves and criminals, but they are only in certain parts. Not in
the whole Plan” (Alejandro, 18, Plan 3000).103
A community study conducted by the project “Quiénes Somos” asked youth to gather the
opinions and experiences of people living in the Plan. Participating youth included their personal
opinions and experiences, with many stating that they felt safe and welcomed within Plan 3000.
“With respect to the place where I live, I feel comfortable and tranquila” (Fabiola Tosube,
student).104
“Since I have lived in Plan 3000, I have felt safe and tranquila. People are very friendly and
considerate (Carmen Melgar, student).105
“I have lived in Plan 3000 for 3 years. I like to live here because the people are very good even
though some people believe the opposite and say that our zone is dangerous and unsafe. I don’t
think like them” (Lizeth Roca Salvatierra, student).106

Jaime Gumiel, an activist and youth mobilizer in Plan 3000 who was interviewed for the
community survey, believed that Plan 3000 was a zona roja until he bought a house there and
lived the reality. “It is a fairly young zone that has invaluable potential; it will become a cultural
epicenter of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.”107 Gumiel also emphasized the positive in the Plan.
“[They] always treat the youth of Plan 3000 with a derogatory tone: gangsters, thugs, assailants,
drug addicts. And it isn’t like that, because not all have bad habits. I want there to be productive
things for everyone, that strengthen their spirit through the arts like painting, theater, and art in
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general. It is true that we have problems with gangs, but a lot of young people choose something
different, they participate in positive things” (Jaime Gumiel, Juventud y Futuro).108

Residents of Plan 3000 are therefore adamant that they are more than the violence and
delinquency their community has come to represent. In rejecting this stereotype, they reveal a
community vision as a safe and progressing ciudadela. Plan 3000 is thus constructing an identity
based on a selective embracing of the positive.
Brazil – Morro do Palácio
Rio’s favelas are notoriously dangerous places, as many are the headquarters and base of
operations of drug trafficking organizations and gangs. Violence in favelas thus obscures
institutional knowledge of the reality of favela life. Due to fear of these places, myth, stereotype,
and reputation replace fact. Census takers may not enter these communities for fear of personal
harm, which contributes to a lack of data on the extent of poverty, impeding or slowing
community development efforts.109 This lack of knowledge about the reality of people living in
poverty may also be intentional on the part of the government.
Janice Perlman’s seminal study Favela is based on an extensive survey carried out in
1976 and revisited 30 years later in favelas in Rio de Janeiro. In an explanation of the study
methods, Perlman acknowledges that field work in favelas is often dangerous, and discusses the
precautions taken by researchers to ensure their safety. Indeed, limitations to the study arose
directly from the problem of violence, as researchers were forced to withdraw from the study for
fear of personal harm from traffickers, interviewees had moved out of the communities since the
time of the original study to escape the violence and thus were unavailable for the followup
study, communities were inaccessible during gun battles, and informants were often unwilling to
answer survey questions about violence for fear of repercussions from the ruling gang (351).
Perlman notes that the rise in violence has been disastrous for people living in the city’s poorest
communities. She points to the entrance of the drug and arms trade into these communities in the
mid-1980s as the primary culprit (7). “The violence has made Rio’s most vulnerable population
fearful of going about their daily lives, reduced their chances of getting jobs, lowered the value
of their homes, weakened the trust and solidarity that has held their communities together, and
co-opted homegrown community organizations” (166).
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Criminal organizations associated with the drug trade are common in Rio’s favelas.
These organizations are gangs that operate in multiple favelas and are often in conflict over
territory. Thus, the element of criminal organizations within favelas necessitates another level of
spatial awareness within the city’s informal communities. Communities located next to one
another may be run by separate and/or warring groups, as is the case with the communities of
Cidade de Deus, Gardênia Azul, and Rio das Pedras, neighboring favelas in the Barra de
Tijuca/Zona Oeste of Rio. Here, each favela has very separate territorialities110, determined in
part by the control of UPPs (Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora), local militias, or trafficking
rings.111 These controlling institutions are the main cause of violence in favelas. Three main drug
gangs control favelas in Rio: Comando Vermelho – the Red Command (CV), Terceiro Comando
– the Third Command (TC), and Amigos dos Amigos – Friends of Friends (ADA) (Perlman,
166). In addition, police units (UPPs) are frequently present in favelas and carry out “pacifying”
operations to oust drug gangs, often resulting in the deaths of local residents caught in the
crossfire. State presence in favelas – in the entire metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro – can
therefore mean increased violence and death rather than improved order and safety.
Residents of Morro do Palácio say that the pacification of their community occurred
roughly 5 years ago, in 2011. In November 2011, Morro do Palácio was one of the first
communities in Niterói to receive a UPP, due to the high level of criminal activity and violence
on the morro.112 Before pacification, it was dangerous to enter the community, and there were
frequent night-long shootouts. Today, residents describe the community as “calm”. Although
there are people still involved in the drug trade, residents are no longer at risk of dying from
stray bullets, and the drug trade is isolated to certain sections or houses within the community.
In Morro do Palácio, people’s experiences with violence reflect the shift from living in
fear to defending their now “calm” community from stereotypes of violence. One resident,
Guilherme, is the owner of a small bakery in the community and has lived in Morro do Palácio
for nearly 16 years. Guilherme acknowledged that it was difficult and dangerous to live in the
community several years ago, but emphasizes that now it is a “good place to live.”
“Before, it was difficult to enter here. There were shootouts all the time. I have a hole in my door,
a bullet flew in there, look...I have various bullet holes in my house...my house has several bullet
holes in the wall, a bullet flew into my bedroom and hit her [my wife’s] arm. Today it is
marvellous here. ...People viewed this [the violence] like a bomb. They came and left. No one
110

While there may be conflicting territorialities among controlling entities, residents of these communities still
interact. One indication of the day-to-day interactions and relationships between favelas is the extent of operations
of the informal economy. For example, there is an open Facebook group "Rio das Pedras, Gardenia Azul, Cidade de
Deus Jacarepaguá – Compra e Venda" for businesses to attract customers.
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wanted… no one knew… they came up to the entrance there down below...before families
wouldn’t come here. Not hers [my wife’s] or mine. They were afraid of coming here. Today
people want to come here. They want to get to know Morro do Palácio (Guilherme, 46).113
“Everyone is friends, they are all good people. It is a good place to live. [People] joke,
converse...In reality, you could say that only family lives here. Only family” (Guilherme, 46).114

Aside from the reduction of violence, Guilherme appreciates the convenience and stability of his
life in the community.
“I have family, and I live well. … My family studies nearby, … my wife is a pastry maker and
baker… I own my house, so my life is peaceful. I have a peaceful life, a good house, thank God,
we live a good life. Whoever says it is bad is lying” (Guilherme, 46).115

Thus, for Guilherme, a “calm” or “easy” life currently has more to do with financial security than
physical safety. Even during the years of violence, he and his family remained in the community,
continuing to work and live their lives.
Regardless of the drastic reduction of violence in Morro do Palácio and the resulting
improved quality of life, comments from other palacianos reveal that violence is still present.
Gabriel, 48 years old, has lived in the community for 30 years, after first living in Rio proper
when he moved to the area. He doesn’t like the noise, “bandidos”, and drug trade in his
community.
Others, however, take a more relativistic stance. Júlia, 21, remarked that Morro do
Palácio “Is very calm. Other morros are more dangerous.” According to Júlia, outsiders are
usually afraid of the community of Palácio. She said that people aren’t prejudiced, but afraid.
“Prejudices no, but fear yes. Because below there are a lot of assaults, they think that they
[assaltants] are from the morro. That I know of, they are not from the morro” (Júlia, age 21).116
Júlia tells people she lives in the community, on the morro, to tell them that in reality it is calm
and there is not much violence now. Even though their fear exists, she says she does not feel
judged when she talks about her community with outsiders.
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“Antes, era difícil de entrar aqui. Era tiro a toda hora. Eu tenho a porta furada, tenho bala que chegou ali,
ô...tenho vários tiros na minha casa, na minha casa tenho várias furações de tiro na parede, passou bala dentro do
meu quarto, atingiu o braço dela [his wife]. Hoje é maravilha isso aqui. ...As pessoas via isso aqui, assim como uma
bomba. Entrava e escrudia. Ninguém queria...ninguém sabia...chegava lá embaixo ali, até para entrega,...antes as
famílias não vinham aqui. Nem a dela nem a minha. Tinha medo de vir aqui. Hoje as pessoas querem vir aqui. Quer
conhecer o Morro do Palácio” (Guilherme. Interview. Morro do Palácio, Niterói, Brazil. August 5, 2016.
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é um lugar que pode dizer que mora só família. Só família” (Guilherme, 46).
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confeiteira da padaria, ...a casa é minha, então a vida é tranquila. Tenho uma vida tranquila, uma casa boa, graças a
Deus, a gente leva a vida boa. Quem diz que tá ruim é mentira” (Guilherme, 46).
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That informants feel the need to explain to outsiders that their community is not
dangerous, that it is a “good place to live” that is attracting new residents, points to persisting
outside ideas of Morro do Palácio as an inherently dangerous place. The negation of this
perception implies a strong internal sense of community identity that is not tied to violence or
criminality, but rather actively works in direct opposition to such notions. In addition, some
community members may not consider themselves to be victims of crime. But residents also
realize that violence and drug trafficking still exist in their community. Although they want
Morro do Palácio to be a place without violence or crime, criminals hide out in their midst. A
community member said “they are contradictions that we encounter.”117 As in Plan 3000,
community identity in Morro do Palácio is thus constructed through an intentional negation of
the negative.
Spatiality, Informality, and Control
As evidenced in the discussion on place of origin, culture, and regional identity, peoples’
relationship to place is a determinant of personal identity. This concept can be expanded – or
narrowed – to the city scale in order to better understand intra-urban identity dynamics. Here, I
describe the physical structure of Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Rio de Janeiro/Niteroi, and locate
informal communities within the urban sprawl. I then discuss the effects of this relative location
on residents and their community identities, as well as the relationship between informal
communities and multiple scales of government as it manifests in urban policy.
Bolivia – Plan 3000
The built environment of Santa Cruz de la Sierra conforms to a classic Chicago School
model of a concentrically expanding city. The city is literally divided into rings, each of which
have their own socioeconomic or commercial functions. The ringed urban design was intended to
transform Santa Cruz into a garden city, modeled after industrial European cities and heavily
influenced by the ideals of modernism.118 The original organization plan that resulted from this
modernist transition in 1957 was called the Plan Techint, which sought to incorporate the idea of
the Garden City and a 1930s plan for São Paulo, Brazil (69).The center of Santa Cruz preserves
the colonial city design, laid out according to the common Spanish “chessboard” with a central
plaza and streets that intersect at right angles. In addition to its historic value, the center is
currently home to governmental buildings, educational headquarters, museums, and local retail –
segregated into sectors geared towards upper class customers and sprawling markets with both
formal and informal commerce.119 Outside of the center, the city is organized in rings, inside of
117
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which lie unidades vecinales (UVs) that were intended to be self-contained and self-sustaining
neighborhood units. Radial roads run outward from the center, providing the main access to each
ring. An update to the Plan Techint in 1972, the Plano Regulador, planned out the third and
fourth rings of the city, and the fourth ring was designated as the city’s outer boundary (71).
Importantly, the Plan Techint did not account for rapid future urban growth, much less
the extreme levels of rural-urban migration that began in the 1970s.120 The 1957 plan accounted
for a maximum of 60,000 residents, and projected 200,000 residents in the year 2000 – this
number was surpassed by 1978 (71). This lack of foresight meant that new arrivals to the city
were forced to create their own infrastructure, settling outside the fourth ring on ‘open’ land.
These were the sites of Santa Cruz’s first informal settlements. The informal in Santa Cruz was
thus historically regarded as existing peripherally to the city. In addition, many informal
communities experienced significant growth in the 1960s and 70s during the intense internal
migration from the Bolivian Andes to Santa Cruz. Thus, informality in Santa Cruz is on some
level associated with ethnic and cultural difference (166).
Within this concentric urban sprawl, many poor migrants settle in predominantly migrant
neighborhoods.121 Low income neighborhoods have been historically ethnically dichotomous,
split between highland and lowland migrants (often considered as camba or colla spaces).122 In
the 1980s, most highland migrants moved to the western half of Santa Cruz, while lowland
migrants concentrated in the eastern section. Stearman found that this distribution resulted from
the location of different transportation routes into the city; the main highway connecting Santa
Cruz to the west passes through the southwestern section of the city where many highlanders
originally settled, whereas highways and railroads to Brazil, Argentina, and northern Santa Cruz
are located in the northern and eastern sectors dominated by cambas (48). At this time, unskilled
laborers were also concentrated around the city’s periphery (74).
Over the past 30 years, the spatiality of migrant settlement in Santa Cruz has become
more complicated. Upper class neighborhoods are forming outside of the fourth anillo (ring), as
developers build condominiums and housing complexes near the seventh and eighth rings as well
as outside of the city limits. Highland and lowland migrants inhabit all areas of the city, although
ethnic enclaves still exist on a smaller scale. These patterns are observable in a detailed analysis
of the urbanization of Plan 3000, or the Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez.
Plan 3000 formed through urban expansion beyond the city’s rings. In 1983, the Piraí
River that runs along the northwestern edge of the city flooded. As the river limited the city’s
growth on that side, its banks became part of the periphery, and thus were the site of informal
settlements home to low-income families and migrants. The flood destroyed these settlements,
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and residents were evacuated.123 The local government relocated the evacuees – los
damnificados (the damned) – to the southeastern sector of the city outside of the fourth ring, and
the army provided military vehicles and tarps to move and house the families. With time, the
municipal government allotted 3,000 official plots to 3,000 evacuated families, thus originating
the name Plan 3000. The land on which they were settled was not developed.
“Basic necessities became more and more urgent. We didn’t have water or electricity, and there
weren’t streets or avenues, or even a road in good condition so that transport could arrive. The
entrance area, just a simple lane, was a sandbank filled with holes with water” (María Zabla
Cortéz Vda. de Chacón, La Historia del Plan 3000: Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez).124

Today, Plan 3000 is rapidly expanding. For example, during the four years of his term, ex
Deputy Mayor and current President of the Asociación de Juntas Vecinales Jesús Álvarez
oversaw the creation of 29 new neighborhoods in the Plan.125
“Municipal District 8 has 145 neighborhoods. … The zone grows at an accelerated pace because
Santa Cruz grows on the southeastern side, migration doesn’t slow, because to the southeast is the
Rio Piraí, which limits settlement, to the north it is very expensive to live, not to mention the zone
of El Urubó, which is even more expensive, so people opt to live on the eastern and
[southeastern] sides” (La Calle, n.174).126

The historical spatial distancing from the planned section of the city led to resentment,
distrust, and feelings of abandonment of evacuees and subsequent migrants to the settlement.
This also led to the spatial differentiation of identity within Plan 3000. Some of the many
neighborhoods correspond to distinct ethnic identities represented by internal migrants.
However, identity on a community or district level (as opposed to the neighborhood scale) is
determined by these feelings of physical separation, and thus resentment due to the lack of ease
of access of resources that were and are more accessible in other parts of the city.
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““There was no transport. We moved around on trucks or on carts and buggies. Then, there
recently appeared large micros [buses] and this was how we left and returned to our homes.” In
the first years of existence of the Plan, there only reigned disorder and a lack of attention from the
authorities, who never imagined the dimensions that these scared citizens who arrived damp and
with the few belongings they could save from the flood could achieve.”127

These feelings of separateness are significant and manifest in policy initiatives. Plan 3000
is a designated ciudadela, meaning that it is represented by a subalcalde, or deputy mayor. This
decentralizes political representation. However, the subalcalde is an appointed position.128
“Osvaldo Peredo, the city council member who represents District 8, the Plan Tres Mil, suggested
that municipal decentralization, or “distritalización,” would be the most effective policy to
support and encourage migrant integration. He explained that the measure would enable local
government to be more representative, and that sections of the city with a substantial migrant
presence could elect subalcaldes” (Kirsher 2009, 211).

The decentralization strategy is indicative that the city is developing new centralities significant
enough to be recognized at a governmental level. Indeed, according to cruceño academic
Gustavo Pedraza, Plan 3000 has its “own political, economic, and cultural centrality” with an
“almost compact internal organization.”129 The community has its own internal commerce, its
own Carnaval celebrations, a newspaper, churches, and a separate Comité Cívico. Pedraza
emphasizes that “that isn’t normal in a barrio”, and that this internal organization developed out
of necessity due to the distance of the original settlement from the rest of the city. “It was very
difficult for them to come here.”
Thus, geographical separateness has led to the development of distinct representative
structures and institutions from the rest of the city. There are Neighborhood Groups as well as
district-level representation. However, a desire for autonomy and the reality of complex cultural
differences do not preclude the merging of regional and ethnic identities within this
institutionalized place identity. Cruceño culture is to some extent also an official part of the
culture of Plan 3000. “The significance of the Plan is its people, there are people that have come
from all parts of Santa Cruz and Bolivia, and even foreigners. The neighbors of the zone have
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taken to heart the slogan of Santa Cruz, which days “The law of the cruceño is hospitality” and
here we are welcoming.”130
Brazil – Morro do Palácio
The urban form of the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro (of which Niterói is a part) is
characterized by favelas, or informal settlements and land occupations that lie within the urban
sprawl as opposed to on the periphery. Unlike the case of Santa Cruz de la Sierra and many other
major cities around the world in which delegitimized informality exists around the periphery of
the city, in Rio de Janeiro these communities exist on the morros that interrupt Rio’s built
environment. Indeed, the morros have been a contentious feature throughout the city’s urban
planning history. Major urban planning renovations in Rio have involved the destruction or
moving of morros, an enormous undertaking requiring many years of labor. The best known
example of this occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century with the removal of the Morro
do Castelo. Further from the center of Rio de Janeiro, favelas are found on more level ground.
However, in some of these cases – such as with the famous Cidade de Deus (City of God) – the
current manifestation of the favela is not the original, rather a new community formed by a
favela that was evicted from elsewhere in the city. It is important to note that favelas are
predominantly found on land that is not wanted for development, or that was not wanted at the
time of their founding. In most cases, these are the hills found throughout the city.
This rule applies to favelas in the city of Niterói as well. Niterói lies across the Bahía de
Guanabara from Rio de Janeiro. Niterói has a long colonial history, often overshadowed by its
more famous and commercially relevant neighbor of Rio de Janeiro. In 1834 Niterói became the
capital of the state of Rio de Janeiro, after the municipality of Rio became the capital city of the
Brazilian empire.131 The new state capital continued to develop throughout the 1800s, mainly
according to a “chessboard” urban plan. In the early 1900s, government and public buildings
were built, and further infrastructure development such as public gas lighting and a central
sewage system was introduced. With the advent of the Estado Novo in 1937, Niterói became
more modernized, and a main avenue (Av. Amaral Peixoto) was the focus of urban development
– just as a similar project with the Av. Presidente Vargas was underway in Rio. In 1974, the
bridge connecting Niterói to Rio de Janeiro was built, increasing accessibility between the two
commercial centers on either side of the bay. The state capital moved back to Rio de Janeiro in
1975, and the subsequent years were characterized by increased “public investment, real estate
speculation, infrastructure, and occupation” in the Região Oceânica and in Rio de Janeiro; in
essence, an expansion of development outside of Niterói’s central business district and central
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neighborhoods (2). This led to the abandonment and devalorization of the properties in Niterói
proper (the neighborhoods of São Domingos, Ingá, Boa Viagem, etc).
The current state of abandonment of many buildings and public areas in this section of
Niterói has led to revitalization efforts to revalue and repurpose urban space.132 Recent efforts
include plans for new condominiums, which threaten the permanence of communities located in
abandoned buildings or on the morros in these neighborhoods. Indeed, recent urban development
comes at the cost of quality of life. “This would indicate a policy of homogenization of space on
the part of public powers and real estate capital, which worry little about the question of sociospatial segregation and the living conditions of the local population.”133
This development trend is concerning in relation to Niterói’s favelas and comunidades.
As in the municipality of Rio, favelas in the broader metropolitan area also exist within the
formal city limits due to the city’s hilly geography. The morros are a physical obstacle that
impede the development of larger structures such as condominiums and apartment buildings. The
community of Morro do Palácio is located on Morro do Ingá, beneath which is located a former
governmental palace. The Morro do Ingá is located between the neighborhoods of Ingá and Boa
Viagem – both middle-upper class neighborhoods with growing skyrises and constant
development. “The neighborhood of Boa Viagem has had recent occupations and urbanization,
and in the last few years accelerated rates of the construction of residential buildings, as well as
an increase of offered services. Nevertheless, its initial occupation was made difficult by its
topography, which due to its natural characteristics impeded access” (3).134 This same difficulty
protects the permanence of Morro do Palácio even as its surrounding neighborhoods continue to
evolve.
In terms of its location within the city of Niterói, Morro do Palácio is enviably situated.
When asked if he was proud of anything in his community, one interviewee mentioned its
relative location. “I live almost in front of the Cristo, next to the beach, everything is close, the
bank...it is great here. It is a palácio. It is very good here” (Guilherme 2016).135 The community
is near Guanabara Bay, the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF), and the Museu de Arte
Contemporânea (MAC), designed by the architect Oscar Niemeyer. The MAC is a tourist
attraction for Niterói, drawing people of various social classes to the base of Morro do Palácio.
From the second floor of the homes of the top of the morro, residents have a privileged view of
the center of Niterói, Guanabara Bay, and the famous skyline of Rio de Janeiro.
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Considering its location, the relationship between the morro and the surrounding
neighborhoods is key. The community is not formally integrated into the economy of Niterói.
This means that most of the morro’s residents work in the service economy outside of the
community, and that most do not have the legal rights to their property. Because of this, residents
do not have access to the city sewer system, public electricity, and other formal services
provided by the municipal government. The community only recently gained access to the water
system, although they have had a public health clinic for many years.
Peripherality and the Importance of a Name
The spatial relationship of Morro do Palácio to the rest of the city relates to its identity as
a community. This is most observable in the current efforts of community members to clearly
define a community identity. Residents recognize that as an informal community in Brazil, the
way they present themselves is important. Morro do Palácio is the official name of the
community. Amongst community members and even nearby neighbors, it may be referred to as
“the morro” as it is the nearest favela on a morro in that neighborhood (Boa Viagem/Ingá). Some
residents refer to it as “the Palácio”. There are also two questions of name and identity that arise
in the specific context of Brazil. The first is that because the community has little documented
history and was formed as a result of waves of rural-urban migrants settling and developing the
hill, the “official” name of the community may not correspond to its “actual” name.
In a panel discussion of several community members facilitated by the Museu de Ingá
and the Universidade Federal Fluminense, both located at the base of the morro, community
members discussed an identity crisis that manifested in the name of the community itself. It
became clear that some of the first settlers of the morro believed that the true name of the
community was Morro do Carniso or Morro do Carnisal, while others said it was Morro da Ingá.
One panel member said that the true or original name from the 1960s was Morro do Carnisal.136
Interviews with some community members revealed that some believed the name Morro do
Palácio was actually a designation from the military police during the years of Brazil’s last
military dictatorship (1964-1985). If true, the implication is that the current name is an
imposition, a sign of external control, criminalization, and vigilance over poverty. This
consequence also manifests in another possible legal name for the community: Travessa de Ingá.
This name is said to have originated during the height of the drug trade years as traffickers
needed to refer to specific territories of control. This designation is then also seen as a
contradiction to the wishes of the community’s self-definition. This version of the community’s
name has everything to do with the territoriality of illegality, and nothing to do with selfdetermination.137

136

(NUPIJ UFF 2016)
(Ibid.)

137

Gempler 58
Another nuance of the community name debate is found in the distinction between
comunidade and favela. One of my guides gently corrected me after I used the term favela in
casual conversation, saying that she didn’t like the word’s negative connotations of poverty and
misery, and that comunidade better represented the reality of life in Morro do Palácio. Another
community member138 mentioned this debate, and said he preferred favela precisely because it
acknowledges different realities of life. “We are not the same, we are different.” Favela helps to
signal that they are not just another community, and that organization within it is distinct. For
him, the word also conveys a sense of apathy that he finds representative of community
involvement. He says that community members did nothing when the government wanted to shut
down the state-funded daycare and did nothing to replace it. “Our difference comes from our
disinterest...That is why I like to refer to it as a favela.”139 This implies that the lack of internal
spatial organization is the result of apathy or the lack of formal community-level organization,
and that perhaps the community is therefore deserving of a negative label like favela.
Whatever the preferred connotation or term, it is clear that both favela and communidade
have a certain power. Morro do Palácio finds power in acknowledging its marginality. Another
crucial side of this name debate relates to the legal consequences of self-determination. Knowing
the legal or officially-determined name of the community is key in fighting for land titles
through the process of regularization. Future deeds will only be legal if they include the correct
name of the community. This technicality and its implications is illustrative of the difficulties
and complexities of living in informality, as well as making the transition from delegitimized
informality.
This name debate is also indicative of the purpose of group identity definition in Morro
do Palácio. The constant renegotiation and redefinition of the community’s name for future
utility point to community identity in Morro do Palácio as a resistance and project identity. In
this instance, identity is territorialized for the purposes of creating a structure through which the
community can gain legitimacy and access to more rights. Claiming a history associated with a
name is a first step in the community’s resistance against their institutionalized marginalization.

Forging Identity: Narrative Resistance against Marginality
Narratives of marginality within Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio are temporally divided.
Residents of both communities often discuss memories of the initial poverty of their
communities in order to highlight the progress the community has made, establishing a
communal collective memory.140 While recognizing the significance and extent of the extreme
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Ronilton Dias dos Santos, a former president of the Morro do Palácio Residents’ Association (Associação de
Moradores do Morro do Ingá). He made these statements during the roundtable conversation between community
members, museum staff, and UFF collaborators (NUPIJ UFF 2016).
139
“Essa diferença nossa, vem de nossa desinterés. …Por isso eu gosto de chamá–lo de favela.”
140
(Peña 2009)
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poverty historically present in both locations, this rhetoric is intended to contribute to the project
of bettering the community’s image, complexifying the notion that these areas are simply
impoverished. In addition, present-day marginality is recognized by the communities in order to
emphasize current necessities. The recognition and application of marginality as a means of
identity production is therefore temporally dependent.
In addition, many of the social determinants of identity in both Plan 3000 and Morro do
Palácio indicate a struggle between externally-determined and internally defined identity in
informal communities. The resistance against social narratives of race, poverty, violence, and
physical separateness are observable on a community scale. Community narratives of
marginality are a significant part of this redefinition. External narratives are refuted through
active community organization designed specifically to improve both internal and external
opinions about the nature of community. To understand the relationship between poverty and
community identity, this section discusses the socioeconomic reality of Plan 3000 and Morro do
Palácio and explores residents’ views of their communities and their socioeconomic status. In
recognizing the developing internal community narratives of self, it becomes clear that
community organizations in both locations are working to help define and consolidate a positive
sense of community identity. This work is the active articulation of identity as a resistance
identity and project identity, the process of which is a form of insurgent citizenship.
Bolivia – Plan 3000
Plan 3000 continues to suffer from economic and infrastructural necessities. District 8 is
one of the most impoverished districts in the city, with the majority of homes with “low
economic capacity”.141 Access to public health services, although improved, remains difficult for
many.142 In an interview with current Deputy Mayor Víctor Hugo Céliz, he revealed that only
about 30 percent of the Plan had paved roads as of March 2016.143 However, he was quick to
situation this lack of development in the context of progress. “Like all ciudadelas experiencing
growth it has its problems that today are small in comparison with previous years, because today
it is much better.”144
Many of the original residents of the Plan tell detailed stories of the widespread poverty
during the first years of the community. As part of the community’s efforts to value its history,
these stories are widely publicized in publications celebrating the anniversary of the founding of
Plan 3000. One such publication is Tiempo & Espacio, a magazine published in Plan 3000 that
includes the voices of community members.145
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(CEDURE 2011, 21)
(Proyecto Quiénes Somos – La Historia del Plan 3000: Salud y Urbanidad 2013)
143
(El Deber 2016)
144
“Como toda ciudadela en pleno crecimiento tiene sus falencias, que ahora ya son pequeñas a comparación de
años anteriores, porque hoy está mucho mejor.”
145
(Tiempo & Espacio, Ed. 2, 2012)
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Concepción Cortés Rojas, born in Cochabamba, was one of the first inhabitants of the
community and worked to provide housing and health services for the damnificados. Her
comments reveal the struggles of the first residents of the Plan, which were mainly due to
institutional failure on the part of the city government.
“We lived in conditions of extreme poverty, with a little rice and wheat, used clothing, straw
mattresses, we received donations from the Mennonites of chickens, cheese, and milk.” “In
addition, many people cheated us, because many donations didn’t make it to their destination,
they were diverted somewhere else. They were supposed to build us bedrooms and a bathroom,
but we only received an unfinished 4m x 4m room.”146

Narratives of the founding and marginality of Plan 3000 are also illustrative of the
“entrepreneurialism” in informality discussed by Roy (2009). Residents who were part of the
original group moved to the site of Plan 3000 after the flood in 1983 destroyed their homes near
the Río Piraí remember the community unity and teamwork that arose out of the desperate
poverty and isolation in which they found themselves. As an abandoned community, the
economy grew out of the need to survive economically and simultaneously develop the basic
infrastructure of the built environment of Plan 3000.
“At the beginning there was incredible chaos, but later, bit by bit, we became organized.
And even so, it was still difficult and complicated. To get a gallon of water, for cooking,
we were in line from 4 in the morning until mid day. For a while, that was the solution
we found, while we were doing the paperwork to create a public services cooperative.”147
However, the consequences of this drive also contributed to the sprawling, disorganized growth
of Plan 3000 as the community increased in population and size. The Plan’s chaos is a main
complaint of many in the community and of those who visit it.
“The ciudadelas are also characterized by a marked disorganization. Mostly a result of the
uncontrolled growth of the markets, informal commerce, brought about by public
transportation...it is the only thing we have to move between the furthest neighborhoods at an
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“Vivimos en condiciones de extrema pobreza, con arrocillo, triguillo, ropa usada, colchón de paja, recibimos
donaciones de los menonitas que consistía en pollos, queso y leche.” “ También mucha gente nos engañó, porque
muchas donaciones no llegaron al lugar del destino, se desviaban a otro lado, tenían que construirnos dos
dormitorios y un baño, pero tan solo recibimos un cuarto de 4x4 en obra bruta.”
147
“Al comienzo se armaba un caos tremendo, pero después, poco a poco nos fuimos organizando. Y aún así, seguía
siendo difícil y complicado. Para recibir un galón de agua, que servía para cocinar, hacíamos cola desde las 4 de la
madrugada hasta casi el medio día. Por un tiempo, esa fue la solución que encontramos, mientras gestionábamos los
trámites para crear una cooperativa de servicios públicos.” (Proyecto Quiénes Somos – La Historia del Plan 3000:
Mi Barrio, 19).
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affordable price, but this also brings a certain disorganization. A vehicular and commercial
chaos...it is the central characteristic of the Plan” (Andrés Romero, 37, Plan/Villa).148
“We are arriving in the heart of the Plan, here at the Rotonda, and you don’t see drainage canals.
We are arriving in the heart of the Plan, look at the commerce. No one respects public
space...here people bring out their things to sell where they deem it convenient. So there is a total
lack of respect of private property. There is a total lack of respect of public space. … It is very
evident here. It is evident and there has been a lot of permissivity. And also, because of this there
was a fire, it took them two days to put out the fire and the third day they returned” (Andrés
Romero, 37, Plan/Villa).149
“It has been practically 33 years since the foundation of the Plan, and it is a real pity that the Plan
still does not have plumbing or sanitation systems” (Andrés Romero, 37, Plan/Villa).150

Thus, much of the marginality in Plan 3000 manifests as internal spatial disorganization and a
lack of infrastructure.
How does the community reconcile this challenge with their desire to attract investment
and disprove negative stereotypes? Much of the rhetoric that drives efforts to consolidate a more
positive community identity in Plan 3000 is related to the pujanza of its residents; its driving
force that makes it a vital contribution to the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Residents conceive
of themselves as hardworking and business-oriented. This attitude is apparent in news media
produced inside Plan 3000. In the newspaper La Calle, the front page reads “Plan 3000
consolidates a new identity.” Pictured in the group of people on the front page is Amélia
Solorzano, the owner of Patra, one of the largest sportswear manufacturer in Santa Cruz that
works within the local and national markets. She is a resident of Plan 3000, and her presence on
the front page highlights the community’s self-identification as a sector of business people.151
The magazine also profiles Pedro García Menacho, a TV personality on the network Red
Uno. Menacho has lived in Plan 3000 since he was 5 years old. His comments illustrate the
defensive attitude toward the progress of the Plan.
148

“Las ciudadelas también son caracterizadas por una desorganización bastante marcada. Sobre todo fruto del
crecimiento descontrolado de los mercados, el comercio informal, fruto del transporte público...es lo único que
tenemos para movilizarnos hasta el último barrio de una manera económica pero eso conlleva también una
desorganización. Un caos vehicular, comercial...es la característica central en el Plan” (Andrés Romero).
149
“Estamos llegando al corazón del Plan, aquí en la Rotonda, y no ves canales de drenaje. Estamos llegando al
corazón del Plan, mirá el comercio. Nadie respete el espacio público... aquí la gente saca a vender sus cosas donde
ellos lo ven conveniente. Entonces hay una falta total de respeto de toda la propiedad privada. Hay una falta total de
respeto al espacio público. Y te digo…que es una falta de respeto porque es un tema cultural de repente no es…no
solamente que sea en el Plan. Pero aquí está muy marcado. Está muy marcado y ha habido mucha permisividad. Es
más aquí había fruto de esto un incendio, tardaron dos días en apagar el fuego y el tercer día se volvieron a sentar
[en un mercado público, informal, que estuvimos pasando en este momento]” (Andrés Romero).
150
“Estamos prácticamente a 33 años de la fundación del Plan, y es una verdadera pena que el Plan todavía no tenga
el alcantaría o sanitário” (Andrés Romero).
151
(La Calle 2013, 8).
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“Message to Plan 3000: That they understand that the Plan will succeed when the will of its
residents wants it to.” (Tiempo & Espacio, Ed. 2, 2012).152
“Many think that Plan 3000 is the backyard of Santa Cruz. Plan 3000 has 20% of the population
in Santa Cruz, it is not a dormitory city, it is a place of a lot of commercial activity, of endeavors
to get out of extreme poverty and contribute to the development that all Bolivians deserve for a
better destiny.”153
“Plan 3000 has created itself alone with its hardworking people, the great migration from the west
has made it self-sufficient, so that it grows in a very unorganized manner.”154
“It needs to be the determiner of its own destiny, to be politically and institutionally autonomous,
it must prioritize education, health, and good nutrition.”155

The magazine also conducted an interview with Dr. Herland Vaca Diez, the president of
the CCPSC in 2012. Dr. Diez was born and raised in the city of Santa Cruz, “three blocks from
the main plaza.”156 His phrasing here indicates the importance of the physical plaza and city
center – a symbol of cruceño civic history – to his personal identity. His views of the Plan 3000
are representative of the tension between marginalization and modernization in the cruceño
imaginary. “The first thoughts I have about Plan 3000 are that there have been many social
problems, there is poverty, backwardness, lack of education, health, basic services. Now I see
vigor, work, integration, effort, and progress.”157
The magazine Tiempo & Espacio is a good example of the defensiveness of positive
community image within Plan 3000. Tiempo & Espacio actively tries to represent the progress of
the community since its founding, and celebrate the work of its residents. After quoting a
resident, for example, the magazine sends the line by saying “proclaimed this beloved founder of
the beautiful and thriving Ciudadela.” Other internally-produced media also aim to celebrate the
community’s positive developments. The most salient example is the newspaper La Calle, a
small paper founded in 2008 with the goal of showing the entrepreneurialism and positive
152

“Mensaje al Plan Tres Mil: Que entiendan que el plan va a salir adelante cuando la voluntad de sus pobladores así
lo quieran” (Tiempo & Espacio, Ed. 2, 2012).
153
“Muchos han pensado que el Plan Tres mil es el patio trasero de Santa Cruz, el Plan Tres Mil tiene el 20% de la
población boliviana en Santa Cruz, no es una ciudad dormitorio, es un lugar de mucho movimiento comercial, de
emprendimientos que busca salir de la extrema pobreza y contribuir al desarrollo que todos los Bolivianos
merecemos un mejor destino.”
154
“El Plan Tres Mil se ha hecho sola con su gente trabajadora, la gran migración del occidente ha hecho que sea
autosuficiente, de manera que crece de forma muy desordenada.”
155
“Necesita ser dueña de su propio destino, ser autónoma política e institucionalmente, se debe priorizar la
educación, la salud y buena alimentación.”
156
(Tiempo & Espacio, Ed. 2, 2012)
157
“Las primeras ideas que tengo del Plan 3000, es que había muchos problemas sociales, había pobreza, atraso,
falta de educación, salud, servicios básicos, ahora veo pujanza, trabajo, integración, esfuerzo y progreso” (ibid).
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developments within all the ciudadelas. An article published in La Calle after the newspaper was
awarded as the most popular newspaper in the ciudadelas in 2014 describes the newspaper’s
mission. “It was born to show the good side of the ciudadelas. Its pages are fed with good news.
The protagonist is the common citizen.”158 In the edition celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of
the community in 2013, a self-promoting article in La Calle declared:
“Before La Calle was born, the ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez did not have a means of social
communication like those in Pampa de la Isla and Villa Primero de Mayo, that shows that these
zones have small medium, and large business people, talented athletes, artesans, beautiful
women, and institutions that transform lives” (La Calle, March 2013, 34).

In an interview, the director of the newspaper, Daine Álvarez Ortiz, acknowledged this
difference between La Calle and other newspapers in the city, saying that they did not report on
violent crime in the ciudadelas or have an obituary section specifically because these types of
news items were overrepresented by other media in the city.159 However, this approach does not
limit La Calle from reporting on serious issues and educating the ciudadelas about the realities of
their continued marginalization. For example, the front page of the early October 2009 issue
declares “The campaigns discriminate against the marginalized neighborhoods,” and follows
with editorials and political analysis with titles such as “Politicians forget about the barrios yet
again.”160
In addition to being conscious of the implications of the type of stories they report for the
representation of the ciudadelas, La Calle also acknowledges identity differentiation from the
idea of the ‘city’ within the ciudadelas more explicitly. The front page of La Calle, in their 33rd
annual edition celebrating the founding of Plan 3000, announces, “Plan 3000 consolidates a new
identity.”161 Explaining further, the newspaper asserts “its protagonists have worked to construct
a new identity of a vigorous, progressive, entrepreneurial ciudadela forging new horizons,
leaving behind its ‘fame’ as a Red Zone, which tarnished its image for many years.”162
Such explicit language that recognizes Plan 3000 as a community with an emerging
cohesive consciousness highlights the role of community media in identity construction and the
raising of this consciousness. Community media is therefore evidence of the realization of Plan
3000’s project identity. The vision of the identity of Plan 3000 as uplifted by Tiempo & Espacio
and La Calle is one that takes into account its origins and celebrates the hard work of residents in
consolidating the transformation from impoverished informal settlement plagued by poverty to a
bustling, contributive district of the city in which needs are still unmet, but progress seems more
possible. The tenets of this identity – hard work, resourcefulness, and cultural diversity – are
158

(La Calle 2014, 29)
Alvarez, Ortiz, Daine. Interview. Villa Primero de Mayo, offices of La Calle. April 2016.
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“Las campañas discriminan a los barrios marginales.” La Calle. October 2009, Number 28. Santa Cruz de la
Sierra, Bolivia.
161
(La Calle, March 2016)
162
(La Calle, March 2016)
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evident in the tone of these media. Given that La Calle sees its work as a deliberate strategy to
control the narrative of ciudadela identity, their promoted identity is also a resistance identity
that works against the dominant negative narrative.
The active refutation of dominant narratives – consciousness-raising of a resistance
identity – is also manifest in many Plan 3000 community organizations, such as the Centro
Cultural San Isidro (CCSI). The cultural center offers free youth programming, including art and
gardening classes, has its own internet radio station run by youth from the community, and hosts
regular theater productions and concerts of local and national bands.163 The CCSI also works on
initiatives to encourage responsible and active citizenship and to educate local youth and uplift
their experiences as young residents of the ciudadela. For example, the CCSI collaborated on a
project to create a series of books entitled La Historia del Plan 3000 (The History of Plan 3000),
in which local youth conducted interviews and community meetings to gather and document
information about the history of their community.164 The project, “Quiénes Somos”, held as its
primary goal to encourage youth. The center relies on the support of both local and international
volunteers, and coordinates with other community initiatives in Santa Cruz.
The CCSI was founded by Juan Pablo Sejas, a sociologist from Santa Cruz. In an
interview, Sejas – himself the child of migrants – elaborated on the necessity of this type of
organization for developing a sense of community identity and the self-worth of its residents.
“I recognize the history of my parents, I’m mestizo, but I’m from Plan 3000. So, being from Plan
3000 also makes me important because I represent this diversity of cultures, of the distinct people
that exist here. Since before this project, the conflict between collas and cambas was very serious,
very apparent even in schools. But when they begin to understand the identity of the
neighborhood, of the territory and its history, the levels [of conflict] start to diminish. And today,
to make a comparison, they have basically gone away. Now, if they call you camba or colla … it
doesn’t really matter. But years ago it did. And this was an important shift in the equilibrium...of
being able to generate an identity” (Juan Pablo Sejas, CCSI, 2016).165
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A small concert at the Centro Cultural San Isidro in March 2016 featured an alternative rock band (La Logia) and
a female rap artist from Sucre, Chuquisaca. Both musical acts focused on themes of indigeneity and identity.
164
(Proyecto “Quienes Somos”)
165
“Yo reconozco la historia de mis padres, soy mestizo, pero soy del Plan 3000. Entonces, al salir del Plan 3000
también me da un valor importante porque de una manera reivindico esta diversidad de culturas, de gente distinta,
diversa que existe acá. Desde antes de este proyecto, evidentemente las luchas de colla y camba eran muy fuertes,
muy duros en los mismos colegios. Pero cuando ellos se empiezan a entender esa identidad del barrio, del territorio
y su historia, los niveles empiezan a disminuir. Y hoy en día, haciendo una comparación, en los términos
básicamente han quedado relegados. Ahora, te digan camba/colla… oséa, pasa de ser percibido. Pero años antes no.
Y eso fue quizás un cambio transcendental en el equilibrio...de poder generar una identidad.” (Juan Pablo Sejas,
CCSI).
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The work of the CCSI is thus an example of an organization encouraging institutionalized forms
of insurgent citizenship in the community, and working to directly impact positive identity
production.166
Aside from the rhetoric of resistance and identity reformation in Plan 3000 exemplified
by CCSI, community members also engage in more traditionally active forms of citizenship.
Since its founding, Plan 3000 has seen a variety of forms of self-organization as a means of
survival. From its first days of abandonment and isolation from the city center, community
members organized to provide food, water, and electricity to those in need.167 This initial
organization evolved, and today Plan 3000 has its own civic committee, water cooperative
(COOPLAN), and neighborhood organizations.168
This self-organization contributes to an increased sense of community cohesion that
manifests civically. The most salient example of this is the fact that there is a movement pushing
to make Plan 3000 its own municipality.
“One of our dreams is to have a mayor’s office with our own officials, elected and financed by us,
this deep desire will be achieved with the unity of all the loyal and brave neighbors on the road to
autonomy, self-determination of the pueblos that put us on the quickest path to development, we
promise to generate better days for Plan 3000” (Dr. Juan Ollisco Rocha, Tiempo & Espacio, Ed.
2, 2012).169

Dr. Diez, president of the CPSC, agrees with the vision of municipal autonomy for Plan 3000. “I
would fight [for autonomy] because it is like this, it has people, quantity and quality, and the
closer the better to administrate its resources.”170 In 2006, a group of representative bodies from
the Plan gathered to organize a committee on behalf of the ciudadela to begin the legal process of
transitioning from ciudadela to municipality.171 The project was eventually postponed by
officials as it was determined that to complete the process legally, a new law enabling municipal
autonomy would need to be enacted. However, the desire remains. María Eugenia Villarroel
Ríos, a Neighborhood Director from the Plan, shared in a 2012 interview that the demand for
municipal autonomy stems from the fact that Plan 3000 is not attended to by the Santa Cruz city
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There are many other organizations in Plan 3000 that work in a similar vein. The Fundación Hombres Nuevos
works to address the poverty and build capacity in the Plan (Fundación Hombres Nuevos).
167
168

(Tiempo & Espacio, Ed. 2, 2012)
“Uno de nuestros sueños es tener nuestra alcaldía con autoridades propuestas, elegidas y fiscalizadas por
nosotros, este ansiado anhelo se va lograr con la unidad de todos los vecinos fieles y valientes en el camino de la
autonomía, autodeterminación de los pueblos que nos expone al camino más rápido de desarrollo,
comprometámonos en generar mejores días para el Plan 3000” (Dr. Juan Ollisco Rocha, Tiempo & Espacio, Ed. 2,
2012)
170
“Yo lucharía porque así sea, tiene gente, tiene cantidad y calidad, cuanto más cerca, mejor para administrar los
recursos” (ibid).
171
(LEX 2012, 23)
169
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government.172 A lack of responsiveness has therefore led to increased demand for municipal
decentralization of the ciudadelas. Notably, this kind of movement is not isolated to Plan 3000.
The Villa Primero de Mayo, a neighboring ciudadela founded in 1969, has a similar movement
for municipal autonomy. The Villa “today represents a thriving zone of Santa Cruz that has
decentralized the commerce of its principal businesses”.173
Thus, citizenship in Plan 3000 and the ciudadelas is becoming politically
institutionalized. Although Holston’s “insurgent citizenship” does not rely on such participation,
the development of these movements shows that community identity (or at least the imaginary)
within Plan 3000 is cohesive enough to be politically articulated, and supported by numerous
representative bodies. The process of this increasing institutionalization is a form of insurgent
citizenship, as residents are forming alternative representational organizations and promoting an
alternative vision of citizens in their community. In light of calls for autonomy, their new
identity relies on their status as citizens.
Brazil – Morro do Palácio
Amid pervasive economic marginalization, homes in Morro do Palácio are constructed by
residents. Many remain “unpolished”, with visible concrete, bricks and corrugated metal,
unfinished plastering, and self-constructed drainage systems. The community relies on the
informal and tertiary sectors for its survival; many residents work in service provision – as
doormen or in local shops. There are also businesses within the community, such as corner
stores, small clothing shops, bakeries, and bars.
Discussions of marginality in Morro do Palácio are similarly temporally divided as in
Plan 3000, although on a smaller scale. Community members discuss the history of the morro
amongst themselves, as the older generations educating the young or the newer arrivals.174 These
stories are related to the physical poverty of Morro do Palácio. During my research and an
interview with an elder member of the community, my guide asked the interviewee follow-up
questions about what the community was like when he arrived 38 years ago; she was clearly
interested in learning more. In addition, staff at the community organization MACquinho have
attempted to gather stories from community members to document the reality of the past. One
resident, Gabriel has lived in Morro do Palácio for at least 30 years. He said that when he arrived
in Niterói, residents of Morro do Palácio lived in shacks made of wood and earth, or barracos.175
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(LEX 2012, 24)
(La Calle 2009, 1)
174
During the course of this research, my questioning prompted these stories. Often, my guide would become
interested and ask followup questions. At this point, my role became that of an observer, as the guide would be
better able to ask relevant questions about the history of their own community. The interview became more of a
conversation.
175
Gabriel. Interview. Morro do Palácio, Niterói, Brazil. August 5, 2016.
173

Gempler 67
Wooden houses like those Gabriel describes were common in favelas in Rio de Janeiro
throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
However, in terms of physical infrastructure, Morro do Palácio has made important gains.
The community now has a paved road that spirals up the hill to the soccer field at its very top.
The steep man-made walkways that wind between homes and act as shortcuts between sections
of the main road are covered with concrete and are kept clean. Access to electricity and water are
widespread. On the community’s Facebook page from September 2016, there are pictures of
residents putting up official street signs for the first time in the community’s history. At that
time, the community was working towards also getting CEPs (zip codes) for Morro do
Palácio.176 That said, residents say there are still improvements to be made. For example,
Fernanda, a middle aged mother who has lived in Morro do Palácio for 24 years, complains
about potholes and structures that were poorly repaired or not well made in the community.177
One resident, Guilherme, attributes community gains to local expertise and cooperation.
“Engineers live here. Foremen live here. I’m a foreman. I know what I’m doing. I know that the
capacity of anything is my limit. But there is badly done construction on the morro because they
don’t have any idea what they’re doing.”178

Notably, Guilherme distinguished between Morro do Palácio and other communities in terms of
the built environment and the attitude of its residents.
“People keep coming, and keep living [here]. Compared to many places … because this here is
not a favela. Not here. Because if you go to other places like Rocinha, [all the houses are
together]. Not here, here the houses are all separate. … Because people are more...there are the
favelado, and there are people who are not favelado. Favelado are the people who live in shacks.
Everything is messy. And there are people who are not favelado. That come from outside, want to
build a good house, want to show off their good house, want to have a good life. But there are
people that don’t [want this]. They throw trash in the street, throw sewage in the street, and
change where they live. But things change. Before you would see sewage in the
street...complicated things, but it changed a lot.”179
176

(“Morro do Palácio.” Facebook Community)
Fernanda. Interview. Morro do Palácio, Niterói, Brazil. August 3, 2016.
178
“Mas aqui mora engenheiro. Aqui mora mestre de obra. Eu sou mestre de obra. Eu sei que tou fazendo. Eu sei a
capacidade de qualquer coisa, é meu limite. Mas existe construção no morro que ...[é mau]... porque não tem som de
que tão fazendo.” (Guilherme. Interview. Morro do Palácio, Niterói, Brazil. August 5, 2016.)
179
“As pessoas vão chegando, e vão morando. Em visto de muitos lugares, ...porque aqui não é uma favela. Aqui
não. Porque se você conhece outros lugares como a Rocinha, como outros lugares [as casas estão todos juntos]. Aqui
não, aqui as casas estão todos separados. [E porquê?] Porque as pessoas são mais ....existe favelado, e existe pessoal
que não é favelado. Favelado são as pessoas que são barraqueira. Tudo...pode ser abagunçado. E existem pessoas
que não são favelado. Que vem de fora, quer construir a casa boa, quer demonstrar a casa boa, quer ter a vida boa.
Mas tem gente que não. Joga lixo na rua, joga esgoto na rua, e aí, ele vai mudando aonde mora. Mas muda muito.
Antes você via esgoto na rua, ...as coisas complicadas mas mudou muito” (ibid).
177
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For Guilherme, the improvements to Morro do Palácio’s built environment remove the
community from the marginalized category of favela, revealing his negative association with the
term. To him, this makes the community more attractive to new residents.
The presence of “new” residents in Morro do Palácio also plays a significant role in
determining present day community identity. There is a definite divide between people who
remember the initial conditions of poverty and the things people had to do to survive years ago,
and the people who only know the conditions they live in today and over the past few years. In
May 2016, the Museo do Ingá held a panel discussion for representatives of Morro do Palácio to
discuss the realities of their community and their interactions with the neighborhoods around
them.180 From the kinds of questions put to the panel and the reactions of panelists to one
another, it was apparent that discussions of what Morro do Palácio was like 20 to 30 years ago
do not happen between people on a regular basis, but that community discussions like the panel
discussion are a concerted effort to change this.
Indeed, the panel discussion is part of a larger effort on the part of community-based and
neighboring organizations that recognize the importance of documenting history in an effort to
create a community consciousness and understand how the community has evolved.
Documenting the power of the past has become more important. Inside the community, this work
is done by community nonprofit organizations. The principal institutional interaction between
Morro do Palácio and its neighbors exists in the form of a partnership between the Museo de
Arte Contemporânea (Museum of Contemporary Art – MAC) and a nonprofit located in the
community – the MACquinho, or little MAC. In the 2000s, the MAC wanted to start a program
to work with the youth in its neighboring communities. Youth from Morro do Palácio were
invited to take part in art programming at the museum, and received scholarships to participate
for six months. The youth applied to the city prefecture for a building for their activities. Oscar
Niemeyer designed a building as a gift, but construction was delayed for 9 years. In the late
2000s the MACquinho was completed and began running under the Fundação de Arte Niterói,
and more recently has been directed by the education department of the prefecture of Niterói.181
The MACquinho functions as a community center, offering computer and art classes,
collecting information about the history of Morro do Palácio, and organizing community projects
and events. Notable projects of the MACquinho include a youth community gardening project,
an open access recording studio, and a community knowledge gathering project to record local
knowledge of home remedies and medicinal plants. Classes teach youth skills and provide an
outlet for creative expression – opportunities that are not readily available elsewhere in the
community. Projects aim to improve the physical aspect of the community as well as build a
sense of collaboration and community responsibility among the youth. Yet, despite the
reasonably well-attended educational and community building activities located within their own
180
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community, many residents don’t participate in MACquinho programming, and its staff are
investigating as to why. One reason hypothesized by a staff member is that the building seems to
have “its back turned” on the community; the building looks outward towards the bay with no
windows on the community side. Despite this relative lack of participation, community
organizations such as the MACquinho are instrumental in developing insurgent forms of
citizenship and community pride; a key step in promoting a positive community identity.

Figure 2.4. MACquinho, Morro do Palácio, Niterói – designed by Oscar Niemeyer

Figure 2.5. View from the MACquinho towards the MAC (also designed by Niemeyer) and the Baía da
Guanabara, Niterói.

In addition to the work of the MACquinho, students and professors from the
Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF), the local university located a few streets away from the
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morro, conduct research and projects in the community. One such project, the documentary
Jovens do Palácio (Youth of the Palace), follows three residents between the ages of 20-24 in
2008.182 The documentary discusses the youth’s varied life paths, goals, and involvement with
the MACquinho. This form of community reporting documents both the difficult reality of the
community’s recent history and the nature of its social life, as well as the resourcefulness,
loyalty, and entrepreneurial spirit of its youth. The subjects share their struggles with finding
employment, avoiding the drug violence in the community, and coming of age in poverty. The
documentary thus works to uplift narratives of the reality of life in Morro do Palácio, told by the
perhaps the first generation of adults to have spent their entire lives on the morro. These
narratives therefore represent the crystallization of community identity.
Community organizations, both internal and external, thus play an important role in
identity production, consolidation, and the documenting of insurgent forms of citizenship in
Morro do Palácio. The differences in senses of community identity over time indicate that as the
built environment of Morro do Palácio improves and the sense of physical marginality
diminishes, residents’ relationship to space changes. Organizations play an important role in this
development. The MACquinho actively promotes activities that reflect positively on the
community and build a communal sense of responsibility. Projects such as the documentary done
through the UFF value and magnify the identity of the new generation. In addition, the
community has an active resident’s association. The Associação de Moradores do Morro do Ingá
(AMMI)183 acts as the community’s representative body. The AMMI works within the
community to improve infrastructure and address unmet needs. They also work to integrate and
facilitate the assistance of larger organizations such as the prefecture of Niterói. For example, in
2013, the AMMI organized a community meetings to present the development projects that the
Câmara Técnica da Secretaria Executiva da Prefeitura would carry out.184
The work of the MACquinho and the AMMI shows that community organizations in
Morro do Palácio promote methods of participation that are in reality form of insurgent
citizenship. Insurgent citizenship in this context manifests in the self-organization of community
members to overcome their marginalization. To help achieve and institutionalize this, these
organizations build on community ties and encourage linkages between community support and
responsibility and identity at the community level.
Conclusion
The racial, geographical, and spatial context of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio reinforce
the multifaceted intersectionality of identity. What is unique about these communities – due to
their marginalization and informality – is that these determinants become activated as resistance
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identities. In both communities, but perhaps more so in Plan 3000, identity labels such as colla
and camba become representative of the racial dynamics involved in the power dialectic between
the formal and the informal. Discrimination plays into the relationship between cultures and
identities in both cases, leading to the racialization of place. Internal migrants – collas – in Plan
3000 form a powerful base for resistance against eastern cultural hegemony in the city, and
Morro do Palácio stands as a bastion for migrants of color in Niterói. These ethnic or racial
labels then contribute to the construction of community resistance identities. Resistance identities
act against social marginalization, and are particularly articulated as a reaction to rhetoric of
violence. Narratives of violence from outside the communities are productive for outsiders, but
internal identity pushes back against production of stereotypes and fear, attempting to separate
personhood from criminality. It is in these realms that the idea of collective memory as an
influence on identity creation is salient.185 There are different temporalities of collective
memories of marginality (past and present), and of the “entrepreneurialism” that lift both
communities out of this state. Thus, community identities that are based on tenets of resistance
become a form of insurgent citizenship.
Community organizations in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio play a significant role in
developing insurgent citizenship as well as in identity production. In both communities, the
temporal difference in identity also follows a generational divide. The current generation of
adults is one of the first that have been born and raised in each community. They have no
personal histories of migration and change, and no other community context with which to relate.
Their entire personal identity in terms of place is related to their community. Thus, there are two
main temporal veins in discussions of marginality. One is associated with the creation of a
community history; the other, with acknowledging the present and the needs of the current
moment. Insurgent citizenship in each community is based on both.
The practices of insurgent citizenship open space for using informality as a social tool in
negotiating a dialectic of power. The next chapter will show that racialization and
marginalization of place in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio is a method of external control of
labeling a place, and of conflating race with social negatives such as violence and poverty.
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Chapter 3
Perceptions and Control

“My study revealed that residents of favelas are not “marginal” to society but tightly integrated
into it, albeit in an asymmetrical manner. They give a lot and receive very little. They are not on
the margins of urban life or irrelevant to its functioning, but actively excluded, exploited, and
“marginalized” by a closed social system.”
(Perlman, 2010, 15)
Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro
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Introduction
Chapter 2 argued that community identity in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio is a form of
insurgent citizenship and a resistance identity, but it did not analyze the narrative that this
resistance necessarily fights against. The internally-determined identity of each community is not
the vision commonly held of informality in society, rather it is influenced by power dynamics
between the community and external sources – other residents of Santa Cruz de la Sierra and
Niterói-Rio de Janeiro and the public social rhetoric of poverty and race, driven by stereotypes
and perceptions rather than fact. These perceptions, which Chapter 2 determined are
territorialized through association with delegitimized informality, control the social imaginary of
urban informality. Thus, territorial stigmatization186 is a method of social control. Clearly,
perpetuated in the relationship between society and those living in informality are an imbalance
of power and social recognition that necessitate community resistance. To understand the
dynamic between resistance and the continuous nature of oppression, Chapter 3 examines the
manifestations and consequences of societal perceptions of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio.
In this chapter, I use perception outside of the realm of urban studies and development
methodologies. Within urban studies and geography literature, perception is often discussed in
terms of community satisfaction as a measure of community development.187 This
methodological tool bridges the power imbalance between marginalized communities, local
governments, and development practitioners. However, in this paper perception refers to the
more pervasive definition of “a mental image.”188 It is also closely tied to Wacquant’s concept of
territorial stigmatization, as perceptions of space influence and are the result of stigma of space.
External perceptions of informal communities indicate the manifestation of social
rhetoric around informality, and point to its intersections with race and class. This chapter
explores the common perceptions of those who do not live in informal communities of Santa
Cruz de la Sierra and Niterói-Rio de Janeiro about informal communities in their cities, as well
as the ways in which these perceptions manifest. I argue that perceptions and stereotypes of Plan
3000 and Morro do Palácio – and informal communities in general – are evident in both the
media and public policy. Perceptions exist in a ‘feedback loop’ in which they self-perpetuate
misconceptions about informality. This loop results in the mainstream media’s legitimization of
incorrect beliefs and ineffective policy and governance, further marginalizing those living in
informality. Perceptions are important because they influence the development of the social
imaginary as well as of real, material possibility. In addition, perceptions – like stereotypes –
have the capacity to erase and obscure because they are nonspecific, and the generalizations they
186
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draw mask the complexities of life in informality. While it is true that informal communities
experience extreme poverty that most formal communities do not experience to the same degree,
the informal economy is a significant contributor to urban economic production. Generalized
perceptions of poverty mask this fact. Because perceptions then become part of the social
imaginary, they influence the way in which people think and react. I therefore also argue that
perceptions contribute to the social control of public discourse and policy. To do this I first
explore the perceptions of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, and informal settlements more
generally, as evidenced by interviews with urbanites. I then conduct a media analysis of
publications from both cities to uncover the rhetoric of racialized violence about each
community. In the final section, I discuss the impact of these perceptions and resulting popular
discourse on housing policy in Rio de Janeiro, Niterói, and Santa Cruz de la Sierra.
Building Public Perceptions
In both the Bolivian and Brazilian cases, any discussion of poverty or violence is
inseparable from notions of race. In the settlements of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, this
association also extends to physically peripheral urban spaces. Any categorization of perceptions
is therefore inherently insufficient, and must be considered in conjunction with other categories.
The interviews conducted in both communities reveal the difficulty of separating outsiders’
perceptions of informal communities into such categories. Statements about internal migrants,
for example, carry both race and class-related opinions and may also be a comment about the
state of violence in a community. However, the exercise of categorization allows for a deeper
interrogation of the roots of different kinds of perceptions. Therefore, the sections that follow are
an attempt to categorize perceptions to reveal both their basis and their relationship to other
categories.
Spatially Informal: Perceptions of the Informal as Illegal, Unregulated, and Peripheral
The previous chapter established that informality elicits resistance identities, in part
because of their spatial relationships to the rest of urban space. In this sense, delegitmized forms
of informality are territorialized in terms of identity. Due to the concentration of people with
marginalized identities in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, predominant perceptions of race and
poverty in Bolivia and Brazil contribute to the further territorialization of resistance identity.
Bolivia
Perceptions of interviewees in Santa Cruz who did not live in Plan 3000 or nearby
ciudadelas indicated that the Plan was almost uniformly conceived of as disorganized.189 Many
informants were also aware that that the Plan’s population has grown due to internal migration.
189
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One Santa Cruz informant, Jhonny, said that he had only briefly visited Plan 3000, but that
people there “have a lot of need” and are poor, and that much of the property is not
regularized.190 Carolina, who lives elsewhere in Santa Cruz and used to teach nutrition classes in
the Plan, described it as disorganized and dirty, and that people think very badly of the Plan.191
She mentioned that she disliked the disorganized nature of the Plan. These kinds of perceptions
that identify problems with the internal spatial organization of Plan 3000 were mainly held by
people who had visited or worked in Plan 3000 as opposed to those who had never been there in
person.
One resident of Plan 3000, interviewed as she was resting after shopping in the city
center in the Plaza 24 de Septiembre, said that she found the Plan chaotic because everything is
growing.192 According to the informant, Plan 3000 was among the most unorganized and unsafe
ciudadelas in the city, but has since become much more developed and has nice urban structures
like plazas, although some sections still have significant poverty. Laura, another informant who
lives in the nearby ciudadela of Pampa de la Isla and worked in Plan 3000 for many years,
echoed the frustration of both residents and visitors with the disorganization of the Plan. Laura
was specifically bothered by the state of the informal markets on the Rotonda – the main
roundabout – and thought they were ugly.193
Laura’s comment alludes to a larger debate over public markets in Santa Cruz de la
Sierra. Joshua Kirshner highlights the importance of informal vendors in the city, observing that
“market vendors have become a flashpoint for issues surrounding the informal economy, inmigration, and demographic change” (153).194 Internal migration to Santa Cruz is associated with
the rise of the informal economy, which most visibly manifests as sprawling markets or street
vendors, overwhelmingly operated by Andean migrants. This growth of the informal economy
has been referenced as the “marketization” or an “invasion” of the city, with an estimated total of
88 markets (18 informal) in Santa Cruz in 2007 (168). Plan 3000 has eight markets, all of which
are informal (169). Kirshner argues that these processes have also resulted in spatially-articulated
hostility towards migrants, which are most closely associated with urban markets. The rise of the
informal market in Santa Cruz has also led to the consolidation of informal merchant power in
the form of gremios, or vendors’ guilds, which due to the fact that many informal vendors are
Andean internal migrants, then become racialized in the regionalist context of Santa Cruz
identity politics (166).
Gremios today remain a strong political force, with a seat on the City Council and an ally
in the mayor. The gremios are stigmatized as uncooperative and disorderly, while their
leadership complain of a lack of government responsiveness to gremio demands (173). For
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example, the municipal government organizes public space as a strategy to contain the sprawl of
informal markets in Santa Cruz. However, gremialistas do not always comply with these
policies, especially when they are formulated without vendor input, such as building a large
indoor market in an area with no vehicle or foot traffic.195 Due to this disconnect, informal
markets persist even as the government invests in public works. This is the case in Plan 3000,
where the markets on the Rotonda referenced by Laura remain despite the existence of a newly
built large indoor market intended to house Plan 3000’s gremialistas.
The gremialistas in the Plan contribute to its perception as unregulated and disorganized.
Cruceños who have been to Plan 3000, whether because they are residents or go to the Plan to
shop or sell in the markets, see this disorganization of public space caused by informal
commerce and the strength of the internal organization of these merchants as one of the principal
areas of concern for further development of the Plan. Bruno, an older man and internal migrant
from the Chaco region of Tarija to the south of Santa Cruz, believes that the Plan has “more
merchants than residents.”196 Bruno, a teacher, goes to Plan 3000 from time to time to buy
certain products197, and although he does not think of the Plan as a zona roja and sees it as “a
mix of all kinds of people”, he laments the prevalence of delinquency in the area. Numerous
informants interviewed in Plan 3000 also noted their dissatisfaction with the internal
organization of their community; one young woman mentioned that the disorganization of the
markets embarrassed her.198
The perception of the informal as spatially unregulated and separate in Santa Cruz goes
beyond the issue of markets. The effects of ethnic difference and migration also play into the
categorization of informal communities such as Plan 3000 as peripheral. Plan 3000 is physically
peripheral to the center of Santa Cruz, as are the other ciudadelas and informal settlements in the
city. In addition to this physical separateness operates a perception of the community as an ethnic
stronghold, that because of its location attains a spatial manifestation. Since the height ruralurban migration from western to eastern Bolivia in the 1960s and 1970s, and the economic pull
to Santa Cruz in the 1980s, Santa Cruz de la Sierra has been a pole for internal migration in
Bolivia. This interregional migration carried with it the history of ethnic and cultural differences
and discrimination in the country. Santa Cruz, long a city of European descendants and
assimilated and essentialized indigenous peoples, was neglected by the national government in
Sucre and La Paz for much of its history. Because of this, the city, department, and much of the
east acquired a “do it yourself” identity. After the consolidation of ties between the east and the
west, eastern regionalism took a more defensive stance. As westerners migrated east, the cultural
organizations and governing bodies that had developed independently of – or without the
assistance of – the central government in the west felt as though their way of life was under
195
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threat. Colla migration to Santa Cruz was seen as an intrusion on cruceño or camba territory.199
Therefore, in the cruceño spatial imaginary there is a long history of conceiving of spaces as
ethnically linked. The fact that informal settlements and commerce are dominated by Andean
migrants in Santa Cruz contributes to their perception as colla spaces.
Brazil
Like in Santa Cruz, informal settlements in Rio de Janeiro have long been perceived as
home to the urban ‘other’. Throughout the history of Rio de Janeiro, favelas, cortiços and
comunidades have been physical and social peripheries. Rio’s first documented favela, Morro da
Providência or Morro da Favella, was founded in the late 1890s on a morro near what today is
the city center. Favelas emerged as places for the poor and the marginalized – namely ex-slaves.
Before the advent of cheap mass transit in Rio, the poor were more likely to live near the center
of the city and closer to their workplaces. The spatial differentiation in terms of centralization of
the rich as the poor was thus less distinct than in the present era.200 Thus, many poor workers
settled in tenement houses in the city, which were considered unclean by many. With new urban
development projects in the 1900s, many of the city’s poor were evicted and found cheap or free
land on the steep hillsides peppered throughout Rio’s sprawl. In addition, favelas developed as
housing for runaway or freed slaves, and thus have a historical association with impoverished
black Brazilians.201
The people that settled in favelas profited off the land on the morros, as they would settle
and rent out sections of their land to other poor families. Yet favelas “were also a steam valve, a
way for politicians to ease social tension and reap political capital by protecting poor populations
from laws and policies that fit crudely with the city’s material, social, and cultural realities.”202
Thus, favelas provided an excuse or a strategy for those in power. Authorities did not have to
tailor their policies to benefit the poor, who could be scapegoated for larger social ills.
“There is every indication that some of the explanation boils down to the concurrence of
ascendant urbanism and quick informal expansion. But writings from the early twentieth century
about Brazil’s favelas and mocambos (shacks) suggest that the terms were invented not so much
to describe the places where poor people lived as to spell out the relationship between such places
and their surrounding cities” (Fischer 2014, 13).

The word favela therefore carries inherently racialized associations of poverty and otherness.
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More recent identity distinctions on the basis of differences in urban infrastructure
emerged in the 1960s. At this time in Rio de Janeiro, the city was undergoing the process of
infrastructure modernization. As the process progressed, areas of the ‘formal’ city were
prioritized, and few favelas and comunidades were paved with asphalt, leaving the roads dusty,
prone to flooding and erosion, and difficult to navigate. It was in this context that favela residents
began to refer to the “legalized neighborhoods” of Rio as “the asphalt”.203 When asked if people
in Niterói have prejudiced views of his community, an interviewee from Morro do Palácio used
this term to distinguish between Morro do Palácio and the rest of the city.
“They are prejudiced, from the moment that they don’t go up into a community. … As long as
they don’t know people from the community, without them being their employees, and without
knowing the community, they’re going to see me, black, with lots of hair, as a thief. [About a
community leader] they’ll say, oh, he’s a needy poor person, but they don’t know that in the
community [he] is a businessman, and that I work in a building with children. When they come
into the community, the wool gets taken away from their eyes. They have this idea that the
community only has football players, prostitutes, and thieves. It goes away. … And the people
that we say are “from the asphalt” are starting to buy things up here, to live up here. And it’s
something we have to be careful of too. Why now that they are coming up here would I go down
there?” (Emanuel, Morro do Palácio).204

Emanuel’s use of the term reveals that these identity distinctions based on physical infrastructure
difference and thus visible marginality persist today, although they can be overcome to a certain
extent with increased contact between the formal and the informal. This implies that informality
in Rio-Niterói is primarily seen as a place in the social imaginary, and inherently tied to
historical associations of race and place in the city. In ideologically separating themselves from
the identity of the ‘formal’ city, favela identity once again becomes a resistance identity, where
resistance takes on a spatial dimension. Resistance identity is thus territorialized.205
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“Tem preconceito, desde o momento que não sobe em uma comunidade. ... Enquanto não conhece pessoas da
comunidade, sem ser os seus empregados, e não conhece a sua comunidade, eles vão ver como eu, negro, cabeludo,
como um bandido, o Salgadinho – vão falar assim, ah, é um pobre necessitado, mas não sabe que na comunidade
Salgadinho é empresário da comunidade, eu trabalho num prédio com crianças. Quando eles entram na comunidade,
passa a borracha na mente deles. Tinha essa visão que a comunidade só tem jogadores de futebol, prostituta e
bandido. Sai. Sai. E o pessoal que a gente fala “do asfalto”, já tá começando a comprar coisas aqui em cima, morar
aqui em cima. E é uma coisa que também nós temos que ter cuidado. Porque já que ele que tá embaixo quer subir,
então porque eu vou descer?” (Emanuel, Morro do Palácio)
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Gente Humilde: External Perceptions of Poverty and Marginality
Bolivia
Plan 3000 has a history of being perceived as a marginal section of Santa Cruz de la
Sierra. These views are supported and fed by readily available information about the quality of
life in the Plan. For example, a report from El Deber reveals that Plan 3000 had 7.4 percent of
homes affected by mosquito-born illnesses such as dengue, chikungunya, and zika – the highest
percentage of any district in Santa Cruz.206
Interviews revealed two main schools of thought about the state of development of Plan
3000. Many informants – the majority of whom had not visited or been exposed to Plan 3000 in
person – believed Plan 3000 to be a place of poverty and delinquency. One Santa Cruz resident
who does not live in Plan 3000 but has owned a plot of land there since 1990 says that he
invested in the plot when it was cheap. An internal migrant from Potosí, he lives closer to the
center of Santa Cruz because it is nearer to his workplace.207 His experience with Plan 3000 is
thus mostly for economic gain. For the informant, the Plan is characterized by informal
commerce, “gangs, and fights between gangs.” He likened the area to the city of El Alto,
arguably the largest informal settlement in Bolivia on the outskirts of the capital La Paz, now its
own municipality. This vision upholds this first view of the community as dangerous and
impoverished.
Another informant interviewed in the city center said that in the past people said it was a
"barrio marginal", a marginal neighborhood with a “bad reputation”, but with the many classes
and organizations there currently, it is getting better.208 Significantly, this informant was a
resident of the ciudadela Villa Primero de Mayo, and had thus personally seen the development
of the community. The perceived role of community organizations in this perception is notable.
This remark is representative of the second view of the community, which acknowledges the
problems in the Plan but is aware of and values its progress.
Brazil
Favelas in Niterói and Rio de Janeiro are famous for their high levels of violence and the
poverty of their residents. One of the principal factors in these negative perceptions is the name
favela itself, and other official designations for informal communities. In official government
literature, favelas are dubbed ‘subnormal agglomerations’. This term immediately places the
informal in a hierarchy with the formal, and removes the dignity of human organization that
comes with the terms ‘community’, ‘neighborhood’, or ‘favela’. Elielton Quieroz Rocha, a
resident of Morro do Palácio and employee of the MACquinho, signaled the importance of
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complexifying the designation of subnormal agglomeration. “This causes a huge distancing”, “so
that we see the community in a generalized way.” “Every community has its particularities, and
community of Palácio is no different.”209 In addition, as discussed above, favela is also
inherently tied to social marginality and urban projects of power. The very names of informal
communities in Brazil thus elicit negative perceptions.
“Our community is not needy. Lots of people see the community as needy. But today that’s not
the case. Not ours. Because we have water, we have electricity, we have garbage collection, [but]
we have a lack of responsibility among the residents in our community. There is a garbage dump
there, but residents put their cars there and block the dump. People are building houses here on
the sidewalk. Almost in the middle of the street. … The problem with our community is us.”210
(Emanuel, Morro do Palácio, 2016).

Territorial Stigmatization through the Media, Violence, and Race
The territorial stigmatization of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio is significantly shaped
by public discourse around violence as well as the reality of crime and lack of responsible
policing in these areas. In her analysis of violent crime in São Paulo, Teresa Caldeira notes that
“the talk of crime feeds a circle in which fear is both dealt with and reproduced, and violence is
both counteracted and magnified.”211 The more people talk about violence, the more stereotypes
and fears about violence are reproduced. Caldeira importantly connects this to the ordering and
classification of space in the public imagination. Narratives of crime order the space of the city
according to possibilities of danger. Caldeira’s approach to the relationship between narrative
and crime will frame the following analysis of perceptions of violence in Plan 3000 and Morro
do Palácio. According to Caldeira:
“Like other everyday practices of dealing with violence, crime stories try to recreate a stable map
for a world that has been shaken. These narratives and practices impose partitions, build up walls,
delineate and enclose spaces, establish distances, segregate, differentiate, impose prohibitions,
multiply rules of avoidance and exclusion, and restrict movements” (Caldeira 2000, 20).
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“É que, a nossa comunidade é uma comunidade que não é carente. Porque muita gente vê a comunidade carente.
Só que hoje em dia não tem isso. A nossa não é. Porque nós temos água, nós temos luz, nós temos coleto de lixo,
nós temos falta de responsabilidade dos moradores da nossa comunidade. Porque, tem uma lixeira ali, os moradores
votam carro, fechando a lixeira. Pessoal tá fazendo casa aqui quase na calçada. Não quase na meia da rua. E também
tão fazendo ...os nosso problema na nossa comunidade somos nós.” (Emanuel, Morro do Palácio, 2016).
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Thus, the “talk of crime” contributes to a social reordering of space within the city.212 Following
this assumption, in this section I analyze the relationship between public narratives, the media,
and government policy in the organization of space. This analysis focuses on narratives of crime
and violence from both individuals as well as those perpetuated by the media. The media plays
an important role in developing and maintaining public perceptions of violence in both Plan 3000
and Morro do Palácio. An examination of outsiders’ perceptions of these communities, media
analysis, and government policy shows that public rhetoric, news media, and government
rhetoric of violence are a means of social control and constant affirmation of informal
communities as “violent”.
Bolivia
Among residents of Santa Cruz perceptions of life in Plan 3000 are negative. Plan 3000 is
one of the more dangerous sections of the city, with frequent deaths and outbreaks of sickness
due to unhealthy living conditions and the concentration of people living in poverty. The most
negative perceptions of the Plan were overwhelmingly held by people with little to no personal
exposure to Plan 3000. These informants expressed perceptions that were almost exclusively
related to violence and migration. One informant who had never been to the Plan, Carla,
described Plan 3000 as “definitively not a good neighborhood,” with vandalism, robberies, and
rapes – “all the worst”. She hasn’t gone because she is afraid, and has no reason to go.213 Others
echoed these sentiments.
“I have heard of it but I haven’t gone there...that there are many, many robberies, delinquency,
that it is dangerous...but I haven’t visited that place” (Elena, 23). 214
“I don’t like to go to the Plan because there are very vicious people there” (Mauricio, 45).215

This violent reality is publicly communicated in city-wide newspapers and on local
television, which oftentimes seek out sensational stories of violence.216 During fieldwork in Plan
3000 and Santa Cruz de la Sierra, news reports of violence most often occurred in Plan 3000.
212
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Carla. Interview. Plaza 24 de Septiembre, Santa Cruz de la Sierra. April 6, 2016.
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“No me gusta ir al Plan porque hay gente muy viciosa por allá.” (Mauricio. Interview. Plaza 24 de Septiembre,
Santa Cruz de la Sierra. April 2, 2016.)
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However, other kinds of press that recognize the voices of the community are also apparent. During my
fieldwork, I saw a newscast about a group of parents in Plan 3000 that had “taken” the modulo educativo in the Plan
demanding that the director quit, accusing her of discriminating against colla parents.
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Headlines like “Burned and abandoned vehicle in Plan 3000” or “Man attacks his partner after
bout of jealousy” proliferate in the news.217 These reports tell a story of high levels of domestic
abuse and violent crime in the area. For example, a search of the word “asaltos” (assaults) in the
online version of El Deber, one of Santa Cruz’s largest and most important newspapers,
generated a list of two stories of recent assaults and robberies – both of which had occurred in
Plan 3000.218 However, Plan 3000 is not alone in its violent media reputation. While many such
incidents do occur in the Plan, the other ciudadelas in Santa Cruz are also essentialized as centers
of violence. Plan 3000, also known as Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez, is one of three official
ciudadelas in the city of Santa Cruz. The ciudadelas are subdivisions of the city – characterized
by poverty and their peripheral location on the extreme eastern edge of the city. In general, the
ciudadelas are parts of the city that are less regulated and more quickly developing than the more
central districts. Santa Cruz newspapers, reporting on extreme cases of violence in the city, then
help to perpetuate the reputation of the ciudadelas as strictly violent.
Aside from days of memorial celebrations of the founding of the ciudadelas, there is
more negative than positive news from Plan 3000 (Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez), Villa Primero de
Mayo, and Pampa de la Isla. One salient example is in an edition of La Estrella del Oriente, the
oldest major newspaper in Santa Cruz. The edition from March 18, 2016 celebrates the thirtythird anniversary of the founding of Plan 3000 on its cover and one additional page. While
celebrating the fact that over the years the community has made “giant steps”, it acknowledges
that residents still struggle with “civil insecurity, sewage, and flooding.”219 This rhetoric is both
beneficial and detrimental to the progress of the Plan. Exposure of community issues in the city
newspaper is a platform for problems to be brought to light and for public officials to be held
accountable. Indeed, the article ends with a community member calling city authorities to action
to solve the flooding problem, which affects “hundreds of families”. However, the rhetoric of
insecurity and poverty does nothing to bolster the image or worth of the community in the public
imagination. In the same edition of La Estrella, in the “security” section, is a story of a horrific
act of domestic violence in which a woman’s partner had punched her face leaving multiple
wounds (which were featured in a large photo next to the article), and previously beat her while
she was pregnant with their fourth child, who later died.220 This violence occurred in the
ciudadela Villa Primero de Mayo. Stories like this contribute to the creation of an image of the
ciudadelas as overwhelmed by violence.
Residents of Santa Cruz (not Plan 3000) embrace the rhetoric of this negative press.
Outside of Plan 3000, the community is thought to be one of the most dangerous parts of the city
of Santa Cruz. For some, especially those who have never visited, the negative rhetoric shapes
their perceptions of and interactions with the district. For example, one interviewee, Ariana, said
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she had never visited the Plan because she had never had a reason to go, and mentioned hearing
on television that there is “a lot of delinquency, and lot of gangsters” in the Plan.221 Another
Santa Cruz resident echoed these sentiments.
“If you listen to the news coming out of Plan 3000 every day… all the rapes, robberies...of poor
people, people that don’t have more than their little house, how is it that people can go and rob
them? No, it’s not conceivable, is it? It’s not conceivable to rob poor people. And it’s drug
addicts who do it. So they don’t care. They don’t live in reality.” (Carla, 60). 222

Interestingly, the more exposure informants had to Plan 3000, the more likely they were to have
positive perceptions of the ciudadela. Many informants expressed mixed opinions, citing
violence and disorganization as drawbacks, but adding that residents were hard working and that
Plan 3000 was becoming a more organized and pleasant place to live.
Another key aspect to the creation of a violent community image is the racialization of
violence in Bolivia. In the interviews of residents from outside the community there emerged the
idea that the presence of internal migrants in Santa Cruz increases the level of violence in the
city. For example, immediately after classifying Santa Cruz de la Sierra as a multicultural city,
two informants outlined their beliefs about how internal migration has made Santa Cruz more
unruly and violent.
“The people from the interior don’t respect the norms or rules of Santa Cruz. They turn bad and
obstinate. They set up in the streets, the plaza, the bus terminals, the airport, and they sell food. It
is a disorganized city. [The people from the interior] don’t understand. They say ‘I have to work
and you all have to feed me.’ It continues to grow disorganized” (Leticia, 50s, SC).223

Leticia said that when she and her family arrived in Santa Cruz in the 1970s, it was more
organized. Leticia is therefore herself an internal migrant, but identifies as camba. Her
companion Andrea, 19 and who also identifies as camba, added that “security was better,
because there weren’t a lot of thugs.” Leticia added, “Evo Morales permitted this migration. [He
said] ‘Go there to the cities of the cambas.’” Andrea believed that this made the situation in
Santa Cruz worse. Another informant had heard that the Plan is “the most dangerous zone”, with
robberies, a black market for stolen goods, and assaults. She had never visited because she was
scared to do so, and added that without a migrant population, “there would be more security
here. Right now it is too insecure [unsafe].”224 The fact that both Leticia and Andrea identify as
221
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camba is important, as informants who identified as cruceño or camba were more likely to
remark on the negative influence of collas or western internal migrants in the city.
There is therefore an element of east-west ethnic tension embedded in perceptions of Plan
3000, although racist views did not emerge in many of the interviews with people from eastern
Bolivia. The majority of residents of Plan 3000 are internal migrants or descendants of internal
migrants from Western Bolivia. It is clear from the fieldwork that the history of the formation of
Plan 3000 is well known throughout the city and amongst informants of different generations, as
is the fact that the population of Santa Cruz de la Sierra grew in part due to heavy west-east and
rural-urban internal migration. The observed increase in violence as the city grew has then
become correlated with the simultaneous internal migration to the east. Another informant, an
internal migrant himself from the Chaco region who has lived in Santa Cruz for 30 years, noted
that “the city has [culturally] ‘ruralized’” due to internal migration.225 This racialization of
violence is therefore socially justified by the correlation between race or ethnicity and class in
Bolivia, as the majority of internal migrants to Santa Cruz de la Sierra are economic migrants in
search of employment.
Brazil
Rio de Janeiro is widely perceived to be one of the most dangerous cities in Brazil – if
not Latin America. High crime rates and instances of assault, robberies, gun battles, and drug
trafficking – especially in the favelas – often represent the city on an international scale. In
addition, there is ample evidence that the increasing militarization of the police in Rio de Janeiro
and throughout Brazil has contributed to a rise in rates of violent crime, police corruption and
abuse of power, and distrust of the police, leading to a high rate of unreported violent crime.226
Caldeira suggests that increasing violence in Brazil “arises from a combination of factors that
culminate by delegitimating the judiciary system as a mediator of conflicts and privatizing the
process of vengeance, trends that can only make violence proliferate” (137). Within the
metropolitan area of Rio – which includes the municipality of Rio de Janeiro and the 20
surrounding ‘satellite’ cities including Niterói.227
Perhaps the most well known consequence (or cause) of violent crime in Rio is the rise of
Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (Pacifying Police Units – UPPs). These units were first
deployed in Rio in 2007 in preparation for the Pan-American Games in order to “have a safe city
to receive the athletes and international community.”228 Their primary goal is to expel criminals
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from Rio’s favelas and regain control of these spaces; they invade, clean, and pacify.229
Significantly, the UPPs are tied to the Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE) or the
Elite Special Forces, descended from the policing arm of Brazil’s military dictatorship and
famous for their extreme violence.230 According to Larkins, the UPPs are a direct result of the
state response to negative perceptions of favelas, as favelas are “the site of violence in the
Brazilian cultural imaginary” (15). UPPs are currently deployed throughout many municipalities
in Brazil, including Niterói.
The city of Niterói, part of metropolitan Rio de Janeiro, is known to locals as Rio’s main
dormitory city. Across the bay from the convoluted urbanity of Rio, Niterói is slightly less
chaotic than its neighbor. Its lack of international tourist attractions makes it appealing to
commuting Brazilians who want to escape the bustle of Rio at home while maintaining their
access to the economic, cultural, and employment benefits of an internationally connected world
city.
However, many niteroienses are expressing concern at the fact that their city is becoming
more violent. They perceive a negative influence of the favelas in Rio on the increasing violence
in the favelas and comunidades of Niterói. Just as in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, news media in Rio
and Niterói help to disseminate negative images of favelas. The voices of these communities
regarding self-determination of community identity are not represented in the mainstream media.
Morro do Palácio in Niterói, like many favelas and informal communities, has a
reputation for violence that is reported on and therefore perpetuated by the media. Indeed, most
publically available information on Morro do Palácio is related to violence. A January 2014
article in the Rio Times described the community of Palácio as one of “Niterói’s most dangerous
favelas.”231 Battles between rival gangs CV and ADA occurred in Morro do Palácio as recently
as May 2015.232 Even though the surrounding neighborhoods of Ingá and Boa Viagem are
relatively calm, safe places to live, there are an increasing number of assaults and thefts. The
Zona Norte of Niterói experienced the brunt of crime over the past 10 years, and Morro do
Palácio is situated very near this area. In 2006 rates of theft were above 35 percent in central
Niterói (the district in which Morro do Palácio is located).233 By 2016 the number was reduced to
the still impressive 24.3 percent, and the percentage of crime in the Zona Norte increased.
Connections to Rio’s drug trafficking industry are thought to be the cause of Niterói’s
burgeoning crime rate. Many favelas in Niterói are being infiltrated or co-opted by criminal
organizations that have been kicked out of favelas on the other side of the bridge, in Rio. These

229

(Larkins 2015)
(Ibid.)
231
Hearst, Chesney. 2014. “Homicides Increase 116 Percent in Niterói From Last Year.” The Rio Times. January 7.
232
Emanuel, Claudio. 2015. “Traficantes em Guerra no Palácio.” O Fluminense. May 19.
233
Teixeira, Fábio and Igor Mello. 2016. “Niterói: Uma Década de Violência Urbana.” O Globo. January 29.
Accessed on October 28, 2016.
230

Gempler 86
expulsions are the result of the work of the UPPs.234 According to the intelligence service of the
12th BPM (Niterói) that mapped the favelas and criminal factions in Rio and the Região
Oceânica (Oceanic Region), in 2011 there were 55 communities in Niterói under the control of
the three drug factions of Rio (CV, TC, and ADA). Figure 3.1 indicates that the community of
Morro do Palácio was a destination for these fleeing gang members, and the map in Figure 3.2
shows that Morro do Palácio is controlled (in 2011) by the same faction that operates in Rocinha,
one of the largest and most notorious favelas in Rio. Therefore, attempts to pacify Rocinha and
favelas within the same criminal network have led to the diffusion of the gang’s influence to the
larger metropolitan area, making Niterói a new hotbed of criminal activity.
(See Macalester College hard copy)
Figure 3.1. “See where fleeing criminals go are going.” A graphic from a Rio newspaper shows that Morro do
Palácio is a destination for criminals fleeing favela pacification in Rio.235

(See Macalester College hard copy)
Figure 3.2. This newspaper graphic shows that Morro do Palácio, pictured in the bottom-left photograph, was
controlled by the same gang that operates in Rocinha, one of the largest favelas in Rio.236

Much of this information was gleaned from television and newspaper reports of violence
in Morro do Palácio. The ease of constructing the above narrative of violence in the community
from clips of television reports and online newspapers is indicative of the prevalence of public
information about violence in Morro do Palácio. Reports such as those pictured above in Figures
3.1 and 3.2 are examples of how criminal activity and favelas are linked in the media. Figure 3.1
categorizes Morro do Palácio as a refuge for drug trafficking criminals wanted in Rio, and Figure
3.2 implies that the community is part of a growing network of communities controlled by
criminal interests. The information in these reports is true, but incomplete. Missing from most
media coverage is information about the relationship between residents and gang members, the
percentage of residents actually involved in gang activity, and community life post-pacification.
Indeed, there are few analyses of the influence of policing itself on community violence.
On one hand, trafficking organizations and gangs provide a sense of security in many
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communities that they control, as they determine the extent and the kind of violence they will
permit.237 Once police disrupt this control, personal security becomes compromised. Many
favelas in Rio exist in a state of perpetual conflict between police and gangs, and the
confrontations disproportionately kill larger numbers of poor black men.238 Caldeira notes that
“the police, far from guaranteeing rights and preventing violence, are in fact contributing to the
erosion of people’s rights and the increase of violence.”239 The process of pacification thus
brings more violence than it aims to prevent, and harms the most marginalized in the process.
Caldeira sums up the relationship between poverty and criminality by pointing out that poverty
“reproduces the victimization and criminalization of the poor, the disregard of their rights, and
their lack of access to justice.”240
The process of pacification in Morro do Palácio began in 2011, although there is still a
gang presence in the community.241 Residents describe the violence of the process as all
encompassing; they were at risk from gun battles and described injuries and property damage
from stray bullets.242 These confrontations, especially those that spilled onto the streets of Niterói
below the community, were covered in the media, contributing to the public perception of Morro
do Palácio as a center of violence.243
With the intensification of the pacification effort in the metropolitan area of Rio, favelas
and comunidades are generally regarded as dangerous. As indicated in Chapter 2 in the analysis
of media coverage of violence in Niterói and Morro do Palácio, this danger is based in the reality
of conflict between UPPs and traffickers; indeed, Morro do Palácio was among the first two
communities to be occupied by UPPs outside of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro.244 The media
coverage of this violent reality contributed to a public image of Morro do Palácio that focused on
its poverty and dangers. Many outlets cover the tragedies and the needs of Morro do Palácio,
using headlines with words like “invasion” and “war”.245 These kinds of headlines are recent as
well, for example, one article describes a warlike shootout between rival gang factions and
subsequently the military police in May 2015.246 As much as this kind of journalism accurately
reports on the most dramatic occurrences in Morro do Palácio, there is no balance to the public
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rhetoric. Only more community-focused organizations and research centers through universities
such as the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF) and TV Comunitária de Niterói focus on
presenting a more diversified view of Morro do Palácio’s reality.
~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~
Rhetoric of crime and violence in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio thus contributes to
their territorial stigmatization. The communities become associated in the public imagination
with danger and the possibility of criminal violence, which deters other urbanites from
understanding the more positive aspects of community life. Plan 3000 struggles with perceptions
of being a “bad neighborhood”, which is bolstered by the media’s nearly exclusive coverage of
violent crime. This stigmatization is then reproduced in conversations between urbanites. In
addition, the association between ethnic minorities in Santa Cruz and poverty adds another layer
to the stigmatization of the community. Criminal activity becomes racialized, and due to the
concentration of migrants in Plan 3000, its territory acquires an additional negative association.
A similar process occurs in Morro do Palácio. By focusing journalistic efforts on the violence in
the community and its effects on the formal parts of Niterói – the asfalto – the onus of
criminality is territorialized. It is important to recognize that it both cases, violence is a daily
reality that affects the quality of life of residents. However, a lack of balanced media coverage
and the propensity to sensationalize negative information contributes to a larger narrative that
further marginalizes Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio in the public eye.
In both cases, the stereotypes are magnified as the community’s names are added to the
long list of poor, informal favelas and ciudadelas in Rio and Santa Cruz that experience similar
violence and stigmatization. The experience of each community thus becomes part of a larger
imaginary of urban poverty, acquiring the stigma of processes outside itself.

Mechanisms of Control: Influencing Policy and Shaping Media Narratives
As is clear from the above analysis, media coverage contributes to the territorial
stigmatization of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, affecting public perception of these spaces.
The social rhetoric surrounding informality is fed by these perceptions, which are also based on
social constructions and criminalization of race, class, and spatial relationships. The more
insidious danger of public perceptions lies in their ability to influence actual policy, whereby
they become institutionalized. For example, policy makers who are blind to or misinformed
about the effect of militarized police in poor communities may support initiatives such as
Brazil’s UPPs, and the Bolivian business class may be loath to invest in the growing businesses
in Plan 3000 due to the racialization and classist associations of violence within the community.
The desire to maintain the status quo means that government policy keeps the “other” at the
margins of society. In relation to informality, this manifests as a directly or indirectly enforced
separateness of Morro do Palácio and Plan 3000, which will not be incorporated into the social
imaginary of the city or as equal beneficiaries of government policy until their public reputations
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are altered. The informal is not part of the inclusive urban imaginary. As a result, lawmakers and
the public can justify policies that negatively affect informal communities as well as equal
application of laws that benefit them.
Examples of this interplay between social marginalization and government accountability
in both case studies are abundant. In response to discrimination, residents of Morro do Palácio
have taken public action to demand change. One recent example occurred in December 2013,
when after a power outage affected the entire city of Niterói, Morro do Palácio was without
electricity after the problem had been fixed in the ‘formal’ sectors of the city.247 Authorities said
they would restore the community’s access in several days, even though most of the rest of the
city had already been attended to. Aside from this lack of responsiveness, residents believed the
lack of electricity posed a threat to their well-being, especially the elderly and sick of Morro do
Palácio who would have to climb up the steep morro in the dark. After a full 24 hours without
power, hundreds of outraged community members descended the morro and protested along the
main road that lies beneath the community (which also houses the local law school). Protesters
said they felt discriminated against, and that this lack of timely responsiveness was common for
the community. Said a community member, “It’s absurd, it’s a lack of consideration for the poor.
We’re poor but we work too.” In this case, the social positionality of Morro do Palácio provided
an excuse for the prefecture’s lack of action. Arguably, the community’s informality and
associated intersections led to its perception as a socially inferior urban space.
In Plan 3000 and other poor sections of Santa Cruz de la Sierra there are similar examples
of unresponsiveness and outright administrative neglect. The ‘origin story’ of Plan 3000 is a
somewhat dated example of this phenomenon. As previously detailed, the founding residents of
Plan 3000 were given little assistance from the municipal government and were forced to selforganize to pressure local authorities to provide basic services like water and electricity. Plan
3000 also offers an example of more institutionalized forms of intentional urban differentiation.
The official name of Plan 3000 is the Ciudadela Andrés Ibáñez. As a ciudadela, Plan 3000 has
fewer administrative ties than other sections of Santa Cruz. Although it is technically District 8
in governmental and urban planning circles, the Plan is still considered a separate institutional
entity from the city itself. There is a total of four ciudadelas in Santa Cruz: Ciudadela Andrés
Ibáñez (Plan 3000), La Villa Primero de Mayo, Pampa de la Isla, and Bajío del Oriente.248 The
ciudadelas are characterized by large populations249, a relatively peripheral location to the city
center (outside the fourth city ring), their status as reception hubs for internal migrants, high
levels of poverty and violence, and consequently negative perceptions by many cruceños.
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Ciudadelas are also defined by their large populations and many neighborhoods as well as
complete “consolidation of basic services”.250 Significantly, Santa Cruz’s four ciudadelas all
began as informal settlements, and most remain characterized today by a lack of titled land and
an ever-expanding market for urbanizaciones – the distribution of parcels of urban land. In
addition, ciudadelas are differentiated from simple informal settlements in Santa Cruz by high
population density, the presence of some public infrastructure such as a market or a plaza,
limited public infrastructure, and basic notions of design.251 Ciudadelas are therefore conflated
with the condition of and settlement patterns of informality.
Leaders and activists in Plan 3000 have publically promoted the vision of the Plan as an
autonomous municipality since 2006. Indeed, in many ways it functions and imagines itself to be
its own entity, and it has been suggested to be “the only successful settlement in all of Latin
America” despite the high levels of poverty in some sections of the Plan.252 Currently, Plan 3000
and all city districts have appointed sub-mayors (subalcaldes), who are responsible for
administrative duties within their district but have limited representative accountability. Official
designation as a city would allow for municipal elections and better representation as well as
more access to and better distribution of resources amongst Plan 3000 residents. One major
obstacle to the equitable and accountable distribution of resources and general government
responsiveness to need is the lack of knowledge of the official population of Plan 3000. The
2001 Census counted just over 148,000 residents in the ciudadela, although there are estimated
to be over 350,000 today. A leader of a Plan 3000 neighborhood said that an official designation
as a municipality would authorize leaders to make Plan 3000 more self-reliant, receive the
correct amount of resources for their population, and attend to those who need the most support.
253
Without this designation and a more accurate census recount, the ciudadela is more easily
ignored and a lack of resources can be officially justified. The lack of institutional inclusion due
to its history of informality thus continues to have ramifications for Plan 3000 in terms of quality
of life and equal consideration under municipal law.
An important consideration of the power dialectic between perception and law is the way
in which law is manipulated to benefit the elite more than the oppressed, and justified based on
negative perceptions or assumptions. Holston reveals the duality of a social tool like the law in
the case of Brazil, where rather than being used to protect the rights of all Brazilian citizens, the
law was routinely manipulated by elites. For Brazilians, the law thus took on a negative
association with control and the undermining of political citizenship.254 The law is therefore not
an institution of moral legitimacy, especially as it relates to citizenship. “This law has little to do
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with justice, and obeying it reduces people to a category of low self esteem” (19). This unevenly
applied control is what Holston refers to as a “misrule of law”.255
The role of the law in controlling informality is apparent in the relationship between
classifications of legality and possible forms of citizenship. As Holston theorizes, “by making
available strategies of action and argument, law also motivates the development of specific types
of citizens to enact citizenship” by structuring the possibilities for the distribution of rights (19).
This relationship between possibilities of action, consideration under the law, and the application
of the law itself as a social tool is inherently unbalanced. In relation to informality, it can be
argued that the “misrule of law” is indeed the permanent state of the law. However, the true
duality of the law and the types of citizenships it encourages are evident in the struggles and
occasional successes of informal communities, including in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio. For
example, in cases of official neglect and a lack of recognition of rights such as in Plan 3000 and
of the outright failure to equally enforce the law and respond to emergencies as in Morro do
Palácio, the law as an institution fails those living in informality. However, the law also acts a
tool through which the marginalized have been able to gain power; to legitimize themselves and
their presence.256 Law and public policy are therefore institutional tools that can legitimize and
formalize actions informed by institutionalized perceptions, as well as provide avenues for
actions of resistance by those marginalized by said institutions. This section explores this
relationship, delving into how the governments of Rio de Janeiro, Niterói, and Santa Cruz de la
Sierra interact with informal communities, and what these approaches reveal about the
relationship between community identity and citizenship, the perception of these identities, and
institutional policy.

Informality and the Law: Regularizing the Extralegal in Rio, Niterói, and Santa Cruz
Government Approaches to Informality: Development Strategies and Manifestations of Attitudes
Towards Informality
Holston argues that in Brazil, citizenship is expressed through and determined by the
law. Citizens use the law as a strategy of social action, and are also empowered by the law to
enact legal or illegal citizenships (e.g. as a voter, or a someone in charge of a community crime
ring).258 However, Holston also frames the law as a tool in the struggle over land, in which the
powerful use the law to legitimate illegal appropriations of land “to the extent that illegality
became a general condition of settlement and the distinction between legal and illegal porous.
Even in its violation, law establishes the terms if not the means of conflict” (25). This
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observation can be applied to both the Brazilian and the Bolivian case to understand how
governments have approached ‘informal’ occupations of land.
The regularization of informal land is a concept at the heart of the debate about the best
way in which to develop and support urban informal communities. Regularization refers to the
granting of land titles and thus the formal incorporation of settlements into the governmentallyrecognized urban space. Upon regularization, the government is obligated to provide access to
services such as electricity. In theory, this practice should ensure that residents of informal
settlements are given equal rights and access to services and the possibility for advancement that
exists in formal sectors of the city. Therefore, prioritizing regularization reveals that the
designation and control of land is a government’s priority, even if improving living conditions is
the primary intention.
In reality, there is a debate as to whether integration of informal settlements into the
formal housing market – an idea popularized in the development world by de Soto – is actually
beneficial for residents. Land regularization as theorized by de Soto and many others is an
intervention aimed at achieving housing security, and thus converting self-built homes into
possible capital for future economic advancement.259 In theory, if a resident owns the title to
their land the government cannot evict them. However, as Williamson argues, in many cases the
most affordable housing market is located within informal areas. Regularizing the land and
giving residents property rights thrusts them into the formal housing market, whereupon the
value of their property increases and they may not be able to afford the rising cost of living in
their own home.260 Scholars and activists like Williamson thus frame regularization as a path to
gentrification. The 2016 World Cities Report produced by UN-Habitat also acknowledges this
pattern, and proposes “less-than-complete title guaranteeing freedom from eviction may be more
useful to lower-income owners than full legal title that can be traded on a market” (55).
Williamson points to collective titling as a means through which it is possible to keep the
informal real estate market stable while working to integrate informal communities into the
formal city (2015).
Slum “upgrading” projects are another government strategy intended to improve informal
living conditions while privileging the desires of the state. Upgrading involves investing in
projects to improve the quality of homes. Participatory “upgrading” of housing is the approach
advocated by UN-Habitat as an effective means of improving living conditions in the world’s
slums.261 In theory, governments should be taking into account the needs and desires of the
communities in question. However, this is not always the case. As in the case of Rio de Janeiro,
municipal governments may move informal communities to other parts of the city instead of
working to improve infrastructure in the original community location – a strategy that also skirts
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the regularization process.262 In addition, there is some evidence to suggest that upgrading also
decreases land tenure security in informal settlements. In informal areas “speculation is
accentuated by ostensibly philanthropic acts when seeking to improve tenure security through
investments in infrastructure of slum areas by NGOs, developmental agencies and
governments.”263 Infrastructure development can therefore also cause gentrification effects that
economically force residents to relocate themselves.
The regulation of space as evidenced through planning is also an important indicator of
how governments view informal settlements. In many cases, informal settlements or markets
may occupy land designated as public. Public space is space in which difference is negotiated; a
place of citizenship.264 However, the definition of citizenship is socially determined, and
therefore only people who are citizens are welcome in public paces. Thus, public space is
socially controlled and is not public in the sense of being unregulated. On a basic level, this
provides justification for governments to modify settlement boundaries or remove settlements
from public land. Urban planning policies that modify the physical form or location of
settlements demonstrate that residents of these communities are not considered full citizens of
the urban space.

Rio de Janeiro: Integration, Upgrading, and Relocation
Here, I outline the housing policies common in Rio de Janeiro as they are largely
representative of policies throughout the metropolitan area, including in Niterói. They are
examples of the national approach to regulating space in aglomerados subnormais (subnormal
agglomerations), of which there are thousands throughout the metropolitan area of Rio de
Janeiro. The unique geography of the region means that informal communities are located on the
many morros that interrupt the urban layout, not only on the periphery or outskirts of city
centers. A nuanced understanding of the reality of the legality and illegality of these occupations
is paramount. As Roy theorizes, informality is not simply the existence of the precarious or
temporary within urban space.265 Informal development is pervasive, and may be legitimized
when beneficial to the elite and simultaneously vilified when in relation to the poor. Roy’s theory
is highly representative of informality in Brazil. In Holston’s analysis of Brazilian citizenships,
he highlights the importance of the law in framing and determining the distribution of the rights
of citizenship in terms of land. “Brazilians have massively used the strategies of law to legitimate
illicit appropriations of land – to legalize the illegal as I describe it – to the extent that illegality
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became a general condition of settlement and the distinction between legal and illegal porous.”266
Informality, as a gray space between the legal and illegal, is therefore also institutionalized to the
benefit of the elite. Given this fact, the treatment of delegitimized informality that in Brazil is
characterized by poverty and a lack of formal rights is concerning. Social and economic factors
that characterize delegitimized informalities become twisted into justifications for unequal
treatment. In terms of land rights, in which this principle dichotomy of types of informality
emerges, favelas have been continually marginalized and forcibly removed to make way for city
planning initiatives, in addition to experiencing systematic neglect by municipal governments.
The following analysis focuses on the most contemporary government approaches to informality
in Rio de Janeiro.
Governmental approaches to informality are significant on two main scales in Brazil: the
national and the municipal. On a national level, the Brazilian Constitution determines the
regulation of urban land management, but allows municipalities to determine the most effective
ways to implement these guidelines according to local contexts.267 In addition, there exist several
national housing institutions and policies, the most recent of which (2009) is the housing
program Minha Casa, Minha Vida (PMCMV) which incentivizes the production of new housing
units.268 In Rio de Janeiro, these guidelines and incentives manifest in housing policy as a
governmental methodology of integration. In other words, the municipal government seeks to
incorporate informal areas into the formal sector.
A book produced by the municipal government of Rio entitled Cidade Inteira (Whole
City) reveals the integration trend. In Rio, it is seen as the government’s duty to provide housing.
“The housing policy of the City of Rio de Janeiro was devised in the principle that dwelling, more
than having a house, is about a whole setting of goods, equipment and services that allow
personal development through the improvement of housing conditions. Furthermore, as this
setting belongs to the collectivity, it cannot be provided by the family. Thus, it is the
Government’s duty to provide it to the city dwellers, [who] nevertheless might have already
solved their housing problem, even precariously” (Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro 1999,
128).

Thus, housing on public land is the government’s responsibility. The city of Rio de Janeiro has
developed a plethora of official policies aimed at integrating favelas: Favela-Bairro (1994) a
comprehensive medium-scale favela upgrading plan, Bairrinho (1997) upgrading small favelas,
Grandes Favelas (1997) upgrading large favelas, Morar sem Risco (1994) relocating favelas
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from unsafe land, Núcleo de Regularização (1994) a land regularization program, Novas
Alternativas (1994) a building repurposing program, and Morar Carioca (2010) credited as one
of the most innovative favela integration programs to date.269
Favela-Bairro and Morar Carioca exemplify the integration approach to informality
regulation. Created in 1994 and aimed at favelas of 500 to 2,500 homes (about a third of the
favelas in Rio, and 60% of the favela population in 1999), Favela-Bairro was intended to convert
favelas into “low-income districts” of the city.270 “Using pre-existing buildings and services”
Favela-Bairro conducted basic infrastructure development of the water supply, sewage system,
electricity, garbage collection, reforestation, and the building of public community spaces.
Buildings like sports arenas and public plazas would in theory decrease physical and symbolic
boundaries between favela and city.271 Thus one main strategy of the municipal government was
to improve public spaces to encourage the integration of the formal and the informal through
interaction (133). Residents were not supposed to be evicted from their communities, and there
was little focus on land regularization.
The Favela-Bairro program was well-received, especially by academics and urban
planners, who appreciated the institutional approach to poverty alleviation. However, although
planners intended the upgrading process to be participatory, allowances and responses based on
the participation of residents of the decision-making process was limited.272 There was a “widely
held perception that favela residents do not have the capacity to understand the upgrading plans
as presented by the architects.”273 Stereotypes about poverty thus were an underlying factor in
the government’s approach to incorporating informal settlements.
The 2010 Morar Carioca program is considered an extension of and improvement upon
Favela-Bairro, with an “impressive participatory model, on-site upgrading that recognizes prior
investments made by residents, a focus on sustainability, and special “social interest” zoning
parameters to maintain areas for affordable housing.”274 However, Morar Carioca was never
implemented in Rio. Conflicting political and business interests – typified by the 2014 World
Cup and 2016 Olympic Games – caused the municipal government to reevaluate its priorities.
Plans to implement the program were abandoned, and any projects carried out under the same
name are considered a “hollowed out” version of the plan.275 In addition, communities that
expected upgrades under Morar Carioca experienced threat of eviction in preparation for Rio’s
mega-events. It is here that local and national policies work in tandem. The federal program
Minha Casa, Minha Vida (PMCMV) calls for new housing as a method of upgrading informal
269

Steiker-Ginzberg, Kate. 2014. “Morar Carioca: The Dismantling of a Dream Favela Upgrading Program.”Rio On
Watch. September 10.
270
Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro. 1999. Cidade Inteira: A Política Habitacional da Cidade do Rio de
Janeiro. Secretária Municipal de Habitação. Rio de Janeiro, 130.
271
(Ibid.)
272
(Riley et al. 2001, 529)
273
(Ibid.)
274
(Steiker-Ginzberg 2014)
275
(Ibid.)

Gempler 96
settlements. However, these new housing areas are often built at the physical periphery of cities,
in areas without sufficient infrastructure and far from the jobs and social circles of recently
moved residents.276 Such settlements became useful for favela resident relocation during the
recent urban restructuring of Rio, when favelas in Barra da Tijuca and the central port area were
cleared to make room for sports complexes and tourist attractions in the years leading up to the
2016 Olympics.277 The municipality of Rio de Janeiro thus recognizes the need to approach the
integration of informal settlements in order to alleviate urban poverty and conduct responsible
development, but questions of economic growth and international interests often outweigh the
implementation of such programs, and may even lead to their reversal.
Niterói: Neglectful Policy, Relocation, and Possibilities for Participatory Planning
Niterói has a much shorter history of municipal policy regarding informality than Rio de
Janeiro. As a municipality, Niterói attempts to follow federal and state directives regarding urban
planning and land regulation, especially after the 1988 Constitution resulted in movements for
urban reform and the development of Niterói's Directive Plan.278 The city’s first Secretariat of
Housing was established in 2002, and the first concerted municipal effort towards developing a
strategy for housing policy was in 2006, with the Plano Estratégico Municipal para
Assentamentos Informais Urbanos or the Strategic Municipal Plan for Urban Informal
Settlements (PEMAS). PEMAS is part of an effort of the Ministério das Cidades, the Ministry of
Cities, that enabled the development and implementation of integrated urban housing policy
across municipalities (68).
Niterói has a nearly nonexistent history of low-income and informal housing policy.
Low-income housing was constructed in Niterói in the 1970s and 80s, and not again until the
year 2000. PEMAS faults the “inexistence of a national housing policy, and the disinterest of
municipal authorities in implementing housing programs for low-income groups” (45). In part,
this disinterest was based in the belief that because nearby municipalities also did not have lowincome housing options, building new public housing would disproportionately attract the poor
to Niterói. PEMAS clarifies that in fact, the lack of formal options for housing did not reduce the
pull of the local job market, and low-income residents that worked in Niterói were forced to
“invent” their own solutions, creating “situations of risk that resulted in tragedy with the loss of
human life and, in others, in environmental degradation as a result of the occupation of areas
under permanent preservation” (45).
According to the plan, the 2000 census showed more than 17,000 people living in 64
areas designated as ‘subnormal’ in Niterói. However, the same census also lists more than
50,000 people living in ‘favelas’ in Niterói. The PEMAS explains that this difference is
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accounted for by different methods of conceiving of “areas of urban informal occupation” (34).
While the city considers identification of these communities to be essential in moving forward
with better service provision, differences in terms used for their classification among different
institutions also contributes to the confusion. The Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística
(IBGE), the organizing body of the national census, lists communities as assentamentos
subnormais (subnormal settlements), the COMPUR279 uses assentamentos populares precários
(precarious popular settlements), and the municipal Directive Plan uses áreas de ocupação
urbana informal or Áreas de Especial Interesse Social (areas of urban informal occupation or
Areas of Special Social Interest). As illustrated by this diversity of labels and data collection
strategies, any housing policy implemented in Niterói would be insufficient and ineffective due
to these disparities. In 2005, a new municipal department (the department of Civil Defense and
Community Integration) was formed to address these issues.280
In 2004, the municipality developed a methodology for placing informal communities
into a hierarchy of need to best identify those most in need of participating in municipal and
federal housing programs. These determinations were made based on location, degree of
consolidation (population size, duration of occupation, existence of a Resident’s Association),
income of residents, quality of the built environment, and impact of the community on the
environment (43). Significantly, communities that were closest to the ‘formal’ city in terms of
infrastructure development and internal organization were prioritized for participation. The
criteria for this prioritization included maps and demographic documentation as well as the
possibility of being easily regularized.281 Therefore, communities that have the most social
capital and most robust economies and internal organization received the majority of municipal
assistance – as opposed to those with fewer resources. Tellingly, the plan refers to Morro do
Palácio as Morro do Ingá, making it clear that the institutions involved in urban development
value the land more than the community itself. This is further supported by the fact that PEMAS
prioritizes the “localization, identification, and treatment...of cases of geotechnical risk for
habitation and permanence” (45).
The use of informality as an institutional tool is most apparent in PEMAS and in
Niterói’s housing policy through the use of the label “Areas of Special Social Interest” (AEIS).
These areas, first created in 1992, were created to ease “land and urban regularization, to be able
to apply a special urban strategy, so as to build popular housing in empty urban spaces” (46).
Throughout the 1990s, the municipality conducted various social projects in AEIS through the
program Vida Nova no Morro (New Life on the Hill) consisting of basic infrastructure
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improvement and health services.282 This program was not sustainably implemented and
eventually failed, but resulted in a robust health program. Since 2004, more AEIS have been
created as a result of Niterói’s participation in federal housing programs.283 These programs
identify AEIS and include rules for their regularization, resulting in the Nucleus of Land
Regularization in 2006.284 The label of AEIS is therefore evidence of a process in Niterói of 1)
creating a hierarchy of need that rewards internal organization in informal communities, 2)
encouraging the upgrading of informal sectors, and 3) creating institutional infrastructure to
facilitate this process. Labeling is a strategy of regularization designed to promote relocation.
Niterói’s strategy of formalization is indicative of the municipality’s attitude toward
informality as insufficient. PEMAS repeatedly refers to the “housing deficit” of Niterói,
deliberately not including the existence of informal settlements and their infrastructure in the
consideration of legitimate housing. According to PEMAS, this justifies Niterói’s housing
strategy that is more related to upgrading and relocation than integration. In addition, the
strategic plan for 2013 to 2033 calls for a curbing of “illegal occupations” through the definition
of AEIS.285 However, the plan also includes the goal of making housing policy more
participatory, and proposals considered in 2003 included the mapping of informal communities
as a method of encouraging their regularization, and of taking into account the existing built
environment when conducting community upgrades.286
Much of Niterói’s policy therefore prioritizes information gathering in informal
communities, as well as their relocation. These relocation efforts have manifested in recent years
in the municipality’s participation in federal housing programs. For example, the SMHRF287
currently administers the city’s participation in PMCMV. As part of this effort, the city launched
Programa Morar Melhor (Program Live Better) aiming to build 5,000 new housing units by
2016.288 The process of knowledge collection and creating official categories for informal
communities in Niterói therefore points to the use of such designations as a tool that justifies
relocation. Nonetheless, language in these same policies indicates that the city is open to
participatory development in informal communities – an encouraging development if
implementation follows institutional plans.
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Santa Cruz de la Sierra: Urban Planning, Integration, and Control
Unlike in Rio de Janeiro and Niterói, the location of informal settlements in Santa Cruz de
la Sierra is a product of the city’s history of urban planning. The most recent plan, the Plan
Techint, was approved in 1969 and organized the city according to a concentric zone model,
modeled after an early design of São Paulo, Brazil.289 This model plans urban space so that the
formal housing and economic markets operate within concentric circles radiating out from the
city center, relegating informal communities formed through urban migration to the city’s
periphery to beyond the city’s fourth “ring” (162).
Similarly to Brazil, Bolivia protects citizens’ rights to adequate housing at the federal
level. According to the Bolivian constitution, and cited in the 2012 law Regularización del
Derecho Propietario sobre Bienes Inmuebles Urbanos Destinados a Vivienda, “all people have
the right: to a dignified life, to private property and to habitat; and it is the obligation of the State
to guarantee and universalize the exercise of these rights.”290 In addition, Bolivia’s Plan de
Desarrollo Económico y Social: 2016-2020 to eliminate extreme poverty by 2025 addresses
housing as part of its goal for the universalization of basic services. The Law of Regularization
places the responsibility for land regularization and home provision on municipal governments.
In contrast to Rio’s approach to informality that focuses on upgrading as a development
strategy, the municipal government of Santa Cruz favors plans based on regularizing informal
communities as a means of controlling urban land, as does Niterói. The preoccupation with
regularization reveals the municipal desire for control of the land, and hints at the more pervasive
issue of lobby control of land speculation.291 Oligarchic private sector landowners control the
urban land market, and benefit from the capital gains of speculating on land occupied by
informal settlements – a significant political effort would be needed to overpower them.
Therefore, the city of Santa Cruz has not actually implemented any official policy regarding
informal settlements within the city. A 2011 study on the reality of informal housing in Santa
Cruz reveals that there are several national and municipal plans or organizations dedicated to
housing concerns. For example, the Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial (PLOT), a 2005 city
ordinance, demonstrates full municipal government understanding that informal settlements
exist, are subject to intense land speculation, and are unregulated. Among other strategies, PLOT
proposed creating a Corporation of Municipal Urban Development (CDU) in order to intervene
in the housing market and relocate informal communities to more ‘suitable’ areas (30-35). While
this plan, as well as its antecedents, recognizes that informal settlements could benefit from more
direct interaction with the government, the main method proposed to enact change is settlement
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relocation and the regulation of land speculation.292 However, he CDU was never supported by
the city government, and thus was never officially created.
This points to an underlying problem that pervades urban and housing policy in Santa
Cruz: urban planning is not considered as important as individual public works, such as public
market buildings (35). The new Plan de Desarrollo Municipal (PDM) adopted the projects
outlined in PLOT and focused on urban planning directed by a multidisciplinary team, but was
delayed in favor of construction projects and new public works. Therefore, although Bolivian
academics, policy-makers, and some municipal officials recognize urban planning as a strategy
to regulate and support those living in informality, the government as an institution is not willing
to invest in such plans. This may be due to negative pressure from landowners.
“In the popular cruceño collective imaginary, obtaining a home is a strictly personal and at most a
family problem, that must be resolved through personal effort, in a process of self construction
that lasts many years and that implies enormous effort and sacrifice for the citizens that involve
themselves in this adventure, for which there is no technical or economic support” (CEDURE
2011, 9).293

The attitude of the Santa Cruz government towards informality can also be observed in the
municipality’s relationship with urban markets. Kirshner (2010) provides a theory of the
regulation of informal markets by the municipal government.
“The organizations charged with managing urban growth and development – municipal officials
and planners – and traditionally powerful Santa Cruz civic institutions, such as the Comité Cívico
and the Cámara de Industria, Comercio, Servicios y Turismo (CAINCO) [Civic Committee and
the Chamber of Commerce] attempt to regulate the most visible aspects of the informal economy
through a new municipal plan to reorganize market networks” (Kirshner 2010, 152).

This regulation occurs through reorganization of large markets and forced vendor
relocation. Informal markets in Santa Cruz are often run by poor Andean migrants, and thus
become representative of occupation and cultural difference in the cruceño imaginary, as the
Andean and lowland cultures have different cultural identities. Indeed, the large urban informal
markets are conceived of as colla spaces (166). Hostility and group differentiation therefore
manifests spatially as well as culturally (158). In addition, public informal markets and street
vending occur in designated “public space” (173). Thus, definitions of the “public” also play into
the government’s interaction with informality. Importantly, public space – while technically a
space in which societal difference can be negotiated – is also a controlled space. Those that have
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the right to make use of public space are the citizens of society. Informal commerce in Santa
Cruz is thus officially viewed as a practice of sub-citizens. Kirshner analyses the work of another
scholar on Bolivian markets, concluding that:
“two factors are at work in the municipal government’s approach toward the public markets,
namely a perception and an ideological factor. First, it recognizes that it has a physical and social
problem on its hands, in which expanding markets occupy space, annex neighboring areas,
worsen congestion, and thwart efforts to create rational, orderly urban growth. There is also an
ideological issue at play, relating to the elite civic powers in the city and their opposition to
“unhygienic” and “informal” uses of public space, as well as to the rising political muscle of the
gremios and other associations of informal workers." (Kirshner 2010, 172)

Informality in Santa Cruz de la Sierra is thus approached as a justification for governmental
control of public space.
~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~
The policies of Rio de Janeiro, Niterói, and Santa Cruz de la Sierra reveal some
commonalities in municipal attitudes towards informal settlements. Although Rio’s and Niterói’s
planned policies regarding upgrading may be more effective integration interventions than Santa
Cruz’s preferred method of regularization and urban planning, there is evidence that all three
governments consider informal residents to be inferior to other urbanites. Non-participatory
interventions, forced removal of informal communities, and the control of public space reveal
these attitudes. In addition, government relationships with business interests often win out over
plans for the integration of informal settlements. In Rio de Janeiro, the possibility of international
investment in mega events led to the abandonment of one of the most progressive and
unprecedented integration plans in history. In Santa Cruz de la Sierra the interests of large
landowners are prioritized over those of people living in informality, also leading to the
dissolution of an informality integration plan. These commonalities indicate that there are
inherent challenges of government-led urban development due in part to the relationship between
private and public sectors, and that these struggles marginalize informal communities.
It is also noteworthy that the governments of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Rio de Janeiro, and
Niterói approach informality through the lens of land regularization. This is a strictly legalistic
consideration of informality. As discussed in Chapter 1, informality has social characteristics as
well as being an economic and spatially-associated condition. The fact that this view of informal
communities and the means through which they can be developed persists indicates that
informality itself is not well understood. Fischer also observes this to be true in her study of
informality in Brazilian cities.
“Land regularization – understood through the lens of Hernando de Soto’s theories about the legal
and bureaucratic sources of poverty – has come to be regarded as a kind of global panacea for the
urban slum, and the fact that these theories demonstrate little understanding of the actual function
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of informality, and show no signs of doing much to end extralegal land tenure in most Brazilian
cities, has not prevented them from dominating urban policy debates” (Fischer 2014, 50).294

Still, regularization is seen by some residents of informal communities as a tool through which
their physical existence may be legitimized, increasing the likelihood that government services
such as water and electricity access will be more readily supplied, and giving residents more
control over their property. Titles, although perhaps not as effective a development tool as once
believed, are a symbol of legitimacy. For example, a former president of the Residents’
Association of Morro do Palácio discussed the importance of discovering the real, legal name of
the community in order to be able to fight for the land regularization of the community.295
Although the informant sees the internal organization of the community as lesser or inferior to
more ‘formal’ organization – as a first step along the process of community development – in his
mind legalization is a main goal.
Conclusions
Widespread perceptions of informality in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio control the
social rhetoric about informality, which in turn influence the attitudes of governing bodies and
shape policy decisions that affect informal communities. The territorial stigmatization of these
communities therefore controls social perception of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, which
contributes to the perceived necessity to externally control these spaces through policy. From
public rhetoric surrounding violence and marginality in poor communities and the resulting
policies of control, it is clear that the government, policymakers, and the media produce and
reproduce rhetoric around informality designed to legitimize the control these policies engender
in Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Rio-Niterói. This dialogue interacts with and shapes the
commonly-held perceptions of the informal, in addition to the popularized social rhetoric
perpetuated in the media. Perception thus both influences the socially-imagined limitations of
informality, and seems to justify control. This works in conjunction with the unique forms of
identity production in delegitimized informal spaces (as explored in Chapter 2) to facilitate the
connection between delegitimized space and the marginalization of certain urban citizenships,
necessitating the development of insurgent citizenships. In addition, this chapter has also shown
that informality as a label is also mobilized as a legal tool for communities seeking
formalization. Resistance identity then becomes a means for fighting for the legitimization of
community citizenship within urban space.
These findings are supported by the 1976 study of favelas in Rio de Janeiro by Janice
Perlman. Perlman found a strong relationship between the idea of marginality and practices of
“othering”, which justified the relocation and removal of informal communities (2010, 12).
“Marginality thus moved beyond the simply descriptive to become a material and ideological
force” (12). In the present cases, informality and its perception have the same ideological force.
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Activating a Dichotomy: Reacting to the Narrative of Delegitimized Informality
In seeking to answer the question How does informality influence and operate as identity
in the social imaginary of urban Bolivia and Brazil?, this paper has revealed the dialectic of
power inherent in the designation and perception of informal urban spaces. Informal
communities are the sites of distinct forms of identity production due to the intersectionality of
marginalized identities that occur within them, the ways in which urban spatial marginality
informs residents’ relationship to place, and the effect of external perceptions of this
marginalization on the sense of self and community. This paper has argued that the label of
informality can then be mobilized in conjunction with these forms of identity production to
further marginalize or uplift citizens in delegitimized informal spaces.
There are two distinct veins in the nature and effectiveness of the activation of
informality as a tool of identity in Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Niterói-Rio de Janeiro. As a tool,
it is mobilized according to or against a common narrative of territorialized otherness that lives
in the urban social imaginary. This social narrative of informality is based on the intermingling
and territorialization of perceptions of race, violence, social and spatial peripherality, and
marginality. It is these perceptions that contribute to the delegitimization of forms of informality
(settlements, economies not beneficial to the elite, etc.), leading to the dichotomy of ‘legitimate’
and ‘illegitimate’ informality in urban space. Informality becomes a justification for perceptions
of community identity as negative, as well as for the creation of an identity that resists this
classification. These resistance identities become politically significant when they mobilize the
label of informality as a tool for acquiring recognition of community rights and claims to land.
The most visible activation of informality as an identity occurs when governments and
policy makers in Niterói-Rio and Santa Cruz institutionalize the societal narrative of informality.
The predominant perceptions of informality emerge as justifications for urban policy that
negatively affect the marginalized communities they purport to assist. In Rio and Niterói, this is
most obvious in governments’ forced evictions of historic favelas and emphasis on relocation
rather than formalization, and of the increased militarization of favelas through occupation by
UPPs. In Santa Cruz, this control is evident in the regulation of public space through urban
planning targeting informal markets. These institutional interactions with informality show that
policy has little nuance in how it conceives of residents of informal communities. The
governments of Santa Cruz and Niterói prioritize policy that addresses the violence and state of
irregulation of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, without taking into account effective internal
strategies of survival, or enacting robust participatory planning measures. The images of Plan
3000 and Morro do Palácio as violent and poor, both concepts which are racialized according to
the social contexts of each country, therefore have more weight in determining policy than do the
desires of the communities such policies affect. The label of “informal” or related terms such as
favela, subnormal agglomerations, AEIS (areas of special social interest) and ciudadela then
becomes a tool of the institutionalization of the narrative of delegitimized informality.
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Conversely, acting against this dominant narrative, informality is activated as an
empowering identity by residents of informal communities. “Informal” and its reclaimed
synonyms of favela, comunidade, and ciudadela are activated as rallying points for resistance
against the stigmatized narrative of illegitimacy. They signify the movement to consolidate
insurgent forms of citizenship into a cohesive community identity that captures the pride and
progress of community residents. In both Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio, informality is
activated in this way in the rhetoric of residents, as well as through the work of community
organizations. Community organizations are key in transforming the pieces of resistance
identities in Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio into project identities by working to improve the
image and reality of their community.296 The organizations act as museums and media outlets
that educate about the past and local knowledge, community centers that provide educational
services and places for congregation, and centers of pride that actively encourage community
members to see and work toward positive change. The reproduction of this rhetoric, as in Plan
3000’s La Calle or through the MACquinho, serves to directly counteract the pervasive narrative
of delegitimized informality. The project of self-organization is to create and promote a new
community narrative of self, and in turn, of the nature of informality.
It is these narratives that are the project identities of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio. In
both cases, the chosen form of differentiation from an identity of marginality is its aspirational
opposite – that of the socioeconomic “norm” (the non-marginalized). However, the goals of
these projects differ. Plan 3000 seeks to be incorporated into the societal norm of formality as in
the rest of Santa Cruz. This project is complicated by the diversity of ethnicities and cultures in
Bolivia, and their spatial differentiation within Plan 3000; on an individual level, many residents
identify primarily with their ethnicity and do not feel culturally integrated into cruceño life.
However, as a district that has developed intra-urban territorial interests and commonalities, its
culture, desires, and economy are more in line with that of the city as a whole. As it becomes
more physically integrated, so too does its culture and sense of self change. This can be
explained by the spatial relationship of Plan 3000 to Santa Cruz. The Plan’s initial physical
separation explains the ease with which distinctions were made between the community and the
city. The fact that the community today is becoming a more formal and economic part of the city
then also explains why some people see themselves as less separate and identify as cruceño.
However, this does not mean that the Plan’s identity is merging with that of Santa Cruz –- they
want to be their own municipality – simply that they seek to gain the legitimacy of the formal
sector. Conversely, Morro do Palácio desires equal treatment within Niterói, but the
marginalization of racial identity outweighs the importance of assimilation into formality. In
addition, its continued physical separation limits expansion, and explains why residents
distinguish between their community context and the identity of the rest of the city. Morro do
Palácio’s community identity thus places less importance on integration, instead prioritizing
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community power and internal development. The possibility of formalization and incorporation
of informal communities thus affects the nature of the project of the redefinition of self.
~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~
The comparison of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio reveals more than an understanding
of the dialectic of legitimization within urban space and intra-urban relations. Despite the many
contextual differences in the case cities and the communities of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio,
their similarities offer important lessons as to the nature of community identity in informal
communities.
The comparison of Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio is valid despite their obvious
differences in size, economic power, built environment, and ethnic makeup. The fact that both
communities continue to experience the same categories of marginalization – due to the
constructions of race, internal migration, perceptions and realities of violence, marginality, and
peripherality – is significant given their differences. Plan 3000, as a community that has
exploded in population and contributes significantly to the city’s economy, experiences the same
types of social marginalization as does Morro do Palácio. However, perhaps to due its physical
location in relation to the rest of the city which permits expansion, Plan 3000 is further along in
its economic development and sense of community power. In contrast, because Morro do Palácio
is located on a morro, the extent to which it can physically expand is limited. As a result, there is
no opportunity for palacianos to create significant sources of community income and
employment, such as a factory.
In addition, the threat of violence remains a concern in both Plan 3000 and Morro do
Palácio. In Morro do Palácio, residents no longer live under constant threat of stray bullets or
gang-related violence, although the possibility of experiencing violence in interactions with
UPPs or as a result of gang actions is still heightened. The threat is greater in Plan 3000, perhaps
due to its size and relative lack of policing. It is more difficult to control and regulate criminal
activity in the Plan, a sprawling and confusing section of Santa Cruz.
One of the more significant conclusions of this research is the similarities in the
relationship between identity and internal migration in each case. Residents of each community
were overwhelmingly internal migrants, or the descendants of migrants. Those who had migrated
to the city and their community before reaching young adulthood were more likely to identify as
being from the urban center (Niterói-Rio or Santa Cruz de la Sierra), while those who moved to
the community as adults were more likely to identify with their state or department of origin. For
children of migrants within each city, they were more likely to identify with the place-based
identity of the city in which they grew up, although some also identified with the place of origin
and the culture of their parents. The only people interviewed who identified with the informal
community as part of their personal identity – in essence, as a determinant of where they were
‘from’ – were those of the younger generation who had been born and raised in Plan 3000 or
Morro do Palácio. Place of origin thus plays an important role in personal identity within these
informal communities. Given the distinct racial dynamics and contexts of migration in Bolivia
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and Brazil, this finding indicates that there are compelling commonalities involved in the internal
migratory experience of rural-urban migration in both countries. In addition, since identification
with their communities as places was not individually salient for many interviewees, this
indicates that the relationship between informality and identity in these cases is principally
articulated at the community level, justifying the community scale comparison.
The marginalization of informality means that community action and support is more
necessary than in other contexts. In both cases, the initial memories of community marginality
were tied to collaboration among community members and the formation of networks of mutual
support and organization that enabled survival and eventually community development. Identity
on the community level is therefore more based in relationships. To that end, the work of
community organizations is the principal means through which community identity has been
articulated and continues to manifest. Identification as a cohesive community ‘unit’ remains a
project in progress. This is also affected by the level of internal migration into informal
communities. As destinations for internal migrants, cohesion of identity within informal
communities battles against a constant influx of new residents. The continual process of creating
a sense of community is therefore also aided by community organizations, which develop and
promote positive representation.
However, it is also important to recognize that identity is activated differently depending
upon the context of an individual’s experience. Residents of both communities indicated that
when speaking to people from outside their communities, they are sometimes reluctant to reveal
where they live for fear of judgment and the repercussions of the negative perceptions of Plan
3000 and Morro do Palácio. In these moments, their identity is determined by external
perceptions based in stereotypes of violence and marginality. In addition, their sense of
belonging to a community is most relevant in this realm – when interacting with residents of
their city from outside the community.
Informal communities are thus places in which racial identity, relative geographic
location, violence, and economic marginality all intersect. The informal then becomes racialized,
stigmatized as separate, dangerous, and inherently poor. In Plan 3000 and Morro do Palácio,
multifaceted resistance identities have developed as a reaction to the marginalization that is
socially legitimized and perpetuated by the negatively perceived “informality”. Community
organizations then work to formally acknowledge community-wide resistance and provide
avenues for amplifying this power, contributing to the project of community cohesion and
narrative resistance.

Gempler 108
Reflections on Informality
This exploration of informality in two distinct national contexts and urban systems has
revealed that informality itself is complex and multifaceted. The notion of informality as a tool
supports the idea that informality is pervasive throughout space297, and is legitimized or
delegitimized as a method of control and marginalization, which removes informal communities
from the responsibility of governing institutions and limits the possibilities for their economic
and social advancement. Considering the pervasiveness of informality indicates that it is perhaps
more useful and more responsible to conceive of urban space as I have done throughout this
paper – as legitimized or delegitimized. Rather than the label ‘informal’ which connotes
inferiority and devaluation, ‘delegitimized’ implies an actor at fault; a responsibility which has
yet to be or has purposefully not been met. This more accurately captures the dialectic of power
between formal and informal space.
The terms ‘legitimized’ and ‘delegitimized’ are closely related to Wacquant’s idea of
territorial stigmatization. Chapter 3 argued that territorial stigmatization is a method of social
control of informal space, as perceived stigma contributes to the justification of policy that
‘otherizes’ informality. Conceiving of space in terms of legitimization therefore communicates
that there is an uneven balance of power in the control of urban space – not all urban space
allows for the same possibilities of belonging; of citizenship. This indicates that the
delegitimization of space also delegitimizes citizens within those spaces.
In addition, focusing on ‘delegitimized’ and ‘legitimized’ space better communicates the
nature of citizenship and belonging in cities. According to Holston's definition of citizenship,
only legitimated citizens occupy formal space; marginalized urbanites are relegated to the
informal. Approaching citizenship in this way recognizes the power of labels as a tool for
regulating urban space. Given that Holston indicates that informality elicits insurgent
citizenships, it follows that insurgent forms of citizenship occur where the space of citizenship is
delegitimized and devalued. Therefore, as a label, informality is central to projects of
representation that depict delegitimized space as negative or positive. Informality thus serves as
means to shape the narrative of urban citizenship.
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(See Macalester College hard copy)
Figure i. Map of District 8, or Plan 3000. Gobierno Municipal Autónomo de Santa Cruz de la
Sierra

(See Macalester College hard copy)
Figure ii. Map of Niterói. Prefeitura de Niterói, 2010
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Figure 2.1. MACquinho, Morro do Palácio, Niterói – designed by Oscar Niemeyer. Photo taken
by author.
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Figure 2.2. View from the MACquinho towards the MAC (also designed by Niemeyer) and the
Baía da Guanabara, Niterói. Photo taken by author.

(See Macalester College hard copy)
Figure 3.1. “See where fleeing criminals go are going.” A graphic from a Rio newspaper shows
that Morro do Palácio is a destination for criminals fleeing favela pacification in Rio (Câmara de
Segurança da Região Oceânica).

(See Macalester College hard copy)
Figure 3.2. This newspaper graphic shows that Morro do Palácio, pictured in the bottom-left
photograph, was controlled by the same gang that operates in Rocinha, one of the largest and
most famous favelas in Rio (Câmara de Segurança da Região Oceânica).

